The prosecuting attorney now arose, and made the closing plea. He set forth in vivid colors the provoking nature of the offence, and the loss of time, temper and school privileges which Otis had suffered in consequence of it. Even allowing that there is no evil in playing harmless practical jokes on the first day of April, he held that this was a very different affair. It was too serious a matter to be passed off as a joke. It was an offence against good order and good feeling. But he was ready to go farther than this, and condemn all kinds of April-fool tricks. It was a foolish custom, if it was an old one. As to boys having an “inalienable right” to make fools of each other, on any day of the year, as had been claimed by the defendant, he said the proposition need only be stated, to be laughed at. There were serious evils connected with this fooling business, as was abundantly illustrated in the case under trial. It was very apt to be carried too far, and to degenerate into impudence, rowdyism, recklessness, revenge, etc. Besides, it begets lying. He believed there were more lies told among boys on April first than on any other day of the year. Lying is almost essential to the playing off of an April-fool hoax. Lies may be acted, as well as spoken; they may be implied, as well as expressed. Any attempt to deceive, is a falsehood.
“I would like to ask the learned counsel,” interrupted Ronald, “whether I am guilty of falsehood, when I give my hens glass nest-eggs?”
This question produced some merriment in the room, and for a moment it seemed to stagger the attorney. He got over it, however, by saying that a falsehood could be told only to a rational being. A hen is not capable of lying, or of being lied to.
Ronald again interposed. He said he admitted that a hen could not tell a lie; but she could be deceived with a glass egg, just as he was sometimes deceived by lying boys why, then, could she not be lied to, as well as he?
The prosecuting attorney appeared somewhat confused, for a moment, but he proceeded to say that this discussion had nothing to do with the case on trial, and he would thank the defendant not to interrupt him again with irrelevant matters. He then resumed his argument. He thought there could be no doubt that if we allowed another to make an erroneous statement in our hearing, innocently, and we did not correct it, we were not blameless; but if we had previously set a trap to mislead the person into this very false statement, we certainly were greatly to blame. He then took up the question of Ronald’s disobedience, and argued that he was without excuse for neglecting to call Otis, when told to. In concluding, he said he had been informed that the accused had been guilty of similar offences, though in a milder degree, a year previous to this time, and had been faithfully warned against repeating them. Justice, both to himself and to the family, seemed to require that efficient means should be adopted to put a stop to such proceedings, and he called upon the jury to do their duty firmly, and not allow their verdict to be influenced by fear, favor, or a mistaken charity.
The judge now arose and charged the jury. He set forth the facts that had been proved against the accused, and stated in an impartial manner the questions which the jury were to consider. He said he did not consider it proper to offer them any instruction as to the moral law on which their decision must be based, as they were as well versed in that as he was himself. He closed by urging them to render an honest and impartial decision.
The jury now retired to another room, and the judge announced that the court would take a recess. Judge and prisoner, counsel and witness, now chatted together quite familiarly for a little while, until the jury returned, when the court was called to order, and the verdict announced, as follows:
“We find the prisoner guilty on all the charges; but as we are of opinion that he has erred through thoughtlessness rather than from malice, we recommend that as light a penalty be inflicted as in the opinion of the court will serve the ends of justice.”
The judge, who had probably anticipated such a verdict, and had decided in his mind what the penalty should be, now told the prisoner to arise, and proceeded to address him in these words:
“Ronald D. Page, you have been tried by a jury, and found guilty of taking unwarrantable liberties with your room-mate, and with being virtually guilty of disobedience and falsehood, that you might the better carry out your plot. The court concurs in the justice of this verdict, and also in the propriety of the recommendation of mercy that accompanies it. But the court is of opinion that while the sentence is tempered with mercy, it should be of sufficient severity to prevent a repetition of the offence. Its sentence, therefore, is, that on Wednesday next, at two o’clock in the afternoon, you be taken to your chamber, and stripped of your clothing.”