“The plan proposed by Mr. Taylor,” they continued, “evidently requires great and combined means to give it even a prospect of success; we are of opinion that his calculations are far too sanguine and that his plan is on too large a scale. These are, however, objections to his scheme which may be easily obviated. In the first instance, we must give our opinion as relates to India that the undertaking may and should be conducted on a more limited scale, and subsequently extended according to circumstances. In transmitting these proposals for your consideration, we cannot avoid expressing our decided opinion that almost incalculable advantages may be anticipated from a well established steam communication by the Red Sea, and our earnest hope that, unless other proposals from individuals have been entertained and their plans put in progress, and in case Mr. Taylor’s schemes are viewed as either inexpedient or impracticable, that every support will be afforded by your Honourable Court to maintain this desirable communication by vessels in the public service.”[308]
Supineness of Court of Directors.
But the temper of the Court of Directors was still strikingly in contrast with the earnestness of the Bombay Government. They do not seem to have cared much about the development of the commercial resources of their empire, and so the recommendations of the Governor and Council at Bombay were laid aside for future consideration; indeed, it was not until, after nearly two years, that they even acknowledged the letters they had received. The expense, they averred, exceeded the amount they cared to risk; while, in the proposed undertaking, they had evidently little confidence, as they urged that “the loss from defective vessels and engines is as likely to occur as ever.” They, nevertheless, at last affirmed that they were not insensible to the advantages of rapid communication with India nor of the importance of steam for that purpose.
Their views.
“We are also disposed to believe,” they added, “that a steam communication by the Red Sea, and still more, if it should be found practicable, by the Persian Gulf and the River Euphrates, would open the way to other improvements, and would ultimately redound to the benefit of this country as well as of India; and, if our finances were in a flourishing state (they were always poor, though ever rolling in wealth), we might probably feel it a duty to incur even the enormous outlay which we have specified (100,000l.). In the present condition of our resources, we cannot, however, think the probable difference of time in the mere transmission of letters a sufficient justification for the expense. We cannot anticipate that the return in postage and passengers would pay more than a very small portion of the charge.” But happily, after other observations, they concluded by saying that, “at the same time we deem the subject too important to be lost sight of or hastily dismissed.”[309]
Official report of the first voyages of the Hugh Lindsay, 1830.
In the meantime the Hugh Lindsay (a war steam-vessel, built of teak at Bombay in 1829 for the service of the East India Company), had fortunately been despatched[310] by the Bombay Government under command of Captain J. H. Wilson, from Bombay to Suez and back—a voyage, I may add, which was twice repeated before the Court of Directors gave any instructions on the subject, though one, too, materially tending to solve some at least of the difficulties they had contemplated. It was on the second of these occasions that Sir John Malcolm and his suite made the overland passage to England.
“When it was determined,” remarks Captain Wilson, “that the Hugh Lindsay should attempt the voyage to Suez, it became necessary to put on board double the quantity of coal the vessel was built to carry, to do which, a great part of the space originally intended for accommodation was appropriated to the stowage of coal; water also was necessary, sufficient for use until the vessel should reach land in the event of a break-down between Bombay and the first depôt; as also stores and provisions for the whole voyage to and from the Red Sea.”[311]
Captain Wilson, however, accomplished the passage from Bombay to Aden, a distance of 1641 miles, in ten days nineteen hours, though only six hours’ coals remained on board when he arrived at that port. At Aden the Hugh Lindsay obtained a fresh supply, coal depôts having been established in anticipation of her arrival at that place, as well as at Jiddah, Cossier, and Suez. Other difficulties, however, had to be overcome, as scarcely a day passed without it being necessary to stop the engines to put the paddle-wheels in order, the boards of which were constantly getting loose. At Aden, Captain Wilson was detained five days and twenty hours in receiving the necessary supply of coal, owing to the want of means at the place for shipping it and other obstacles. The passage from Aden to Mocha roads, where he had despatches to land, was accomplished in twelve hours, and thence to Jiddah, a distance of 557 miles, in four days twelve hours. Here his vessel was detained four days and a half in obtaining a supply of coals; in five days more he reached Suez, having performed the voyage from Bombay to Suez in twenty-one days six hours’ steaming, or, including stoppages, in thirty-two days sixteen hours.
Had a steamer been ready at Alexandria the mails (consisting of 306 letters, the postage on which amounted to 1176 rupees), which could have been conveyed thence in three days, would in twenty-five more days have reached England. Thus, in spite of the delays at the depôts, the communication between India and England could have been accomplished in sixty-one days. The return passage of the Hugh Lindsay to Bombay occupied thirty-three days, including stoppages of nineteen days, or fourteen days’ steaming; and, under all the circumstances, the whole voyage was considered far from unsatisfactory;[312] one of the subsequent voyages, to Cossier[313] (300 miles below the Isthmus), was accomplished in twenty-two days, including five days’ detention at the coaling stations.