Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, K.C.B. commanding the cavalry division, had under him Brigadier Scott, C.B.,[30] who held a reserve in the first brigade on our left, ready to act as circumstances might render necessary. Brigadier Scott, as well as the Major-General, had commanded cavalry in the Affghan campaign, when Ghuznee was taken, in July 1839, and proceeded to Cabool; so that, should the presence of Sir Joseph Thackwell have been required in any other part of the field of action, he had as his second in command, an officer whom he well knew, and in whom he could place the most implicit confidence, for it must always be recollected that it is of great advantage to have an officer in the field, who has had experience in Indian warfare. It cannot be supposed that an officer just come from Europe can all at once, be prepared to command a brigade composed of Lancers, Dragoons, and native Cavalry. Surely a little experience is requisite. Besides in India, from the nature of the service, a Lieutenant-Colonel often commands a Brigade; while in Europe that command would generally devolve upon a Major-General.
Our battery of 9-pounders, twelve of which had been reamed up to 12-pounders, opened their fire near Little Sobraon, a village a short way in advance, between Major-General Gilbert's and Major-General Sir Harry Smith's divisions. Our artillery was thus placed,—five 24-pounder howitzers on our right, three 12-pounders (reamed) on the right of the 29th Foot, No. 19 battery on the left of Major-General Gilbert's right brigade; then between General Gilbert's left and the 62nd Foot there were six 8-inch howitzers, and six 5½-inch howitzers; on the left of the 62nd Foot there were eight 8-inch howitzers and five 18-pounders flanked by the 9th Foot and the 26th regiment of Native Infantry. On the extreme right there were forty-eight guns and howitzers, besides twelve guns, etc. on the right and left of Major-General Sir Robert Dick's division. In fact Major-General Sir Harry Smith's division was wheeled up to its left, so as to throw a flanking fire into the enemy's left. Also, Major-General Sir Robert Dick's division on the left, wheeled up to its right, so as to fire into the enemy's right.
Owing to the mist before mentioned, it was half-past-six A.M. before the whole of our artillery fire was brought into full play; the object of this fire was to silence the enemy's guns and to destroy their works before we assaulted the place. There was also a rocket battery. It must be remembered that the enemy had upwards of a hundred guns to fire against our sixty-two guns and the rocket battery. Rockets, the reader must be aware, were formerly much used in Indian warfare among the native armies. They were tried at Hattrass in 1817, with the force under the command of the late Major-General Sir W.S. Whish, K.C.B., but there was too much wind. On the present occasion the wind was not unfavourable. As the enemy's camp on the other side of the river was set on fire, the means by which that important service was effected may be disputed.
We must bear in mind that the Sikh guns were like those of a fortress, protected by walls, not en barbette, i.e. open all round. Besides this there was a triple line of trenches. The Sikhs also had two batteries on the other side of the river. When these batteries were silenced, the gunners came over by the bridge of boats, to the works on our side, to aid and to replace the gunners who had been killed or wounded. The bridge was said to be mined in case of accident, that is to say, if they were pursued in the retreat they could have blown it up to prevent our pursuing them.
It is clear that the mist had delayed the practice of the batteries, but still the artillery played upon the enemy's works for two hours. A more powerful battery would have been desirable; and it is said that this was Colonel Irvine's reason for proposing the delay. However, in all battles, there are two main points of consideration; first the military delays, and then the political delays, we know are sometimes dangerous. No doubt a casual observer would have exclaimed, "Why not wait for more guns? Recollect Ferozeshah; you tarried fifty days for this attack, during which time the enemy strengthened his position. You have more guns, more shot and shell coming up. Recollect also, you fell short of shot on the 22nd of December at Ferozeshah!" The late Captain J.D. Cunningham, of the Engineers, who was present at the battles of Aliwal and Sobraon, wrote thus: "The officers of artillery naturally desired that their guns, the representatives of a high art, should be used agreeably to the established rules of the engineers; or that ramparts should be breached in front and swept in flank, before they were stormed by defenceless battalions; but such deliberate tediousness of process did not satisfy the judgment or the impatience of the commanders, and it was arranged that the whole of the heavy ordnance should be planted in masses opposite particular points of the enemy's entrenchments, and, that when the Sikhs had been shaken by a continuous storm of shot and shells, the right, or weakest part of the position, should be assaulted in line, by the strongest of the three investing divisions, which, together mustered nearly 15,000 men," the enemy being 30,000 men.[31]
A military friend of mine, Major W. Hough, of the Bengal establishment, formerly a deputy Judge-Advocate, and author of some most valuable works on Military Law, and other subjects, has suggested that the attack in column is the more usual mode of assault, and has adduced many proofs that such a system has been at different periods acted upon, both in ancient and modern warfare.
Now let us look at the other side of the picture. Proposals had been made by the Sikh Sirdars, some say by Goolab Singh, which were refused. Had Goolab Singh's troops mutinied and refused to obey his orders, he would have said that he was helpless; it was possible that these same troops might be anxious to join Sham Singh in the entrenchments, a movement which it was the great object of the British chiefs to prevent.
As to the artillery, which is not surpassed by any artillery in the world, in celerity of movement, in precision of fire, or in any of the qualities which render this branch of the service illustrious, they could not perform impossibilities. They were deficient in that indispensable desideratum, shot. To have continued firing till all our shot was expended, and thus have exposed our want of it to the enemy, would have been very unwise; for, had the infantry failed in the attack, they might have retired, and our artillery resumed their fire. Hence it was that the British artillery ceased for a while to send forth its missives of death.
After two, or two and a half hour's firing, and at about nine o'clock, Brigadier Stacey's Brigade, supported on either flank by two batteries of Foot and a troop of Horse Artillery, moved to the attack in good order, with Brigadier Stacey at their head. This gallant officer was armed with sword and buckler, the most effective weapons for such an attack, where you may come into personal contact with men who, after the custom of their country, are armed in this peculiar manner.
'Ἁμφἱ σἁρ 'ὡμοισιν βἁλετο ξἱφος ἁργυρὁηον,
——αὑτἁρ ἑπειτα σἁκος μἑγα τε στιβαρὁν τε.
Homer. Iliad III. lines 334-5.