That my readers may understand more thoroughly the nature and value of these regulations, I furnish[222] for their information the more important heads of the instructions given to all the commanders of the Cunard ships. They are clear and to the point and, though every person on board is subordinate to the commander, the engineer also receives printed instructions for his guidance. Distinct regulations are laid down for exercising the boats and fire-pumps, and for their prompt and efficient use in case of accident:[223] even the duties of the stewards and servants are as clearly defined, so that in the cabin the same quiet and order prevails as in all other parts of the ship.
Neglect of these or similar orders has too often led to the most serious consequences; hence, in all the ships of the Cunard Company, as on the Transatlantic ships, generally, they are enforced even to the most minute detail. Any negligence with regard to them would be severely reprimanded, and any second offence or any wilful neglect, would be punished by disrating or dismissal from the service. Every person on board from the captain to the cook’s mate knows this: consequently, these regulations do not hang neglected on the walls as regulations of the same kind too frequently do in too many other vessels, they are carefully studied, as every man on board knows full well that they must be attended to. Nor does the care of the Company for the safety of their ships and the lives of their passengers end here. To avoid as far as possible collision at sea they have within the last two or three years issued a notice, which is advertised almost daily in the leading public journals, of the course their ships will pursue in their passages across the Atlantic.[224]
Most disasters may be prevented by foresight, &c.
Though the “dangers of the sea” are proverbial, they might be reduced by at least two-thirds of their present amount. This is neither an exaggerated nor a haphazard statement, for upon a close examination of the wreck returns, it will be found that a still larger proportion could be prevented. A large volume might be indeed written to advantage on this important subject. But as our space is limited, and, having already ([vol. iii. chap. xvii.]) directed the attention of my readers to it, I shall only now ask them to turn over in their minds the too frequent accounts of shipwrecks which appear in the public journals, and such expressions as “drunkenness,” “overloading,” “negligence,” “incompetency,” “fire,” “collision,” and “unseaworthy ships and sailors,” will recur to their recollection as the alleged causes of too many of these disasters. This is no overdrawn picture, it is but too true.[225]
With these facts in view, and having before them the regulations of the Cunard Company with the knowledge, also, of the perfect safety with which their ships have traversed, at the highest rate of speed for a long series of years, one of the most stormy oceans; one, too, where icebergs abound, and where far more ships navigate than anywhere else, they may ask themselves with advantage this question and study it in their own minds: Cannot this melancholy list of maritime casualties be materially reduced? It can and must. Opinions may differ widely as to the most effective mode of carrying into practice the means at our disposal for bringing about a more satisfactory state of things than exists at present. But the work has to be done, and ought to be done, when the great fact, which cannot be too often repeated, is considered that the Cunard Company’s steamers have for thirty-five years constantly traversed the Atlantic without the loss of the life of a passenger, or of a letter entrusted to their care.
Success depends on fitting means.
Some persons may say that this arises from extraordinary “good luck.” As a rule, I have no faith in such old sayings; good or bad luck are expressions only applicable to games of chance where no skill, genius, industry, or prudence are required, and where every man has an equal opportunity of winning a prize. In all other matters success depends on the means applied to obtain it. And there can be no doubt that the freedom from accident on board of the ships of the Cunard Company may be attributed, almost entirely, to the wise measures adopted to prevent casualties, and to the rigour with which they are enforced. If this conclusion is sound and borne out by the facts, why should we not make the rules of that company or similar rules adopted by other steam lines, the bases of our maritime legislation, especially in passenger ships, and enforce them by legislative enactments? We could thus dispense with a large portion of the confused mass of maritime legislation now in force, and from its extent, in too many cases, practically worthless.[226]
With regard to the seaworthiness, of a ship and the competency of her crew, it would, while maintaining the valuable existing laws for the examination of the officers, and the engagement and discharge of the seamen, be desirable to sweep away the great bulk of the legislative technical details, which even Parliament in its wisdom knows little about, and require shipowners to produce vessels in all respects seaworthy, under heavy penalties for negligence, while leaving them to manage their own affairs as to the best mode of construction, number, and efficiency of crew, outfits, load line, and so forth. Such matters cannot be effectually dealt with by Act of Parliament; but, if they could, is it just, is it proper, that the nation should be required to take upon itself responsibilities, essentially, belonging to individuals? If it does, we shall most assuredly create greater dangers and bring about greater misfortunes and calamities, than those we attempt to obviate by well-meant but injudicious legislation.
Cunard line shows what can be done.
The case of the Cunard Company is a striking instance of what individuals can do. Legislative enactments are not required to regulate the conduct of such men as constitute the managing owners of this company, nor of that of the great majority of British shipowners. They know that a good ship, well managed and well found, is a much better investment than a bad one. But they likewise know, and therefore the Government can always depend upon the support of such men in any wise and necessary legislative measure, that there are interlopers in their trade who “go down to the sea in ships and do business on the mighty waters” of quite as knavish a character and, even more heartless, than the swindlers who concoct joint stock undertakings on shore to rob the widow of her mite and the fatherless children of their daily bread: they know, also, that there are very bad men who send their ships to sea to be lost, and villains who actually scuttle them. Nor are they unaware that, among their number, there are men who smile when their ships are lost because they are well insured.[227] Therefore, so far from objecting to general laws of even a much more stringent character than those at present in force, they would welcome them if, by their rigorous enforcement, the perpetration of crime could be more effectually checked. If, for instance, punishment was made more certain and severe, bad men would hesitate before they over-insured their ships in the hope of realising profits out of disasters, especially where loss of life occurs. It is only a question of degree between the man who smiles when his ship founders, and the rogue who dispatches her for the purpose of being cast away; and Parliament, when it again deals with the loss of life and property at sea, might do well to direct its attention more than has hitherto been done to over-insurance, and to the insurance laws of our own and other countries. To limit the amount insured to the honest value of the article thus protected from loss, may appear a simple enough matter, but the whole subject is surrounded with difficulties. It must not, therefore, be hastily dealt with, and before any legislation is attempted, should be fully investigated, either by a committee of the House of Commons or by a Royal Commission.