Dhuleep Singh, the reputed son of Runjeet Singh, who was only a few months old at the time of his father's death, and, consequently, now only four years of age, was proclaimed Maharajah. His mother, Chunda, appointed her brother, Jowahir Singh, prime minister; but he was disliked by the army, and cruelly murdered by them. The military were now masters of the state, and sought to make Goolab Singh, the oldest of Runjeet's favourites, vizier. Goolab being fully aware that his great wealth was the bait, kept them in a state of uncertainty as to his resolve; but, in the meantime, instigated them to march upon the British territories, with the intent of invasion.
Deceived by the promised support of Goolab, and buoyed up by exalted notions of their own military prowess and discipline, as well as animated by the desire of pillage, the Sikhs made sure of success. Though they had never seen the British troops in battle, the Khalsa soldiers considered themselves fully equal to contend against them. There is no doubt, and it is necessary to make the remark in order to account for the presumptuous conduct of the Sikhs, that our sad reverses at Cabool in 1841, and our retreat in 1842, had greatly affected the prestige of the British military character. Just as the failure of Lord Lake before Bhurtpore, in 1805, even after his victories in 1803 and 1804, had left the impression on the minds of the native princes, that we could not take forts.
Now the Sikhs under Runjeet Singh had defeated the Affghans under Ajean Khan, the elder brother of Dost Mahomed Khan, at Noushera (half way between Attock and Peshawur), in 1823. They imagined themselves superior, as soldiers, to the Affghans, and knew that the latter had defeated the British. They did not, however, bear in mind that our troops were destroyed in the retreat by the frost and snow. Lady Sale says, the first snow fell on the 26th of November. They, therefore, argued thus:—They had beaten the Affghans, and the Affghans had beaten the British; therefore the British were not invincible, and might be overcome by Sikh troops.
The disturbed state of the Lahore government during the latter part of the reign of Runjeet Singh, up to the present moment, had compelled the British government to introduce various precautionary measures for the protection of the British frontier, on a scale which was opposed to the terms of the treaty of 1809. It is true that the British government had recognised their boy-king, Dhuleep Singh, who had been proclaimed by the army, but being of a naturally suspicious character, the Sikhs considered themselves in danger of invasion, and resolved to anticipate the British, and wage war, by crossing the Sutlej. They appointed Lall Singh, prime minister, or vizier, and Tej Singh, an officer of considerable talent and experience, commander-in-chief of the Sikh forces.
The British government demanded an explanation of this movement, but none being given, the Governor-General issued a proclamation,[13] declaring all the possessions and territories of the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh on the left bank of the Sutlej to be confiscated and annexed to the British dominions; calling upon the inhabitants and their rulers to second the British government, he assured all who were peaceably disposed, of the protection of that government.
Thus the war was begun. The Sikhs, as we have seen, crossed the Sutlej with their heavy artillery on the 13th, on the 14th, marched to Ferozeshah, and, on the 18th, met the British forces, under the command of Sir Hugh Gough.
The battle of Moodkee, on the 18th of December, was their first battle with the English. This engagement they themselves allowed to be a defeat; but in that of Ferozeshah, three or four days later, they claimed the victory. Indeed many British officers have told me that it was a very desperate affair, and that it was fortunate the Sikhs were ignorant of their own power and resources. If this fact be held in recollection, when the reader comes to the battle of Sobraon, seven weeks later, he will see the necessity for a grand effort on their part; for another defeat or retreat would have been ruin to the Sikh cause.
Colonel Campbell's force was, as we have stated, nearly 3,000 strong, but the loss of the English in the battles of Moodkee and Ferozeshah, amounted to 3,291 men killed and wounded, and 804 horses; so that the arrival of this force would not replace the numbers lost. It was, therefore, necessary to draw troops from other quarters also, and concentrate them at the place of action.
FOOTNOTES:
[4] In the Dragoons, one groom is allowed by Government for every two horses, the other being paid by the soldiers themselves.