Journal of a Cavalry Officer; Including the Memorable Sikh Campaign of 1845-1846

by W. W. W. Humbley

Secondly, the troops of Sindiah and of the Berar Rajah, at the battle of Assaye had indeed been drilled, but they had not then had the advantage of having French officers; besides which, they, the Sirdars, were unable to act by themselves; nor had their men, like the Khalsa troops, been disciplined by such distinguished officers as were in the service of Runjeet Singh. The older French officers had died off, and the others were mere adventurers, very different from Ventura and Allard, who had served in the wars of the great Napoleon; the former having been in the retreat from Moscow. Sindiah's European officers were simply drill-sergeants; the merely being able to advance in line, or to execute some common evolutions will not gain a battle. A practised military eye for planning a battle, and marking out the details, is the indispensable requisite for such an achievement. As General Lloyd truly observes, in his able work on the Art of War: "No art or science is more difficult than that of war. It may be divided into two parts: the one mechanical, which may be taught by precepts; the other has no name, nor can it be either defined or taught. It consists in a just application of the principles and precepts of war in all the numberless circumstances and situations which occur; no rule, no study or application however assiduous, no experience however long, can teach this part; it is the effect of genius alone. As to the first, it may be reduced to mathematical principles; its object is to prepare the materials which form an army, for all the different operations which may occur: genius must apply them, according to the ground, number, species, and quality of the troops, which admit of infinite combinations. In this art, as in poetry and eloquence, there are many who can trace the rules by which a poem or an oration should be composed, and even compose according to the exactest rules, but, for want of that enthusiastic and divine fire, their productions are languid and insipid: so in our profession, many are to be found who know every precept of it by heart; but alas! when called upon to apply them, are immediately at a stand. They then recall their rules, and want to make everything, the rivers, woods, ravines, mountains, etc., subservient to them; whereas, their precept should, on the contrary, be subject to these, which are the only rules, the only guide we ought to follow. Whatever manoeuvre is not formed on these is absurd and ridiculous. These form the Great Book of War, and he who cannot read it, must for ever be content with the title of a brave soldier, and never aspire to that of a great general."

The discipline and training of the Sikh army had, as I have observed before, undergone a complete transformation and improvement under Runjeet Singh, so that the troops under Sindiah, in 1803, could not bear comparison with those of 1845, who had been disciplined by Ventura and Allard. Runjeet Singh himself was a great warrior; and from the time that he visited Lord Lake's camp, in 1805, he became convinced of the superiority of the discipline of the British army, and at once resolved on re-forming his own. He had a good material to work upon in the native hardihood, bravery and energy of the Sikh character. His primary attention was given to the formation of a regular infantry; and in this he was greatly aided by some deserters from the British service, to whom he confided the drilling of his troops. After that, he enlisted the Goorkhas, whose able resistance to the English had given him great confidence in their mode of discipline.

The opposition of his officers and troops, especially in the adoption of a new dress, would have daunted a less resolute character; but Runjeet Singh, conscious of the power of example, took part in all the military exercises and drill, and even wore the unaccustomed dress of a British foot-soldier; thus making himself master de facto, and not merely de verbo, of the new principles of war. After this, Ventura, Allard, and other European officers, carried out and perfected that discipline, which made the Sikh army what it was, when led under Tej Singh against the British forces, in 1845.

Let the reader bear in mind how fatal the trap, laid by the Sikhs for our troops at Ramnuggur, had proved to those gallant cavalry officers, Colonel Cureton,[17] Lieutenant-Colonel Havelock, and Captain Fitzgerald; the two latter were my brother officers in the 4th Queen's Own Light Dragoons, at Bombay. At the battle of Goojerat, on the 21st of February, 1849, the Sikhs moved more than once to try and turn our flank. Was such an attempt ever made in 1803? No! It was at Assaye that the Duke of Wellington fought his hardest and best battle (I am speaking of India), for he had five to one as odds against him. In guns, the enemy had seven times the number, besides several 16-pounders and heavy guns. The Duke had none but 17 pop-guns; for 6-pounders, when brought into action against 16 and 12-pounders, deserve no better name.

Thirdly, The Sikhs fired their guns in the ratio of thrice to our twice, which multiplies most fearfully the battering power of artillery, and raises the calibre of a six into a nine-pounder. At the battle of Ferozeshah, the Sikh guns were served with extraordinary rapidity and precision. The infantry stood between and behind the batteries, and lay on the ground behind their artillery, priming their muskets, and actively discharging their pieces in the face of the British force, thus forming an almost unprecedented shower of balls, carrying destruction and death with irresistible force. Recollecting that in 1845 and 1846, the enemy's artillery was double that of the British, we might rather ask how it came that so many escaped its deadly effects, than wonder how it was that so many were destroyed.

At Goojerat, where we had the greatest number of guns, the victory was complete; for after three hours' constant firing, our troops advanced, the enemy's guns were taken, and they fled.

Referring to the history of the battles in India in earlier times, from 1780 to 1792, we find that Hyder Ali Khan and Tippoo Sultan, used 18-pounder guns as field-guns. Sir Eyre Coote was obliged to use the same, which taught the British the necessity of having large guns; but, till very recently, we had departed from the practice of using guns equal in calibre to those of our enemies. It is a curious fact, that the British had 2,419 killed and wounded at Ferozeshah, and 2,383, or 36 less, at Sobraon: also, at the former battle, 694 killed, and at the latter, only 460, being a difference of 50 per cent. less. How can we account for this, but from the circumstance of our having had more guns at Sobraon? At Goojerat, the British loss was 807, out of which number 96 were killed, or not one-eighth. At Moodkee, the English lost 872 killed and wounded, of which number 215 were killed, or nearly one-fourth. At Goojerat, nearly 90 guns had been playing for three hours upon the Sikhs, before they gave way and the British advanced to take their guns. At Moodkee, the 36 Horse Artillery guns were the only ones brought into play. Except at the battle of Aliwal, where the loss was 589, the British suffered less at Goojerat than in any other battle with the Sikhs.

Lord Gough, in his Despatch,[18] says that the enemy had 60,000 men (perhaps overrated), and 59 guns. His lordship had 84 guns, according to the return, and these were of heavier metal than those of the enemy.

Surely, after these proofs, and when we have lost 10,788 men, killed and wounded, and 1,899 horses, in seven battles and one siege, viz., Moodkee, Ferozeshah, Aliwal, Sobraon, Ramnuggur, Chillianwallah, Goojerat, and the fort of Mooltan, we ought to be prepared on every point on our North-West frontier.