CHAPTER XIII
THE WILDERNESS AND SPOTTSYLVANIA
Wherever Grant had control in the West, and in all his counsels, his distinct purpose was to mass the Union forces and not scatter them, and to get at the enemy. With what ideas and intention he began the new task he set forth definitely in his report made in July, 1865.
"From an early period in the rebellion, I had been impressed with the idea that the active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war.... I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy, preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance; second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal sections of our common country to the Constitution and laws of the land."
Grant instructed General Butler, who had a large army at Fortress Monroe, to make Richmond his objective point. He instructed General Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, that Lee's army "would be his objective point, and wherever Lee went he would go also." He hoped to defeat and capture Lee, or to drive him back on Richmond, following close and establishing a connection with Butler's army there, if Butler had succeeded in advancing so far. Sherman was to move against Johnston's army, and Sigel, with a strong force, was to protect West Virginia and Pennsylvania from incursions. This, with plans for keeping all the other armies of the Confederacy so occupied that Lee could not draw from them, constituted the grand strategy of the campaign.
The theatre of operations of the Army of the Potomac was a region of country lying west of a nearly north-and-south line passing through Richmond and Washington. It was about 120 miles long, from the Potomac on the north to the James on the south, and from 30 to 60 miles wide, intersected by several rivers flowing into Chesapeake Bay. The headquarters of the Union army were at Culpeper Court House, about 70 miles southwest of Washington, with which it was connected by railroad. This was the starting point. Lee's army was about fifteen miles away, with the Rapidan, a river difficult of passage, in front of it, the foothills of the Blue Ridge on its left, and on its right a densely wooded tract of scrub pines and various low growths, almost pathless, known as "the Wilderness."
Two courses were open to Grant,—to march by the right, cross the upper fords, and attack Lee on his left flank, or march by the left, crossing the lower fords, and making into the Wilderness. Grant chose the latter way, as, on the whole, most favorable to keeping open communications. For General Grant, as commander of all the armies, was bound to avoid being shut up or leaving Washington imperiled. And it may properly be said here that his plan contemplated leaving General Meade free in his tactics, giving him only general directions regarding what he desired to have accomplished, the actual fighting to be done under Meade's orders.
The official reports to the Adjutant-General's office in Washington show that on the 20th of April the Army of the Potomac numbered 81,864 men present and fit for duty. Burnside's corps, which joined in the Wilderness, added to this force 19,250 men, making a total of 101,114 men. After the Wilderness, a division numbering 7000 or 8000 men under General Tyler joined it. When the Chickahominy was reached, a junction with Butler's army, 25,000 strong, was made. Lee had on the 20th of April present for duty, armed and equipped, 53,891. A few days later he was reinforced by Longstreet's corps, which on the date given numbered 18,387, making a total of 72,278. Grant's army outnumbered Lee's, but he was to make an offensive campaign in the enemy's country, operating on exterior lines, and keeping long lines of communication open. Defending Richmond and Petersburg there were other Confederate forces, under Beauregard, Hill, and Hoke, estimated to amount to nearly 30,000 men, and Breckenridge commanded still another army in the Shenandoah Valley. In Grant's command, but not of the Army of the Potomac, were the garrison of Washington and the force in West Virginia.