Japan

by Walter G. Dickson

So great were Japanese interests in China and Corea, that the question of the integrity of those countries, with “open doors,” had become of vital importance to the Island Empire. To secure both integrity and “open doors,” Japan utilized the full power of her diplomatic genius to obtain an alliance with Great Britain. Her endeavors in this direction were highly successful. On February 12, 1902, was formed the historical Anglo-Japanese Alliance to preserve the integrity of China and the independence of Corea. What led to this greatest political event in 1902? this first alliance in history between a white nation and a yellow nation? What induced England to abandon her traditional policy of “splendid isolation”? Why did England break that policy for the first time in many decades to ally herself with an Oriental rather than an Occidental power? It is to be noted here that Japan at this time called herself the England of the East, one historian—Diosy—referring to the matter thus: “Japan, geographically to the mighty continent of Asia what Great Britain is to the continent of Europe; Japan, an island people with all the strength, mental and physical, that is the heritage of a nation cradled on the sea; Japan, by the necessities of her environment compelled to appreciate the importance of sea-power; Japan, in short, the Britain of the Orient.”

Japan’s first opportunity to back up this view of herself, by concrete demonstration, was furnished by the Boxer Movement in China. Even then, in 1900, Japan had in mind an alliance with Great Britain; and now she determined to make the best possible showing. So thoroughly, accordingly, did she display her military and naval efficiency, so repeatedly did her troops win laurels side by side with European troops, that England was greatly impressed. It was by her triumph during the Boxer uprising, indeed, that Japan confirmed her claim to recognition as a world power—a claim recognized by the powers in 1899, but not reaching full completion until the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Convention in 1902.

Second, the alliance was said to be the result of a natural community of British and Japanese interests in the East; that the two countries were now allies in fact, while formerly they had only been allies in spirit; that Japan and England had similar sympathies and similar policies in the East; and that therefore the convention was entirely voluntary, spontaneous, and natural.

Third, the alliance was popularly supposed to include the two greatest naval powers in the world, and as such it was said to represent a guarantee of peace in the Orient, and of fairness in all matters relating to China and Corea. A Japanese official, in his exaltation, said: “There is no power or combination of powers that could make head against this union in the Far East; the attempt would be like spitting at a tiger.”

The signing of the convention met with popular disapproval in England; but it was the occasion of great rejoicing in Japan. In every province in the Mikado’s empire feasts were held, the celebration being continued over a period of ten days.

One significant phase of public opinion regarding the alliance, was that to all intents and purposes it would include the United States as a “silent partner.” An American historian, Ernest W. Clement, in his “Hand Book of Modern Japan,” wrote: “It is well known that the convention was shown at Washington before it was promulgated, and that it was heartily approved by our Government. Practically, therefore, it is, in a very broad sense, an Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Certainly our interests in the Far East have been and are identical with those of Great Britain and Japan; and all our ‘moral influence,’ at least, should be exerted toward the purposes of that convention. Indeed, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should mean the union of Great Britain and the United States with Japan to maintain in the Orient the ‘open door,’ not merely of trade and commerce, but of all social, intellectual, moral, and religious reforms; the open door, not of material civilization only, but also of the gospel of Jesus Christ.”

It was natural that Japan should be eager for American assistance. When events foretold the coming war between Russia and Japan, the influence of the United States in international councils was so great that, as an ally, she would have been welcomed by Japan, of course. Until the exact position which the United States would take in regard to affairs in the Far East was known Japan was nervous; for Japan understood that the policy of Great Britain as well as that of France and Germany would be governed to some extent by that of America. As a government, however, the government would take no part in the coming war, principally because the government, for the present, at least, could not see wherein American interests would be threatened. However, Japan asked the question pointblank: Would the United States assist Japan? The answer was an emphatic but courteous “No.”

With the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Convention began the seventh great period in the Japan of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—the period of Cosmopolitanism. Japan was no longer native Japan, or Asiatic Japan; she was now Cosmopolitan Japan. The sixth previous periods were:

I. Seclusion (1801-1853). II. Treaty-making (1854-1858). III. Civil Commotions (1858-1868). IV. Reconstruction (1868-1878). V. Internal Development (1879-1889). VI. Constitutional Government (1889-1904).

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was presumably a proof that both the nations signing the convention regarded the presence of Russian troops in Manchuria and Russian aggression in the East generally as a genuine, threatening, and immediate source of danger—danger to British and Japanese trade. The facts concerning Russia’s interference with Japan were these: The Russian military forces which were stationed throughout Manchuria, in 1900, to suppress the Boxer Movement, had remained on Manchurian soil. In 1901, Japan and other European powers began pressing the Pekin Government to order the Russian forces out of Manchuria. Finally, on April 8, 1902, Russia and China signed a convention at Pekin, wherein Russia agreed to evacuate Manchuria by the 8th of October. In the meantime, however, through astute diplomatic procedure on the part of Russia, the Convention of April 8th “lapsed,” and on October 8th, consequently, there was as great a number of Russian troops in Manchuria as on April 8th. It was the “lapse” of the Convention of April 8th that aroused the Japanese nation to the fact that she would have to deal sternly with Russia; else Russia, secure in Manchuria, would assume a like position in Corea, and thus prepare the way for Russian armed invasion of Japan. A Japanese statesman referred to Corea at this time as “an arrow with the point aimed at our heart.” “The absorption of Manchuria by the Russians,” continued the statesman, “renders the position of Corea precarious. Corea is life or death to Japan. For the safety of my country I insist that it shall become Japanese, and upon that insistence every subject of the Mikado is willing to lay down his life.”