About nine o'clock the general, Lord Chelmsford, cantered up to the camp, accompanied by his staff and an escort of 100 mounted infantry and some Natal mounted police. The general seemed delighted at the celerity with which his orders had been carried out, as in eighteen hours Wood's party had covered twenty-seven miles, and the men and horses were as fresh as paint. A long consultation took place with the general, and then the order was issued for the return to the main body; but this was not found necessary, as Colonel Gilbert met them after about ten miles.
In this day, or rather twenty-four hours, the men had marched thirty-one miles, and were not fated, on camp being pitched, to enjoy the fruits of their labour and toil, for soon after they were settled for the evening a heavy thunderstorm came suddenly over the tents, and in a quarter of an hour they were up to their ankles in a perfect river of water. The tents went down in all directions, and in many cases poles were snapped. The next day, however, a patrol of Buller's horse was paraded soon after daybreak, as scouts had brought in information that a large number of cattle were to be seen in the neighbouring kloof. Soon after leaving camp Buller's men were fired upon, but the Zulus did not stand their ground, and by the afternoon they had brought in nearly 1000 cattle. Captain Barton, who had gone out later in the day with another party, marched twenty miles in the direction of Umkanga's kraal, where in the skirmish which resulted 550 cattle were taken, and seven of the Zulus were killed and wounded. On the following morning a strong reconnaissance was made in the direction of the Bushee Valley. The Zulus were in considerable force, and their general tried to induce the English skirmishers to follow him to ground of his own choosing. Colonel Wood, however, kept his men well in hand, and contented himself by sending forward two companies of the 13th Light Infantry, Colonel Gilbert's fine corps, and menacing the Zulu flank with some score or more horsemen, who, galloping to a favouring eminence, made capital practice at the Zulu main body with their rifles at 700 and 800 yards. The Zulus still continued to creep up in rear, getting what cover they could from the bushes, and a sharp fire was kept up on both sides. As the men in skirmishing order pushed the enemy gradually before them, the mounted force harassed them on either flank, sometimes galloping round to the right and left to obtain vantage-ground and cover, and then dismounting in sections, and acting as infantry, while the main body was kept carefully out of sight in the dense mimosa which was found in the rear. The bush, as they advanced, gradually became more dense, and the path scarcely allowed them to move in fours by a steep descent into a wooded valley. Instinctively it was guessed that here would be the main body of the foe, and this turned out to be the case, for away to the left front, on a tall "copjie" or circular hill, about twenty mounted Zulus were to be seen, evidently the commander and his staff giving orders and directing the operations of the columns in the plain. The firing had now become general, but the soldiers were not allowed to waste their ammunition, and nearly every shot told with fatal effect. Colonel Wood had taken the precaution to strengthen his flanks as he advanced, and as the enemy could not tell how strong he was, the main body being still invisible, they were completely puzzled by the daring of the mounted men, who seemed ubiquitous. The guns were found rather a nuisance; one of the carriages broke down, and the limber had to be left behind, while the gun itself was secured. The head of the first line of skirmishers had now made good their way through the kloof with slight loss, and the Zulus attempted in vain to get round to its rear, but found all hopes of such a manœuvre utterly futile—as the flanking parties were on the qui-vive. It was now Wood's turn to push them, and he used the opportunity. Two more companies were advanced at the double to force the centre of the Zulu line, and in a few moments we had cut it in two. In the meanwhile one of the light field-pieces had obtained a favourable position, and had got the enemy's range exactly, but the execution done was not what could have been obtained with a good honest nine or twelve-pounder. The pursuit was carried on for about a mile, and the Zulus were scattered in all directions, but the commander was too wary to allow his men to go too far, and the recall was sounded, and in a short time brought back the excited fellows, puffing and blowing, to rejoin the main body.
For some days this column continued to advance steadily without meeting any serious opposition. Having moved on from the Blood River, Wood's force encamped at Bemba's Kop till the 20th January. The country over which they had passed since they left Utrecht may be described as a succession of large rolling plains, interspersed in all directions by watercourses (dongas), which radiate from the bases of the table-topped mountains rising at intervals throughout this part of the country. These watercourses are as a rule about twelve to fourteen feet deep, and serve to irrigate the country, which seems prosperous and well-populated. What would be called a road in England does not exist in Zululand. The tracks made by the traders with their waggons answer the purpose. These tracks are, however, tolerably good, and experience proved that artillery could be moved almost anywhere, except in wet weather. Waggons could pass each other at almost any part of the main road from Utrecht to Ulundi, except at that portion leading across the Inhlazatye Mountain, which runs along a narrow ledge, and where it ascends the Intendeka table-land. Wherever the troops moved they came across numerous kraals, each kraal containing from eight to fifteen huts, and each hut ten to fifteen men. From Bemba's Kop they moved on the 20th to Wolpoint, as nearly as possible seven miles west of the White Umbolosi, and thence went on to Tunguin's Neck, where a laager was planned and completed. After a reconnaissance made by Colonel Wood on the 22nd, in which his troops had a slight skirmish with a small body of Zulus, suffering no casualties, and inflicting a slight loss upon them, he halted on the 23rd, and sent out strong patrols in the direction of the Ingwazini River. These men rode over an open plain admirably suited for cavalry operations, but found nothing but some deserted kraals and the dead bodies of some Zulus, who, it was subsequently discovered, were wounded at Isandula the previous day. On their return the party were fortunate enough to discover the whereabouts of a strong body, some 4000 to 5000 Zulu warriors, who, it was imagined, were merely the nucleus of a force intended to surprise Wood's column. They were posted in a well-chosen position at a place called Tintas Hill, and when they moved down in his direction the following day, Wood had concealed a portion of his force so well, that he got them between two fires, and in about half an hour had killed about sixty or seventy of them, his own casualties being only two men wounded. It was during this action that information was brought by Captain Alan Gardner, who gallantly rode without any escort from Helpmakaar to Utrecht, notifying the terrible disaster of the 22nd, and the destruction of No. 3 Column. This news caused Colonel Wood to change his plans, and after a halt of a couple of hours, he turned back towards the Umbolosi, where his little force arrived at seven a.m. on the 25th. On Sunday (26th) he moved on to Ugaba Ka Hawana, where good camping-ground and a defensive position were chosen, and where the minor essentials of wood and water were in plenty.
Colonel Pearson, who commanded No. 1 Column on the extreme right, had also been prosecuting his advance with the greatest vigour, and the results were in every way satisfactory, though already the tremendous difficulties of commissariat and transport had made themselves unpleasantly evident. This force assembled near Fort Stanger, and crossed the Lower Tugela on the 12th, having as nearly as possible 1500 regular troops, consisting of eight companies of the old Buffs, under Colonel Parnell; six companies of the 99th, under Colonel Welman; one company Royal Engineers, and two 7-pounder guns. A naval brigade, however, which might be considered as a little army in itself, went with them, and were under Colonel Pearson's command. This force consisted of 270 bluejackets and marines, under Captain Campbell, of her Majesty's ships "Active" and "Tenedos," with three of the new-pattern Gatling. Two hundred mounted infantry and 200 colonial mounted riflemen also formed part of the column, while the whole force was supplemented by Major Griffiths and about 2000 men of the Native Contingent. The crossing of the river was at first impeded by the rains, and another delay occurred at the lower drift, where the river was at least 400 yards wide, but all these difficulties were overcome, and after a week's delay a flying column was sent forward on the 18th in the direction of Ekowe, which is a mission-station not quite forty miles inland, and distant nearly seventy from the king's kraal at Ulundi. It was the intention of Colonel Pearson to establish here an entrenched post as a point d'appui to the invading army. On the following day the colonel was followed by the rear division, escorting the heavy baggage, necessary though inconvenient impedimenta, as it contained stores and ammunition. The column of waggons extended for five miles, and it took the officers in charge all their time and the services of three horses each during the day to supervise its progress from inspan till outspan. Again, two days later, came the commissariat, and here imagination fails to describe the difficulties encountered. The subject of transport is one that must be considered in any future operations in Africa. The waggons must be stronger than those employed; the animals should be proof against sickness caused by climate, the tulip plant, and the tsetse fly, and this can be avoided by choosing one's own season for marching. The employment of mules would be much preferable to that of oxen, although in many books the converse is stated, the Dutch being infatuated in regard to the superior qualities of the latter. Mules, for instance, have this advantage over oxen. They can travel twenty-five miles a day with ease, while twelve or fifteen a day with oxen is considered good work; but, on the other hand, it must be remembered that a mule costs twice as much as an ox, apart from the cost of feeding. The mule must, of course, be fed on forage carried for him or bought on the road, while the ox will feed on the veldt, except during the three winter months, when his services are not often required. Two kinds of mules can be procured about Pretoria—the Montevidean and the home-bred animal. The latter is generally preferred, although no doubt the former is most tractable. There is an immense trouble in selecting oxen for campaigning, as none but those bred in the sour veldt of Natal or Zululand are of any use for such rough food and hard work; and, as a rule, these will live where others would die. The usual load is 7000 lbs., placed on a waggon weighing 3000 lbs., and drawn by sixteen or eighteen oxen. The cost for oxen averages about 9l. each, but during this war they went up to 18l., and even 25l. Each waggon, with dissel-boom and yokes complete, costs at least 180l. The cost of mules will average 20l. each, and mule waggons 100l., with harness at 5l. for each animal.
The road, after crossing the river Tugela, crosses no less than four streams, and before reaching Ekowe passes through a broken bushy country. On the 22nd, the day on which Isandula was attacked, Colonel Pearson had a sharp engagement with the enemy at a place called by the natives Inyezane, about four or five miles beyond his camping-ground of the 21st. Major Barrow had been sent forward along a fertile valley which led to the Inyezane, when Colonel Pearson received a despatch from him, saying that he had selected a tolerably good place for camping, which he had carefully guarded by vedettes. On receiving this information the colonel at once rode on to the spot, and although he did not quite approve of the ground, as being too full of bush for an outspan, he decided to allow the waggons to be outspanned for two hours on account of there being no water near at hand. This was done to rest and feed the oxen, and to allow the men to have their morning meal. About eight o'clock, just as the waggons had begun to park, and while the officers were busy in directing the posting of pickets, scouts, and sentries, the advanced company of the Native Contingent, which had been scouting in front under Captain Hart, discovered the Zulus in force rapidly advancing over the slopes and attempting to gain the bushes on both flanks. They came on in skirmishing and extended order in the finest style, rushing from bush to bush in a steady but stealthy manner until within 100 or 150 yards of the outposts. Captain Hart's men, being in the open, had to bear the brunt of a heavy fire, and not without casualties, as they lost one officer, four non-commissioned officers, and four privates almost at once. These poor fellows, it is feared, were sacrificed, inasmuch as they did not understand the order to retire and seek cover, and concluded that it was their duty to remain in the open. The Naval Brigade was now ordered into action, and most ably they acquitted themselves. Two 7-pounders and two 24-pounder Naval Brigade rockets were smartly brought into action on a knoll at the base of the pass, but commanding the valley from which the flank attack was made. Meanwhile two companies of the Buffs and A and B companies of the Naval Brigade opened a heavy and well-directed fire upon the enemy, and effectually held him in check. This coign of vantage was occupied by Colonel Pearson, whence he directed the movements of his troops during the fight. All this time the waggons continued to park, and while the fire was kept up by Commander Campbell, Lieutenant Lloyd, with his guns, and Lieutenant Martin with the Buffs, two other companies of the same regiment which had been employed in guarding waggons were moved down, ready to clear the bush as soon as it was well shelled and swept with rockets and musketry. Colonel Pearson selected Captain Macgregor to undertake this duty, with the assistance of Captains Harrison and Wyld, who, getting their men into skirmishing order, and bringing their shoulders gradually forward as steadily as if manœuvring at a field-day, sent the Zulu braves flying discomfited before them, and exposed them once more in the open to the hail of shot and shell which swept the plain. Colonel Welman, 99th Regiment, now took advantage of this favourable moment, when the enemy was demoralized, to send forward Captain Wynne and Major Barrow with the infantry. These, with skirmishers and flankers on the left, and supported by two half-companies of the Buffs and 99th, now moved forward at a steady pace.
The Zulus, however, were not beaten, though evidently puzzled, and Campbell, who was in charge of the Naval Brigade, saw that they were making a flank movement on the left. This officer at once obtained permission from Colonel Pearson to take a portion of his men and drive out a body of Zulus who had obtained possession of a kraal about 400 yards from the knoll. Captain Hart, with part of his Native Contingent, gallantly supported this movement. They managed to obtain possession of the high ground to the left of the Ekowe road, and effectually checked the enemy in their movement on the British left.
But the gallant sailor Campbell was not satisfied with this partial success, and sent for further permission to follow up his coup by driving on the foe to a more respectable distance. Colonel Parnell, of the Buffs, who up to this time had been acting as a sort of reserve with Captain Foster's company at the foot knoll, where Colonel Pearson remained throughout the action, had now an opportunity of mingling in the fray. Smartly deploying his men, he advanced at the double, and forming up on the right of the bluejackets, swept the heights beyond the kraal which a few moments before were crowned with savage warriors. This decided the action, as the Zulus, thoroughly distracted, fled in all directions, the guns making capital practice wherever a group collected. The last round from the rocket-tubes seemed to carry destruction and confusion amongst them, and was fired a little before ten a.m.
Colonel Pearson and Colonel Parnell both had their horses shot under them, and several officers remarked that the fire of the Zulus was principally directed at the English leaders. The regiments opposed to Pearson were composed of the Umxapu, Umdhlanefu, and Ingulubi, and as near as could be judged, and from the information subsequently received, numbered about 5000 men. Of these at the very least 300 were slain, while the number of wounded, as a rule carried away into the bush, could not have been less than double that. Pearson's loss was eight killed and sixteen wounded, and of these were six officers and non-commissioned officers of the Native Contingent. The following day two companies of the Buffs, two companies Native Contingent, and a few mounted men were sent off to the help of Colonel Ely, 99th Regiment, who with three companies of his regiment was bringing up a convoy, much wanted, of seventy waggons of stores and ammunition, while on Saturday, the 18th, Major Coates started with fifty extra waggons to bring up more supplies. On the day after the Inyezane engagement Pearson arrived at Ekowe. The position was a strong one, and he immediately set to work to make it still more formidable. Water was close to the fort, and well under its fire.
At this juncture news of the Isandhlwana disaster reached Colonel Pearson. After consultation with his officers, he decided to remain where he was, feeling confident that even without further supplies or reinforcements he could hold his position for at least a couple of months. All his waggons came in safety to the fort except five, which broke down and had to be abandoned. The mounted men and Native Contingent were sent back to save food, and there thus remained 1200 British troops, having 320 rounds per man.
The first failure in the carrying out of Lord Chelmsford's plans occurred to No. 4 Column, and proved the initial step to the crowning disaster of Isandhlwana. The right centre column, which should have operated simultaneously with Colonel Wood's force, was unfortunately composed almost entirely of natives, and these fellows did not succeed in getting over at the point directed in orders. As this column could not be brought over the river, a portion of it was left behind to keep open communications and guard the frontier, while the remainder, under Colonel Durnford, was moved up to Rorke's Drift to reinforce Colonel Glyn's command. The following day (12th) Colonel Glyn had his first brush with the enemy. Lord Chelmsford had joined this column, and after crossing the Tugela ordered out a reconnaissance by the Bashee Valley and along the road leading to Izpizi. Glyn took with him three companies of the 1st battalion 24th and one battalion 3rd Regiment Natal Native Contingent, while the mounted men, crossing the valley, went rapidly along the road leading over the Ngudu mountains, where high cliffs close in the gorge for more than three miles. Cattle and armed Zulus were seen on the heights, and some of the 24th and the natives were ordered to bear round to the right flank and cut them off. The skirmish which followed lasted about twenty minutes, and was a very smart affair. It resulted in the taking of the fastnesses and the precipitate flight of the Zulus, who suffered a loss of ten killed, three wounded, and nine prisoners taken, together with a quantity of cattle, horses, and sheep. Colonel Glyn's loss was two privates Natal Contingent killed, one officer of the same, Lieutenant Purvis, severely wounded; Corporal Mayer, Natal Native Contingent, severe wound in thigh. Four companies of the 2nd battalion 24th, and four companies of the 2nd battalion 3rd Regiment Natal Native Contingent, under Colonel Degacher, were now ordered by the General to advance up the Bashee and attack Usirayo's kraal, a place called Loxie, about two or three miles farther on. This place, situated in a wild and mountainous gorge or krantz, interspersed with caves, guarded by huge boulders, was completely explored by these men. In the meantime Russell and his mounted men had ascended to the summit of the Ngudu mountain, where they were fired upon at a distance of 90 or 100 yards. Sixteen of the Zulus were killed, and a very heavy thunderstorm came on during the fight. No signs could be observed of any Zulu force in reserve, and this was explained by the subsequent news that Usirayo had made a precipitate flight in the direction of the king's kraal. On the following day communications were opened between Wood's column and that of Colonel Glyn. The General's movements from the first appear to have been hampered by baggage and transport arrangements, and a similar reason delayed Colonel Pearson. Lord Chelmsford was present with this column when it moved from Rorke's Drift, and saw the site which was chosen by Colonel Glyn at Insalwana, ten miles on the road to the Indeni forest. He then left Colonel Glyn in charge of the camp, and on the same day moved, with a portion of the force, ten miles further on, to reconnoitre the country in front. Returning to camp that evening, without having had time to fully explore, the General, the following morning, sent out two separate reconnoitring columns, under the command respectively of Major Dartnell, who took with him the Mounted Police and Natal Volunteers, of which he is commandant, and Commandant Lonsdale with two battalions of his Native Contingent. Dartnell went along the same road as that explored by the General the previous day, while Lonsdale moved along the southern slope of the Inhlazatye range, towards a hill called Malaka's Kop. If possible a junction between these two bodies was to be effected; and, as soon as information could be obtained as to the situation of the enemy and the strategical features of the locality, both were to return to the headquarter camp. By some extraordinary oversight, neither of these reconnoitring columns seems to have been supplied with rations, while it was usual on such expeditions for the men to take preserved meat and three days' biscuit in their haversacks, supposing that mule transport cannot be had. On the afternoon of the Tuesday Major Dartnell sent an officer to the headquarter camp, to inform the General that he could not advance beyond the Insangu river, a small stream near Inkankla Mountain, as the Zulus were posted there in force. Dartnell, therefore, sent an orderly to call up Lonsdale with his Native Contingent, and sent to Lord Chelmsford to request a reinforcement of regulars to enable him to attack the enemy. His lordship did not consider it advisable to comply with this demand, as the daylight was almost gone, and the distance was long. A supply of biscuit was, however, sent out to the exploring party, who bivouacked at the foot of the Inhlazatye. During the night, however, Major Dartnell appears to have become aware of his critical position, and at half-past two on the morning of the 22nd (Wednesday), Colonel Glyn received a letter from him, saying that the Zulus had been strongly reinforced, and were now in his front in great strength. Instead of recalling the column, or at once pushing forward troops to its assistance, a delay took place, and a staff officer was despatched to ask Dartnell what he wished done. After some further lapse of time the General ordered Colonel Glyn to march to Major Dartnell's assistance with the 2nd battalion 24th Regiment, consisting of six companies, the mounted infantry, and four of Harness's guns. As this detachment would considerably weaken the camp, the General at the same time sent off two expresses to Colonel Durnford, who had been left at Rorke's Drift, telling him to move up at once to Isandula with his 500 native troops, 250 of whom were mounted. The General then decided to accompany Colonel Glyn's force, and Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, 1-24th, was left in charge of the camp, with orders to defend it, pending the arrival of Durnford's natives. The actual fighting strength of Pulleine's force consisted of 2 officers, 78 men, and 2 guns R.A.; 1-24th Regiment, 15 officers, 334 men; 2-24th Regiment, 5 officers, 90 men; mounted Europeans, 5 officers, 204 men; Native Contingent, 19 officers, 391 men; Natal Pioneers, 1 officer, 10 men; while Durnford, when he arrived very soon after, brought with him 18 officers and 450 men, thus making an aggregate of 772 Europeans and 850 natives, or in all 1622 combatants. On his arrival at the camp, Colonel Durnford, being the senior officer, of course immediately assumed the command.