The number of English engaged in this action was eight officers and 131 non-commissioned officers and men; of these fifteen were killed and twelve wounded, two subsequently dying of their hurts. The attacking Zulu force consisted of two regiments—the Undi and Udkloko—in all a total of something less than 4000. Of these 370 lay dead around the post on the morning that Lord Chelmsford so opportunely arrived.
Surgeon Reynolds, Acting Commissary Officer Dalton, and Assistant Commissary Dunne were throughout conspicuous for their gallantry and coolness. Lieutenants Chard, R.E., and Bromhead, 24th Regiment, subsequently received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament for their heroic conduct, and were advanced to the rank of majors.
So much has been said and written as to the cause of, and so many people have been held responsible for the Isandhlwana disaster that the subject cannot here be passed over in silence.
The living no less than the dead have a claim to a full share of justice and truth; but remembering that the mouths of one party—"les morts qui ne reviennent pas"—are closed, we should be extremely careful in drawing any conclusion from acts which, could the testimony of the fallen be obtained, it would not only explain and excuse, but amply justify.
The court of inquiry held at Helpmakaar found itself unable to form from the available evidence any positive judgment; but the facts disclosed point irresistibly to a negative conclusion. Had the troops acted on the defensive, the camp would not have been lost.
Still there may have been cogent—nay irresistible reasons which caused Colonel Durnford to push forward his forces. Were Colonel Pulleine alive, he might give equally good reasons for acceding to Durnford's urgent request and sending out the reinforcements.
The British regular infantry advanced successfully, retired slowly and in unbroken order; they were still firing rapidly, coolly, and with great effect. Things though desperate were by no means hopeless. Suddenly the native levies, "though their officers tried to restrain them, rushed back in the utmost disorder," thus exposing the flank and rear of the regulars. "Few of the men had time to fix bayonets before the enemy were amongst them, using their assegais with terrible effect." Here is the answer to "How did it happen?" The natives on one side—the Zulu—were regarded too lightly; on the other, fighting for the English with too great confidence. "Why," it will be asked, "were not the waggons laagered? Whose duty was it to see this done?" Lord Chelmsford had issued a standing order at the very commencement of the campaign, that this was to be the first consideration in all camps. Lord Chelmsford, accompanied Colonel Glyn from Rorke's Drift, saw the site chosen at Isandhlwana, and then immediately started on a reconnaissance which lasted till after nightfall. Doubtless Lord Chelmsford supposed Colonel Glyn had done what was necessary. On the following morning with the first streak of dawn Colonel Glyn was ordered to proceed to Major Dartnell's assistance, and Lord Chelmsford determined to accompany him, after despatching an express to Colonel Durnford ordering him up "to strengthen the camp." Doubtless Colonel Glyn supposed that Colonel Pulleine would see to laagering the waggons. Colonel Pulleine was in command of the camp a bare three hours, and doubtless, knowing how brief his tenure of office was to be, preferred to let things remain as they were till his successor's arrival. Colonel Durnford had not been a single half-hour in camp before the action was commenced.
It is asked why did not the troops form squares? Hastings, we are told, had Harold's men only remained in their position, would have been a Saxon victory—Torres Vedras a disgrace instead of a glory had the British troops been rashly taunted into leaving their trenches: and Waterloo a more glowing theme for Beranger's lyre had Napoleon been able to entice the patient English squares to forsake their adamantine formation. But why was Colonel Durnford to form squares? How was he to imagine that such an immense force was arrayed against him when the Commander-in-chief had with him a superior force to that left in the camp avowedly to operate against the enemy's main body? For such his information and personal observation led him to believe was the force against whom he and Major Dartnell were acting.
Colonel Durnford was no novice in South African war; like Cæsar, he had the gift of the pen no less than the sword; he had both written and fought well. Colonel Pulleine was an experienced officer of no mean reputation, and by whatever device they were deceived, we may be sure that it was no ordinary one, and that few would have stood where they fell.
Again, who could have anticipated the attack? We have it from the lips of a Zulu that the onset was unpremeditated, and the result of accident. With all humbleness, let it be confessed that—