I dislike to leave this heroic assault without a short description. The ground in our front was heavily timbered, descending for 200 yards to a ravine, thence a thirty per cent rising grade for 300 yards to their line of works, consisting of heavy embankment with head logs, so mounted as to give space for firing underneath. A wide and deep ditch was in front of the works. A large share of the timber was felled with tops down the hill, all twigs and light limbs cut off, so that in advance up to their works haste or alignment was an impossibility. Through this in double column we struggled, a few of the men falling very near the ditch and others actually reaching their embankment, but they could not reach them in mass sufficient to drive the enemy. A new stand of colors, presented to the regiment by the ladies of Chillicothe, Ohio, was carried into this desperate charge. The color sergeant was killed and several of the color guards killed and wounded and the staff of the colors was shot in three places with fifty-seven bullet holes through the colors. Go see the flag in the State House, Columbus. The marks on the staff are still showing.
Sherman continued fortifying and lengthening his battle-line to the right (nearly south), until the morning of July 2d, when we found the Confederate lines were vacated. We followed close to their rear guard, about seven miles to “Smirny Camp Grounds,” where we became quite strongly engaged, driving their rear and developing a strong line of works. Here we were held with very brisk skirmishing until July 5th, losing a few men from the regiment on the 4th. Again we moved briskly south, hoping to meet our enemy in the confusion of crossing the Chattahoochee River, but we failed. From the bluffs on the north side of the river we first saw Atlanta, ten miles away, while here the non-veterans (those that did not reenlist), were ordered to Chattanooga and mustered out, the veterans and recruits holding the company and regimental organization. On the 16th we crossed the river, advancing slowly that the army of the Tennessee and Ohio (McPherson and Schofield), who had a greater distance to move, might be nearer. On the 20th we crossed Peach Tree Creek and gained a ridge about half a mile south, when our division of the 4th and the 20th corps were to establish a line. The Confederate army, now commanded by General Hood, had concentrated in front of this position, intending to crush us while we were in the confusion of crossing the stream, and did make a most furious attack when but part of the line had gained position. Those not in line, being close, countercharged, driving the enemy and establishing a connected line. Hood repeated the assault, but was at every point repulsed. Thus less than half of the army of the Cumberland alone, without fortifications and hardly an equal show with the enemy, lacking a completed line at the opening, thoroughly repulsed the combined strength of Hood’s army. On the 22nd we advanced in line to the front of the main fortifications around Atlanta. The army of the Tennessee, in the effort to close to our left, fought the battle of Atlanta, their commander, General McPherson, being among the slain. We skirmished very heavily and were under the direct fire of their artillery from the main line of fortifications in front of the city. This continued more or less until August 26th. The army of the Tennessee, now under the command of General Howard, moved to the extreme right. The army of the Ohio, under General Schofield, a few days later did the same. This left our division the extreme left of Sherman’s army. We readjusted our line of fortifications, making a refused flank with completely inclosed forts supplied with surplus ammunition, water and food. Sherman’s flank movement by the right to the south of Atlanta commenced on August 25th by withdrawing our 4th corps to the rear of the 20th corps and moving it (the 20th) to and across the Chattahoochee River with all surplus trains and artillery, we the 4th corps continuing to move to the right, on the following day passed beyond the extreme right of Hood’s army and on the 28th advanced to the Mount Gilead Church, skirmishing heavily and driving the enemy across the West Point railroad. On the 29th and 30th, continuing the movement, we gained possession of the Macon railroad, thus severing the last line leading from the city, and September 1st, until about 4 p. m., we were burning the ties and heating and twisting the rails, moving south as we did so, and by so doing were prevented from reaching Jonesboro in time to envelop the flank of Hardee’s corps. We were rushed hastily into position and were driving their shattered flank when darkness and the entanglement of brush, ravines, etc., and the danger of coming into conflict with our troops closed the movement. In the morning we found the enemy had fled. During the night we heard the explosion of the magazines and trains of ammunition at Atlanta, over twenty miles away. We followed Hood south to Lovejoy Station, when we drove their skirmishers and outposts into their main line of works. We remained in front of them until the 5th, when we withdrew and marched back to Atlanta, where we remained in camp until about the 20th. During our stay at this place official reports were made covering the losses of each organization during the Atlanta Campaign. I have not access at this writing to those reports as published in the war records. The 26th Ohio had killed and wounded, as officially reported, 117.[5] Of this number company E lost but two, one mortally wounded, one wounded. Clark became captain of the company in December, 1862. He was on detached service, commanding a battalion of pioneers, and did not join the company and regiment until we veteranized in January, 1864. In May, 1864, he was placed in command of the brigade battalion of pioneers, consisting of twenty privates, two corporals, one sergeant and one commissioned officer from each regiment of the brigade or about 175 in all. Company E was made the detail from the 26th and we were exempt from picket or skirmish duty. We were required to each carry either a pick, shovel or ax in addition to that required of each soldier. Our place was with our regiment, but subject to call to any point, to build fortification rifle pits or to open or repair roads. We might justly compare our industry to that of the honey bee. During that campaign we stopped work only long enough to take part in the fighting and some of the time were using tools when the shell and minnie were adding impetus to our mental and muscular skill. About the close of the Atlanta campaign Captain Clark became the commander of the regiment and was soon afterward promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and continued in command until mustered out with the regiment.
About September 25th Hood’s flank movement around Atlanta had advanced so that Sherman divined his intentions and ordered our division north by rail to Chattanooga. The 26th Ohio was thrown in the lead (advance guard) on two passenger coaches, each man with loaded gun ready for immediate action. The division followed by freight trains in sections. On arriving at Chattanooga we were kept on trains much of the time and moving from place to place between Dalton and Bridgeport, many times nearly smothered with smoke as we rode on top of the cars through the tunnel under Missionary Ridge. After Hood moved west into Alabama we started to join the main army west of Rome, Ga., where orders met us by which we crossed Lookout and Sand Mountains to Stevason, Ala., where we were mustered for pay October 31, going from there by rail to Athens, Ala., thence marched to Pulaski, Tenn., thus placing ourselves between Hood, now at Florence, Ala., and Nashville, Tenn. We held this position until Hood advanced via Columbia. We moved October 21 to Lineville and to Columbia on the 23rd formed line of battle, each flank reaching Duck River, one above the other, below the town. This position we held, skirmishing lightly, until the night of the 27th when we crossed to the north bank. Early in the morning of the 29th, Thomas at Nashville ordered General Schofield (in direct command at Columbia) to fall back to Franklin. The trains, over eight hundred wagons, were started on the Nashville pike. When the head of this train reached Spring Hill, eleven miles away, they were stopped by the enemy’s cavalry. Our division, General Wagner commanding, hastened to the relief of the train, arriving about 1 p. m., Opdyke’s brigade leading, and drove the enemy out of the town north. Bradley’s brigade, the second in line of march, formed line facing east and advanced nearly a mile, our brigade, Colonel Lane commanding, forming the reserve. The 26th Ohio soon after was ordered to extend the skirmish line east of the pike farther south and take possession of and hold a dirt road coming into the pike over a mile south. At this place we were located near a cotton gin, on which an outlook was posted, who soon reported Confederate troops in sight. We built a rail barricade, each man got out of cartridge box and bit off ten cartridges and made all the arrangements we could for rapid firing. The gray lines could be seen by Sergeant Hall (the outlook) for a long distance and he kept posting us as to their movements. He held his post too long and was killed in the effort to reach us at the barricade. It was undulating farm land where we were located, with timber showing south of us and also in our rear three-fourths of a mile or one-fourth west of the pike. We could see the gray lines east of us, at some places half a mile away, as they were advancing, but owing to the roll of the land they passed out of our view nearly one-fourth of a mile in front or east of us and did not appear again until less than one hundred yards away. We opened fire and effectually stopped them in our front and temporarily to right and left, but to our left, north of us, they soon pressed forward, passing directly between us and Spring Hill. Wagner, seeing our situation from his position, over a mile away, rushed a battery forward and opened fire, we getting the effect as well as our enemy between us and the guns. We held this position until all or nearly all had consumed their ten rounds, when Captain Clark gave the order to escape if possible. In doing this we obliqued to the southwest to escape a heavy fire now reaching us from the north and the quicker to get protection from the rolling ground. While the battery held them in check we crossed the pike and made a complete half circle to reach Spring Hill, which we did, losing 77 men from the regiment. Sergeant John F. Chambers of company E was among the slain. Schofield, with the army from Columbia, began to arrive about 11 p. m., and leaving our division, now confronting Hood’s entire army, in position, moved north, driving the rebel cavalry from the pike, the wagon train following, just as it began to show light in the east, the last of the wagons crossed a bridge at the north edge of the town. Our division swung back in line of battle across the pike and became the rear guard as the train moved off rapidly and cleared the way. Lane’s (our brigade) and Conrad’s (formerly Harken’s) swung into the pike, leaving Opdyke’s the rear guard. This order was kept, holding the enemy in check until we reached the heights, about three miles south of Franklin. Here Opdyke moved to the inside of the works being built, Lane and Conrad moving back gradually from one position to another until nearly one-third of a mile in front of the hastily constructed fortifications. Here, through a blunder that General Schofield should not escape by charging it to others, as we were in plain sight and had been on extreme duty without cooked food of any kind for thirty-two hours, and every soldier in the line knowing we were in a false position, our two brigades of the division that had protected his rear saved the entire train, fought the battle of Spring Hill and stood guard during the night while the army and train moved on. To be left on the plains without works and both flanks exposed was a gross error. The 26th Ohio was the extreme right of this exposed line upon the plain. We saw the solid lines of Hood’s army as it advanced. We held this position but a short time. Those to the left of us being more advanced, owing to the lay of the ground, than we, were struck and broken, we fell back to the main line. Company E was less than 200 yards to the right of the Carter House and the main line was not broken at this point. We fought with other troops that occupied the works when we reached them. Here the enemy was repulsed. A short distance to our left, near the Carter House, they had gained part of our line. The 26th, under orders from Captain Clark, moved or closed to the left to aid in repelling them from this place. Our lines, with the other troops in the works, formed in ranks four or five deep, the rear men loading and passing the guns to those in front, and the firing was constant until long after dark, when Hood ceased his efforts to make his lodgment permanent and firing gradually ceased. Vanhorn in his history states (Vol. 2, page 202): “The defensive fire was so rapid from 4 p. m. to nightfall that it was difficult to supply the troops with ammunition. One hundred wagon loads of artillery and infantry ammunition were used from the 4th corps train alone.” Company E had one man wounded. In view of the fact that General J. D. Cox, in his writing on the battle, has left the impression that the two brigades doing outpost duty continued their retreat past the main line to the river, I feel that in justice to those brigades (and more especially to company E, 26th and company D, 65th Ohio, both Morrow County companies), I should say a few words more. I have never yet seen in any official report a single statement justifying his position. Cox on that day was in command of the 23rd corps. It was his line that was broken at the Carter House and it was Opdyke’s brigade of our division that, without orders, started the countercharge which, with the assistance of Lane’s comrades and part of the 23rd corps, reestablished the continuity of the line. Either of those three brigades, called Sheridan’s old division,[6] have more regiments listed among Fox’s three hundred than has the entire corps commanded on that occasion by Cox. When we started from our first position, exposed on the plain, it became necessary for us to make speed and clear the field in front of our main line that our men in the works might open fire. In this hasty retreat it was but natural for the men to incline to the left or east toward the pike or road by which we had retreated from Columbia, and some of the extreme left of our regiment reached the works near the Carter House and found them already vacated by our troops and occupied by the enemy, and two or three of company B were taken prisoners after reaching the main line. Of these, Sergeant David Bragg, now living in Columbus, Ohio, and one of the oldest railroad mail clerks now in the service, was one. From the recent call for volunteers and the draft, quite a large assignment of new troops had been made to some of the regiments in Lane’s and Conrad’s brigades. (Our regiment received none.) These new troops reached us while on the retreat from Pulaski but a few days before. They had never been drilled and it is probable that a large share of them may have continued their flight beyond the main line. Opdyke’s, Lane’s and Conrad’s brigades (2nd division, 4th army corps) lost more men than the entire other four divisions of infantry and the cavalry corps that was present, and as a rule, if you follow the trail of blood, you are keeping close to the fighting line.
The veterans of that old division, whose well-tried courage shone forth in historic grandeur, it is not overpraise to say were practically panic-proof. Opdyke was in the direct line of retreat, and on the same reasons given by Cox and others for the break in the line at the Carter House, he (Opdyke) with no line of works to protect them would certainly have been “carried away” if the flight of Lane and Conrad had continued to the river. The men of the 26th were called from the lines and we crossed the river before midnight and continued our march, arriving at Nashville December 1st, near noon, where we made coffee and lay down to rest for the first time since the morning of November 29th. In the evening company E was called to tear down some buildings in front of our established line and to build works during the night. We remained at this line until the battle of Nashville, December 15th and 16th. December 9th Captain Wm. Clark was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, First Lieutenant Phillips M. Ogan to Captain and Sergeant Walden Kelly to First Lieutenant. The first day of the battle, the 4th corps, leaving a detail to hold the works, moved to the right, attacked the enemy, driving them from their fortified position. The 26th Ohio was left in our main line of works, deployed to a division front or nearly half a mile. Our instructions were to hold them. We were not engaged the first day. On the morning of the second day’s battle, December 16th, before daylight, we moved to position in the front line of the brigade and at daylight moved toward the Brentwood Hills, driving the enemy’s outposts and establishing our lines under easy Enfield rifle range of their fortified line. Under a heavy artillery and infantry fire we held position until about 3 p. m., when we were instructed to prepare ten rounds for rapid firing, at a given signal to commence and at a second signal, to be given as we exhausted the ninth round, we were to charge with loaded guns and capture the works on our front. These instructions were literally carried out, a heavy per cent of the enemy being captured in their works. We pursued rapidly until dusk. Early in the morning of the 17th we were in pursuit, the 4th corps in the lead on the direct line of Hood’s retreat. Thus in midwinter, following as rapidly as possible, the bridges were all destroyed, and flooded streams delayed the pursuit, which was continued until January 1, 1865. The broken and disorganized army of Hood’s crossed the Tennessee River at Florence, Ala. The latter part of the campaign was done by us on short rations; three days to last five were the orders. Our line of march was changed to Huntsville, Ala., where we arrived January 7, 1865, and remained enjoying a well-earned season of rest until March 15. Soon after arriving Captain Ogan rejoined his company and Lieutenant Kelly was temporarily placed in command of company F. This proved to be permanent. On February 28th he was commissioned captain and assigned to said company after having served three years and over eight months in company E, and, as it proved, after all our fighting was over. In March we (the 4th army corps), moved to East Tennessee by rail via Chattanooga and Knoxville to Bulls Gap, thence marched repairing and rebuilding the railroad northeast toward Richmond, Va. While at this work, near Greenville, Tenn., we received the news of Lee’s surrender. That night was spent hilariously cheering and singing that old familiar piece, “Go Tell Aunt Rhoda the Old Gray Goose Is Dead.” The following morning I doubt if there was enough ammunition in the cartridge boxes of the men in our division to have made a respectable skirmish. Soon afterward Johnston surrendered to Sherman and the 4th corps was ordered by rail to Nashville, where we expected to be mustered out. May 9th the corps passed in review before General Thomas and received his congratulatory order on the 10th. About the 1st of June it became the talk of the camp that our corps would probably be sent to the Mexican frontier on account of the Maximilian government which foreign powers were trying to establish there. Strong protests were made by both officers and men, feeling that we had fulfilled the terms of our enlistment, “three years or during the war,” but to no avail. June 16th the command started. Just before starting all who had less than ninety day’s to serve were mustered out. The 97th Ohio infantry of our brigade came under this order. Fifty-six of their men, who had more than the specified time yet to serve, were transferred to the 26th, company E receiving her share of them. The command moved by rail to Johnsonville, Tenn., thence, by steamboats down the Tennessee, Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to New Orleans, La., by ocean steamers to the Matagorda Bay, landing at Indianola, since destroyed by a storm similar to the one a few years ago at Galveston. We marched about thirty-five miles and camped on the Plasadore, about July 20th. Here we remained. Nothing especially interesting or eventful worth relating took place—no drill, except dress parade. Guard and fatigue duty was reduced to the minimum until mustered out October 21. We started on the home trip the 24th. On account of storms and an unsafe vessel we ran into the harbor at Galveston and remained four days, were transferred to a safer vessel and arrived at New Orleans November 4th. We came up the Mississippi to Cairo on the steamer Ruth, the largest vessel then plying the river; by rail (freight cars) via Matoon, Ill., Terra Haute and Indianapolis, Ind. From there we took passenger coaches to Columbus, Ohio. The enlisted men received their pay and discharges in the same barracks that we had built when the regiment organized in June, 1861. The commissioned officers were held one day later to turn over the official records and make final settlement, arriving at home near the middle of November, 1865.
Discrepancies appear in both the Rebellion Official Records and Roster of Ohio Soldiers. Some of them, when properly explained, show to the reader the honest intention of the compiler or author. I call attention to two cases:
First, General George D. Wagner, commanding 2nd brigade, 2nd division, 4th army corps. The 26th was in said brigade. In his official report covering the entire Atlanta campaign, May 3, to September 20, 1864, he reports ten officers killed and wounded in the 26th Ohio regiment.
The official report of Major Noris T. Peatman, commanding the regiment at the close of said campaign, reports one officer, Lieutenant Platt, killed, and five officers, viz.: Major Peatman, Captain Baldwin, Lieutenants Renick, Hoge and Foster wounded—six in all. During said campaign the company and regimental official records were left far in the rear and not seen until after the campaign closed. During this period temporary reports were made almost daily on just such scraps of paper as were available—leaves from memorandum books, etc. In the continual skirmish or battle many officers and men were temporarily disabled by wounds and in the daily reports would be included in the list of casualties. In the official report, made at close of the campaign, only those whose disabilities compelled a continued absence were reported.
Second, in the Roster of Ohio Soldiers: Company E 26th Ohio, is shown to have had two first lieutenants from December 9, 1864, to February 28, 1865—Kelly and Osler. The former was present (at date of commission) with the regiment and was mustered. Osler was wounded June 27, 1864, at Kenesaw and was still in the hospital, at or near the time Kelly was commissioned captain and assigned to company F. He (Osler) joined the regiment, was mustered and assigned to company E. He remained but a short time, his wound still in bad condition and continued so, and he was compelled to have his leg amputated twenty or twenty-five years later. He died in Columbus, Ohio, a few years ago. In 1890 I did considerable careful estimating as to losses and percentage of losses in the 26th Ohio and wrote Colonel William F. Fox the results of my study. I here insert a copy of his reply:
“Albany, N. Y., June 18, 1890.
“Capt. Walden Kelley, Osborn, Mo.: