The Story of the Zulu Campaign

by Waller Ashe; Edmund Verney Wyatt-Edgell

Ibabanango, which Lord Chelmsford had selected as an advanced depôt for the united forces of his column and that of Wood, is again situated about midway between this place (Kopje Allein) and the king's kraal at Ulundi. The troops in this camp consisted of a company of Engineers, the cavalry brigade, two batteries of Royal Artillery, four line battalions, and 800 natives. The encampment was rather extensive, but this upon sanitary grounds and the best medical advice. The battalions were encamped as at open order, front as in line, with a depth of 116 yards, which is unusual, for half the above frontage is the usual encampment, and 30 yards were left between each of the four battalions. Each regiment of cavalry usually occupies 172 yards of front and 130 yards of depth, but its camp can be condensed to 120 yards of front by crossing heel-ropes, and this, for defensive reasons, was the plan adopted by General Marshall. This could not be done with Cape or Indian remounts, as entire horses would fight if so close to each other; but English horses are so accustomed to this proximity that it was found they throve better when allowed companionship. To each battery of artillery was allowed a frontage of 133 yards, with a depth of 114 yards, or 70 yards front at close order, while from centre to centre of the tents 10 paces were allotted. The kitchens were simple enough, being nothing more than a trench to catch the wind and hold the usual pattern of Flanders or Torrens kettle—the former, weighing 8½ lbs., holding twelve quarts, and cooking for eight men, while the latter weighs 3½ lbs., holds six quarts, and cooks for five men. Whenever the ground was too wet for a trench, two parallel sod walls answered the same purpose, and two trenches, 10 feet long, 9 inches broad, and 12 inches deep were allowed for a company of 120 men. The medical arrangements were as elaborate as could be made consistent with the limited means of transport, but what was deficient in quantity was made up in excellence of detail. Medical officers and stretcher-bearers usually moved in front of the camp, and the temporary hospital was always placed in the least exposed position near at hand, while the field-hospitals were always in rear. One medical officer was allotted to each battalion of infantry, regiment of cavalry, or battery of artillery—more could not be spared. One bearer company and two field-hospitals were allotted to each division. This bearer company included 206 men, part natives, 101 mules or horses, and 30 waggons. The field-hospitals had each 75 men, 52 mules, and 10 waggons, while each field-hospital had equipment for 200 sick. Fortunately the health of the troops was exceptionally good.

Instead of an advance from Rorke's Drift, it was now determined to take a line from Kopje Allein to Blood river, across the more northern spurs of the Ingutu hills, and endeavour to ultimately strike the road laid down in the maps, between the Alarm and the Isipizi hills. This route was to be taken by General Wood's flying column in advance, and General Newdigate's division, of which actually it was intended to form an integral portion. The former consisted of the 13th and 90th Regiments of Light Infantry and five companies of the 80th Regiment, all of them in splendid and hard-working condition, and devoted to their brilliant leader. Wood's cavalry consisted of 900 mounted men belonging to various corps, and commanded by the Rupert of South Africa, Redvers Buller, whose men were ready to follow him anywhere, and die for him to a man, after his splendid self-devotion at Zlobani and elsewhere. Wood, who made friends wherever he moved, had some valuable allies in Oham's people, who, hating the tyranny of Cetywayo, were invaluable as scouts and spies to the flying columns. The arrangements for the line of advance were as follows:—Wood's flying column was to keep in advance of Newdigate's division by about five miles, while in front of the former a veil of cavalry was to keep in advance about ten miles, connected by intervening files. Each morning orderlies were to report whether the front and rear were perfectly clear, nor was an advance to be made until such was known. In case of any enemy attacking Wood, the latter was to be at once supported by Marshall, who could circle round and take the Zulus in the rear, a principle of strategy they strongly object to. Crealock, with the aid of the naval authorities, was at the same time to push forward from Fort Chelmsford, and, if the landing at Port Durnford was reported practicable, force the Umvolosi and operate in conjunction with the 2nd column from his base at Port Durnford.

Lord Chelmsford had long seen that the best method to obviate the almost overwhelming difficulties of transport would be to form some seaport on the Zulu coast. Delagoa Bay was at first selected; but considerable difficulty was found in arranging with the Portuguese Government as to our landing a force in the neighbourhood, and that scheme was consequently abandoned. It then became evident that if a seaport, or even ever so small a landing-place could be provided at the mouth of the Umlalasi, it would be at once the nearest and best base of operations for any force moving from the Tugela upon Ulundi or Cetywayo's other stronghold.

Furthermore, as far back as December, 1877, Sir Theophilus Shepstone wrote to Sir Bartle Frere, informing his Excellency that two gentlemen—Mr. E. Rathbone and Mr. H. W. Taylor—wished to call attention to the fact that, from personal observations they had made, they were satisfied that a practicable landing-place on the Zulu coast could be found. These gentlemen, it is true, as Sir Theophilus pointed out, differed as to the precise spot on the coast, but both agreed that it was near the Tugela mouth, and but a very few miles intervene between the one place described and the other. This discovery was made twenty-seven years ago, in the year 1852, and, so far from being kept a secret, was published for general information in the Natal Mercury.

H.M. gunboat "Forester" was accordingly despatched to thoroughly explore this part of the coast; no less than three minute and careful surveys were made, and finally, on May 26th, she returned with the welcome intelligence that a fine lagoon existed close to the mouth of the Umlalasi, with a sheltered outlet, and that, from the soundings taken for five miles on either side of the river, there was no actual obstacle to a landing being practicable at all tides and all seasons.

There was, however, at the mouth of the river, a bar on which the surf broke heavily; and in bad weather experience proved on more than one occasion that this formed an impassable barrier even to the most determined attempts to make a landing.

This spot was christened Port Durnford, and steps were immediately taken to form there a fort and depôt of supplies for the 1st column, in command of which was General Crealock.

To Commodore Sullivan, Major Barrow, and the captain of H.M.S. "Forester" principally belong the honours of the discovery; and while the sailors worked heartily seaward and along the dangerous and difficult coast, Barrow and his riders found out all the roads which led to the point selected. It had been arranged that General Crealock, with the advanced guard of the 1st division should move down the Umlalasi to a point carefully surveyed by Barrow, and which was subsequently, in compliment to the gallant young prince, called Fort Napoleon. Thence he was to proceed to Port Durnford, to meet the "Forester."

Hitherto the advance had been slow; but when it is remembered that forts were constructed at every strategic point of defence—at the Amatikula, the Inyezani (respectively Forts Chelmsford and Crealock), and the whole of the road between this place and the Tugela had been put into working order by fatigue parties and Engineers, it is clear there was no real ground for complaint of the delay. Every stream had been bridged, either with pontoons, casks, or trestles, and trees had been cut down, rocks and boulders blown up, as well as gradients eased and facilities for transport carried out. Forts Pearson, Tenedos, Chelmsford, Crealock, and Napoleon were garrisoned by the less robust men of the column. Six companies of the 88th, with the headquarters, held Fort Chelmsford, while a wing of the 99th performed the same office at Fort Crealock. The regular communications along this line of advanced forts were placed in charge of one of the best men out there, namely, Colonel Hugh Rowlands, 41st Regiment, whose eye for country, tact, and temper with the natives and incessant vigilance eminently qualified him for such a responsibility.