[163] In 1833, Mr. Randall designed and built the Wisconsin, 218 feet in length and 38 feet in width, at Detroit, Michigan, and ran her successfully, under his own command, through three of the lakes between Buffalo and Chicago, carrying freight and passengers, in spite of strong head winds, on round trips of 2000 miles, averaging a speed quite as great as the maximum contemplated many years afterwards by the projectors of the Great Eastern. In 1845 he designed and navigated in the same trade the Empire of 251 feet in length, with a beam of 38 feet, at an average speed of 16 statute miles per hour. Soon afterwards the City of Buffalo and the Western Metropolis, constructed according to his design, were sent afloat. They were sister ships, each 340 feet in length with a beam of 42 feet, and far in advance of any ship England had then afloat, while their draught of water, when laden, was only 9½ feet. By a report which appeared in the Cleveland Herald (U.S.) [and there is no reason to doubt its accuracy], the trip between Buffalo and Cleveland was made at an average speed of 21 miles an hour by the Metropolis, while the City of Buffalo made a similar voyage, averaging still greater speed in the ordinary course of trade. Nor were Mr. Randall’s practical experiments in vessels of similar model and design confined to the lakes, for he commanded the Yankee Blade, a vessel of still larger dimensions, with a draft of 11 feet of water, on her voyage from New York to California round Cape Horn, encountering, successfully, a gale in which many vessels foundered; afterwards, he continued to ply with her for some years on the station between San Francisco and Panama.
CHAPTER IV.
Struggle between Great Britain and United States for the Atlantic carrying trade—English shipowners cleave to Protection—“Baltimore clippers” and “American liners”—The Savannah, the first American Atlantic steamer, 1819—The Curaçoa, 1829—The Royal William, 1833, from Quebec—The Sirius and Great Western, 1838—Successful voyages of these vessels—Details of Great Western—The Royal William, second of that name, the first steam-ship from Liverpool, 1838, followed by the Liverpool—Origin of the Cunard Company—Contract for conveyance of mails—Conditions—Names and particulars of the first steamers in this service—The Britannia—Comparative results of different vessels—Building (1839) and loss (1841) of the President—Building of the Great Britain in 1843—Advantages of iron ships—American auxiliary screw steamer Massachusetts, 1845—American line of steamers to Europe, 1847—First ocean race won by the English—Not satisfied with Cunard line, the Americans determine to start one of their own—Reasons for so doing—American shipowners complain justly of the “Protective” policy of their own Government—Nevertheless adopted—Collins line established—Original terms of subsidy—Dimensions of their steamers—Mr. Faron’s visit to England—Details of the build of these vessels—Engines—Frame sustaining engines and dead weight—Cost of steamers greatly increased by demand for increased speed—Further details of competing lines—Speed obtained and cost—Great competition, 1850-1852—Results of it.
Struggle between England and the United States for the Atlantic carrying trade.
Having furnished a general outline of the rise and progress of propulsion by steam on the rivers, coasts, and lakes of the United States of America, and traced its advance in Great Britain to the period when the superiority of the screw over the paddle-wheel, and of iron over wood, had come to be generally acknowledged, I shall now ask my readers to accompany me while I endeavour to describe the great contest between these two countries for the carrying trade of the Atlantic. It is a grand story to tell, one far more worthy of record than the wars for maritime supremacy between Rome and Carthage, or than, perhaps, some wars of more recent times which, without any apparently useful object, have stained land and sea with the blood alike of the victor and the vanquished, rendering desolate many a once happy home.
The war I have now to relate was a far nobler conflict, consisting as it did in the struggle between the genius, scientific skill, and industry of the people of two great nations, commenced, too, and, continued throughout without bloodshed and with a fair field, neither country having, in the direct trade, any special legislative advantages.
English shipowners cleave to Protection.
Though the Americans still retain the whole of their river, lake, and coasting trade, including even the distant voyage between New York and California, for the immediate benefit of their own shipping, the vessels of both nations conduct on equal terms the intercourse between the mother-countries, and have done so for more than half a century. But when, towards the close of the War of Independence, the struggle for supremacy commenced, the shipping of both England and America were, in all branches of their maritime commerce, under the leading-strings of their respective legislators. England would not then allow American vessels to trade with most of her vast possessions and, while thus nursing her shipowners, prevented the mass of her people from deriving the advantages invariably flowing from a natural and wholesome competition. Nor did she, indeed, confer any real benefit on this favoured class: on the contrary, she taught them to lean on Protection, instead of depending on their own skill and industry. The consequences were apparent in even the earlier results of this struggle. Having ample fields for employment exclusively their own, English shipowners did not enter with their wonted energy, into the direct carrying trade between their own country and America, which was so rapidly developed after the Americans had become independent; they remained satisfied with those branches of commerce expressly secured to them by law, just as the boy too frequently does who, receiving a small patrimony by his parents, cares not to exert himself to increase it and, consequently, leaves others not so highly favoured, to surpass him in the race of competition for wealth and independence. Thus the shipowners of Great Britain did not care to continue their vessels in the trade with America in a competition, on equal terms, with those of that country, especially when they found they would have to produce a superior class of vessel and to use extra exertions, to make this trade pay as well as did their protected branches of oversea commerce without the additional trouble of “improvements.” It was otherwise with the shipowners of the United States, for there was then no other branch of oversea trade where the laws of nations allowed them to compete on equal terms with foreign vessels.
“Baltimore clippers,” and “American liners.”
Although possessing the advantage of vast forests of timber for the construction of their ships, the American shipbuilders were obliged to import their iron[164] from Great Britain, their hemp from Russia, and many other articles necessary for the equipment of their vessels from other and distant countries; they did not, therefore, especially as skilled labour was higher at home than in Europe, engage in the vigorous though peaceful struggle, I am about to describe, with any special advantages, but, being equal in energy and industry, they had the incalculable advantage of being obliged to depend on themselves. They, consequently, set to work to construct that description of merchant-vessel likely to yield the most remunerative returns, adopting the best mechanical contrivances within their reach, so as to reduce navigation to the smallest cost consistent with safety and efficiency; and the world soon saw the results of their labours in their celebrated “Baltimore clippers” and the still more celebrated “American liners,” which for a considerable period almost monopolised the carrying trade between Great Britain and the States.