History of merchant shipping and ancient commerce, Volume 4 (of 4)

by W. S. Lindsay

STEAMER “WASHINGTON.”

Hitherto the American Government had been opposed in principle to all subsidies, but the vast results which accrued to the material interests of the United States from the extensive employment of steam navigation, effected concurrently a great change in the policy of the Federal Legislature and soon rendered it necessary to subsidize vessels of their own for the conveyance of their mails to Great Britain. If, before the period of the introduction of steam, Congress had exhibited an undue parsimony in providing funds in any form for their national navy, it is certain that a more liberal policy now prevailed.

Not satisfied with the Cunard line, the Americans determine to start one of their own.

Ocean steam navigation was now adopted by the Americans for the joint purpose of extending and advancing the commercial and other interests of the country, and more especially to provide a marine force which might be easily made available for the protection “of American rights;” and the attainment of this two-fold object was the motive which, in the opinion of Congress, justified the application of public funds in aid of private enterprise. Nor was the argument, once so popular in England, overlooked that the money so advanced would ultimately be reimbursed by saving the expense of a standing fleet to the extent of the number of the vessels subsidized in the conveyance of the mails, while encouraging commerce and the arts during the time of peace.

Reasons for so doing.

The Americans also now complained (they had not thought of it before) that the ocean mails along their southern coasts had been placed in the hands of foreign carriers,[194] sustained and protected by the British Government, under the forms of contracts to carry the British mails; while the Cunard line, between Liverpool and Boston viâ Halifax, constituted the only medium of regular steam navigation between the United States and Europe. In this way it was alleged that the commercial interests of the United States were on one side entirely at the mercy of British steamers which plied along the southern coast of the United States, entering their ports at pleasure, and thereby acquiring an intimate knowledge of the soundings and other peculiarities of the American harbours, a process which might prove highly injurious to America in the event of a war with Great Britain: while, on the other, danger was incurred by a foreign line of steamers carrying the ocean mails, under the liberal encouragement of the British Government, and thus threatening to monopolize by steam the mail postage and freight between the two countries.

Under these somewhat hazardous circumstances to the commercial and political interests of the United States, it became necessary to decide whether American commerce should continue to be “thus tributary to British maritime supremacy,” or an American medium of communication should be established through the intervention of the Federal Government in the form of loans in aid of individual enterprise. The Americans now felt that unless they departed from their previous policy, they could not contend successfully against the Cunard line of packets, which received a large subsidy from the English Government.

It was humiliating, they also argued, to their pride as a great maritime people, that foreigners and commercial rivals should wrest from them the virtual monopoly of ocean steam conveyance, especially between the United States and Europe, as well as between the West Indies and South America. But, in reviewing this question, their statesmen and politicians might have perceived without prejudice, that England has acted upon the same liberal policy in furnishing means to establish ocean lines to other parts of the world where American rivalry has no place; therefore, the paragraph about the “Queen of the Ocean levying her imposts upon the industry and intelligence of all the nations that frequent the highway of the world,”[195] is merely a rhetorical flight, with no foundation in fact, apparently introduced into their official reports in order to reconcile the ignorant people of the Western States to the payment of a tax for services performed, by which they would be but indirectly and remotely benefited.

American ship-owners complain justly of the “Protective” policy of their own Government.

Moreover, it was urged, in favour of the principle of subsidies, that the American sailing packets, though undoubtedly vessels of unrivalled beauty and swiftness, were fast losing the most valuable portion of their trade through the competition of steamers under a foreign flag; but, so far from this being an argument in favour of subsidizing vessels of their own of a similar description, the shipowners of New York and Boston and in all the leading American ports, who held the sailing-ships as a property, naturally complained that the United States’ Government should improperly interfere by a protective system, which would inflict a double injury upon them, and insisted that such matters should be left entirely to individual enterprise, which, in their opinion, becomes paralyzed under the effects of Government patronage bestowed upon some to the exclusion of others. To all these, and similar complaints from other quarters, the Government answered that the system was deemed to be not only calculated to awaken and reward the enterprise of American citizens, but avoid the expense of keeping on hand, in time of peace, a large and useless military marine, which could only be preserved in a condition of efficiency by a vast annual outlay of public money. The Government therefore came, perhaps reluctantly, to the opinion that these ocean facilities should exist through their intervention, more especially as they were beyond the capabilities of private means.