| Irregular Cavalry. | |||
| Charaganee Horse | 4,500 | ||
| Orderly do. | 3,500 | ||
| Lall Singh's do. | 1,800 | Heera Singh's do. | 3,500 |
| Moolraj's do. | 550 | ||
| Bala Singh's do. | 200 | ||
| Nehing's do. | 1,000 | ||
| Utter Singh's do. | 700 | ||
| Pindeewalas | 900 | ||
| Dogras[14] | 200 | ||
| ———— | |||
| 16,850 | |||
| ———— | |||
| 4 Corps of Regular Cavalry, | about 2,000 | ||
| Irregular Horse, | 16,850 | ||
| ——— | |||
| 18,850 | |||
| Infantry | 7,200 | ||
| ——— | |||
| Total | 26,050 | ||
| ——— | |||
| Artillery Field Guns | 60 | ||
| Heavy Guns | 28 | ||
| — | |||
| 88 | |||
| — | |||
| Zumbooruks (Camel Guns) | 250 | ||
| — |
The above force, with 3,000 detached Infantry, and the greater part of the Irregular Horse, marched to Ferozeshah, for the purpose of holding Moodkee; reaching this place in the evening, they fought the battle of the 18th of December, with a force of 17,000 or 18,000 men.
The British force at Moodkee was about 13,000 men, and 48 guns, 36 of which were horse artillery: the action was sudden, and there was no regularity; the corps moved off in echelon, but owing to the dust, confusion, and lateness of the day, some infantry corps fired into each other. I have heard that a native infantry corps fired by mistake into H.M. 50th foot. Many of the officers, and all those of the staff who were killed, were shot by Sikh soldiers from the branches of trees, where they had stationed themselves. The Horse Artillery and Cavalry opened the encounter; but the dust which these troops raised, caused the Infantry, which came up last, to grope as it were in the dark, and to make serious mistakes.
The Sikhs having been defeated at Moodkee, called upon the troops before Ferozepore, and the Nuggur Ghât to join them, which made their force as under:
| Battalions. | Infantry. | Cavalry. | Guns. | |||
| 10 | Additional, | 6,000 | Additional, | 500 | Additional, | 55 |
| 12 | Before | 7,200 | Before | 2,000 | Before | 60 |
| —— | —— | Heavy Guns | 28 | |||
| 13,200 | 2,500 | —— | ||||
| —— | —— | 143 | ||||
| —— |
This, including the 16,850 Irregular Cavalry, gives 32,550 men, of whom the Regular troops were 15,700 men; and, deducting the seventeen guns taken at Moodkee, the enemy ought to have had 126 guns at Ferozeshah, besides the 250 Zumbooruks. These were not very great odds against the British as to numbers.
The number of British killed and wounded was 2,419; namely, 2,269 non-commissioned officers and privates, and 150 officers, which gives one officer to every fifteen men; and as the usual proportion is one to twenty, or twenty-five, this was the greatest proportional loss in the four battles.
At Ferozeshah, including the Sikh force detached to Moodkee, there were 13,200 infantry; deducting, say 1,200 killed and wounded at Moodkee, there remained, say 12,000 men; to these add an additional reinforcement of 6,000 men and we have 18,000 infantry, which appears to have been the amount of the Sikh forces in the entrenchments at Ferozeshah on the 21st of December 1845; also 126 guns, of which twenty-eight were heavy guns, which likewise agrees with the returns; the enemy's cavalry could scarcely have exceeded 8,000 or 10,000 men. The entrenchment was about a mile in length, and half a mile in breadth, but as there was a village within those limits, the space for the troops was of course greatly diminished by it.
It will be for the military reader to form his own judgment, as my experience does not warrant me in giving an opinion of the motives and actions of my superiors. I have trusted a great deal throughout my accounts, to officers who were actually present in this remarkable campaign. It is curious to note the opinions of others. One thing however seems tolerably clear, that the only mode by which a really true account of any battle can be given, is to obtain a statement from some competent officer of each corps, troop, or company of artillery, etc., actually present in the field.
The practice, in this respect in the Indian army is this: each brigadier reports to the major-general commanding his division, upon the efficiency and prominent services of each regiment in his brigade, noting also the disposition of each corps; the major-general in a similar manner makes a report to the Adjutant-General for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, of the state of each of his brigades, and the particular services rendered. It is from these divisional reports that the Commander-in-Chief draws up his despatches.