Difficulty of the “Favoured-nation” clause.

Suppose, again, Russia, on the Black Sea, imposed a duty of 50 per cent. on manufactures, we must retaliate by a duty of 50 per cent. on Russian corn and timber. We must, in fact, have distinct treaties and distinct tariffs, and there would hence result a most complicated system of international commerce. Reciprocity meant that or nothing. But, after thus stating his views on reciprocity of produce, Mr. Wilson admitted that by imposing restrictions on foreign ships corresponding with those imposed on our own, we should have the advantage of dealing with the same interest, and the weapon would be more likely to be effectual, in that those, for whose sake duties were imposed abroad, would be subject to corresponding disadvantages in this country. But he was wholly opposed to reciprocity even in shipping. He had shown what variety of treaties would be required if the principle of reciprocity was adopted with regard to manufactures and produce; and he felt convinced that a corresponding or analogous difficulty would arise from adopting that principle in the case of shipping. Very intricate and complicated regulations would be required. Thus, supposing we found a country disposed to give all, we ourselves would be obliged to give all. But then it must be borne in mind that there were twenty countries with whom we had already treaties, and to whom we were bound to extend the advantages obtainable by the most favoured nations: and, therefore, if, now, we gave privileges to any one country, we must extend the same to all the other countries which stood in the same position.

Suppose, he said, that Hamburg were to give this country all that it required, and that, in return, its ships were placed on the same footing as British ships; what guarantee should we have that a third country, which had given us nothing, would not derive the same advantages as the shipowners of Hamburg, or that the sugar of Java, and the coffee of South America, would not be brought to this country in their ships? There would be no end of evasion. The United States would reciprocate; Prussia would do the same; Russia and the ports of the Hanseatic League would follow their example: what, therefore, had this country to fear? It was admitted that we should not expect the same reciprocity from France, Spain, or Belgium; but, in these cases, should we be really worse off than we are now? At this moment France and Spain had great privileges in this country. France had the right, not according to treaty, but from the general policy of our Navigation Laws, to send her produce direct to this country in her own ships. She, however, availed herself to a very small extent of this privilege. Nine-tenths of the importations of Spanish colonial sugars came likewise in British bottoms. As far as regards the reservations at the discretion of the Queen in Council, Free-trade unrestricted would most assuredly be the rule and restriction the exception.

Marquess of Granby.

The Marquess of Granby followed on the side of Protection, urging the mischief that would result from the great number of persons thrown out of employment; he pointed out how uncertain were the advantages to be derived, and the reality of its evils; but despite of disadvantages, if Englishmen were but true to themselves and their country, he felt that we should be able to weather the impending storm, and retain the command of that “glorious element” which was our natural protector, so that the flag of England might still for years to come “wave triumphant over every sea.”

Mr. Cardwell.

Mr. Cardwell, although he could not share in the gloomy apprehensions of Mr. Herries or the eloquent doubts of the Marquess of Granby, felt the importance of this question and its bearing on the mercantile interests of England and her colonies. He warned the House of the danger of not taking timely steps with regard to what was called the “long-voyage” clause, which some of the witnesses before the Lords’ Committee regarded as a fundamental principle of the Navigation Laws; and he showed that the effect of maintaining this clause would be to defeat the policy of the warehousing system, and rob us of a large share of the commerce of the world. There was nothing more important than that great interest known by the denomination of the “warehousing system,” which had been the growth of comparatively recent years and was the offspring of a judicious relaxation in the Navigation Laws: this system he held had made this country the entrepôt between regions furnishing tropical produce and the great consuming countries of Europe. Mr. Cardwell then urged the importance of the Canadian claims, and described the keen competition going on between Canada and the United States.

Mr. Henley

Mr. Henley went into a long argument against the Bill, especially animadverting upon Mr. Wilson’s having derided reciprocity, while nevertheless the Bill legislated for it, and Government had been in correspondence with foreign Governments for the purpose of securing it. “What did the Government intend to do,” he asked, “on the subject of impressment? If the masters were to be taken from a superior class, were they still liable to be impressed?”[109] The experiment of Free-trade had not in Mr. Henley’s opinion been sufficiently tried to justify the application of that principle to another great interest. If the country were polled, every man, he was sure, would cheerfully pay the hardly-appreciable advance in prices, rather than run the risk of a failure in an experiment so dangerous. No one had attempted to deny that obstruction was here, and inconvenience there; but when you came to balance the possible risk with the possible gain, no one would be disposed to run that risk, which he for one feared must take place if the measure were carried. It was a great interest to tamper with, and involved not only capital and industry, but the national defences.

Mr. Gladstone.