On the following morning the advanced guard consisted of a troop of the Royal Lancers—the light companies of the 43rd and 59th regiments of Native Infantry—some sappers and miners—and four 12-pounders. The main body consisted of the 9th Lancers—43rd and 59th regiments of Native Infantry—and six 12-pounders. The rear-guard consisted of a troop of the 9th—one company from each of the Infantry regiments—and two 12-pounders: Captain Spottiswoode, 9th Lancers, an able and most intelligent officer, acting as major of brigade. Here was a respectable force of nearly 3,000 men and twelve guns, or four to each thousand men, being above Napoleon's proportion, which was only three to 1,000.
It will be seen that we began the campaign with an artillery very inferior to that of the Sikhs. In fact, if calibres are reckoned, we, probably, were in the minority as one to three. I shall, in the sequel, prove these facts. But to proceed:
It will appear strange to the European reader when he hears that the whole tract of country between the Sutlej and the Jumna, including the protected Sikh states, which were under our control, as well as our protection, had been in the possession of the East India Company since the year 1809, or for thirty-six years before this period; and that, nevertheless, troops marching to join the army, in a direct line, sixty miles off, were not even aware that the Sikhs had crossed the Sutlej; and that, moreover, two battles had been fought, that of Moodkee, on the 18th, and that of Ferozeshah on the 21st and 22nd of December, the latter being one of the most deadly contested actions ever fought in India. I have before stated that the 9th Lancers had been ordered from Meerut, and did march on the 25th of November; that this line corps, being unfortunately ordered back, did not leave Meerut the second time until the 11th of December. Here was a loss of sixteen days: hence it is clear, that, as the regiment heard firing, or sounds arising from the explosion of powder mines on the 21st of December, it would have been present in the battles of Moodkee and Ferozeshah, had not its march been countermanded.
Now the order to return to Meerut was received on the 27th of November. To what circumstance was this to be attributed? The Sikhs did not cross the Sutlej until the 13th of December, or sixteen days after the 27th of November; and, allowing the order for the return to be dated the 25th of November, there certainly was not any crossing of the Sikhs at that time. It is positively stated, by a staff officer, that Lord Hardinge did not send the order. Although a Governor-General can send such an order direct, yet all military men here know that the Commander-in-chief is the channel for transmitting such orders. At the same time it is an established rule in the Indian army that a Commander-in-chief cannot order any troops on service without the sanction of the Governor-General, or of the government. Even in the common biennial or triennial relief the order is prefaced with the words: "With the sanction of government." The Governor-General being, in the present instance, on the field, was, de facto, the government. As Louis XIV. said: L'état? C'est moi.
Great uncertainty if not mystery prevailed in our army as to the probability of the Sikhs crossing the Sutlej. The Blue Book comes to our aid in deciding upon such a probability. It was argued that in 1843 the Sikhs did threaten to cross, but thought better of it and forebore; and therefore they might do the same now. But all the politicals knew well enough that the Punts and Punchees were no longer under the control of the Durbar as they were in 1843, but were more likely than not, to act in open defiance of it.
There were two officers, however, of great political talent, whose official position enabled them to know more of the feelings of the Sikhs, and of the probability of such a step than most others; one was Major G. Broadfoot of the 34th Madras Native Infantry, who had held the office of British Agent for Sikh affairs since November 1844, and who had acted as engineer in the celebrated defence of Jellalabad, the heroes of which obtained the well merited Roman distinction of a mural crown; the other was Captain P. Nicolson, 28th Bengal Native Infantry who had been appointed his assistant. Captain Nicolson was in Affghanistan in 1838-39, and was deputed to conduct the traitor Dost Mahomed Khan to Calcutta, and afterwards to Saharunpore. This officer had had seven years' experience of the politics of the Affghans and the Sikhs. At this juncture he was with Major General Sir John H. Littler at Ferozepore. He was in the daily receipt of intelligence from Lahore, and knew that the Sikhs would cross, for he wrote to Calcutta on the 9th of October, 1845, that "he believed the Sikhs would cross." What! because Major Broadfoot knew that the Sikhs had made an empty threat to cross in 1843, was it therefore improbable, that, being encamped for a long time, on the right bank of the Sutlej, menacing the Durbar at Lahore, from whence they marched in defiance of their government and of their chief, whom they compelled to join them, they would execute their threat under these circumstances?
Major Broadfoot was the Governor-General's agent, and as such was the officer to whom he looked for intelligence, Captain Nicolson was his subordinate; the Major doubted the Captain's intelligence, because he had received no other information to induce him to believe that the rebellious and infatuated Khalsa (or royal) troops would dare to cross. If they threatened to cross in 1843 without carrying that threat into execution, why might they not do the same in 1845? But this was not good logic; the inference was against him; because in 1843 they were obedient to the Durbar, and in 1845 they acted in defiance of it.
It would be useless at this distant period to enter into the discussion which arose in India, and was afterwards taken up with much warmth in England, as to the correctness of the views entertained by these officers on the crossing of the Sutlej by the Sikhs. The relative views of those two officers were then and are still sustained by their respective friends; but as far as we can individually offer an opinion, and as it seemed to many at the time, there is great difficulty in arriving at a decision as to the rights of the question at issue. It is true that Major Broadfoot, as the superior officer, might be presumed to be in a position for obtaining access to sources of information from which his subordinate was debarred. In a military point of view, this position must always carry its due weight in the scale of probable authentic intelligence, and should have a preponderating influence in ultimate proceedings, especially in such a country as India, and among such a people as we were then dealing with.
On the other hand, it is by no means uncommon for a subordinate in an important position, to have access directly, and indirectly, to authentic intelligence from which his superior may be shut out, and such a subordinate, knowing his duties and his means of intelligence, can constantly elicit facts in a variety of ways, especially from a hostile source, from which his superior is excluded.
Now, in reference to the position of Captain Nicolson at this juncture, and for a long period antecedent, we are decidedly of opinion that his information and impressions were correct: at the same time we do not consider that the admission of this circumstance can warrant any one to seek, or in justice desire, to disparage the opinions of Major Broadfoot. He, no doubt, had strong grounds for arriving at the conclusion that he did, as the information upon which he acted coincided with his own predilections, and for persisting in these views, even in the face of equally strong opinions on the part of Captain Nicolson.