The secessionists held clear, logical views on the question before them. They clearly distinguished the “state” or “people” from “government.” No secessionist ever claimed that the right of secession was one derived from or preserved by the Constitution; it was a sovereign right. Granted the sovereignty of the state, the right to secede in any way at any time was, of course, not to be questioned. Consequently, they said but little on that point.

The coöperationists were vague-minded. Most of them were stanch believers in state sovereignty and opposed secession merely on the ground of expediency. A few held a confused theory that while the state was sovereign it had no right to secede unless with the whole South. This view was most strongly advocated by Clark of Lawrence. Separate secession was not a right, he said, though he admitted the sovereignty of the state. To secede alone would be rebellion; not so, if in company with other southern states. Earnest (c.) of Jefferson said that the state was sovereign, and that after secession any acts of the state or of its citizens to protect their rights would not be treason. But unless the state acted in its sovereign capacity, it could not withdraw from the Union, and her citizens would be subject to the penalties of treason.[50] Sheffield (c.) of Marshall believed in the right of “secession or revolution.” Clemens of Madison, elected as a coöperationist, said that in voting for secession he did it with the full knowledge that in secession they were all about to commit treason, and, if not successful, would suffer the pains and penalties pronounced against the highest political crime. Acting “upon the convictions of a lifetime” he “calmly and deliberately walked into revolution.”[51]

The coöperationists were generally disposed to deny the sovereignty of the convention. Most of them were former Whigs, who had never worked out a theory of government. Davis (c.) of Madison repeatedly denied that the convention had sovereign powers; sovereignty, he said, was held by the people. Clark (c.) of Lawrence complained that the convention was encroaching upon the rights of the people whom it should protect, and asserted it did not possess unlimited power, but that its power was conferred by act of the legislature, which created only a general agency for a special purpose; that the convention had no power to do more than pass the ordinance of secession and acts necessary thereto. Smith (c.) said that the convention was the creature of the legislature, not of the people, and that the southern Congress was the creature of the convention. Buford (s.) of Barbour[52] doubted whether the convention possessed legislative powers. According to his views, political or sovereign power was vested in the people; the convention was not above the constitution which created the legislature. Watts (s.) of Montgomery believed that the power of the convention to interfere with the constitution was confined to such changes as were necessary to the perfect accomplishment of secession. Yelverton (s.) of Coffee summed up the theory of the majority: the convention had full power and control over the legislative, executive, and judiciary; the people were present in convention in the persons of their representatives and in them was the sovereignty, the power, and the will of the state. This was the theory upon which the convention acted.

Passage of the Ordinance of Secession

On January 11, 1861, Yancey spoke at length, closing the debate on the question of secession. Referring to the spirit of fraternity that prevailed, he stated that irritation and suspicion had, in great degree, subsided. The majority had yielded to the minority all the time wanted for deliberation, and every one had been given an opportunity to record his sentiments. The question had not been pressed to a vote before all were ready. Though preferring a simple ordinance of secession, the majority had, for the sake of harmony and fraternal feeling, yielded to amendment by the minority. All, he said, were for resistance to Republican rule, and differed only as to the manner of resistance. Some believed in secession, others in revolution. The ordinance might mean disunion, secession, or revolution, as the members preferred. The mode was organized coöperation, not of states, but of the people of Alabama, in resistance to wrong. Yet the ordinance provided for coöperation with other states upon the basis of the Federal Constitution. Every effort, he said, had been made to find common ground upon which the advocates of resistance might meet, and all parties had been satisfied. This was not a movement of the politicians, but a great popular movement, based upon the widespread, deep-seated conviction that the government had fallen into the hands of a sectional majority who were determined to use it for the destruction of the rights of the South. All were driven by an irresistible tide; the minority had been unable to repress the movement, the majority had not been able to add one particle to its momentum; in northern, not in southern, hands was held the rod that smote the rock from which flowed this flood.

Some, he said, concluded that by dissolving the Union the rich inheritance bequeathed by the fathers was hazarded. But liberties were one thing, the power of government delegated to secure them was another. Liberties were inalienable, and the state governments were formed to secure them; the Federal government was the common agent, and its powers should be withdrawn when it abused them to destroy the rights of the people. This movement was not hostile to liberty nor to the Federal Constitution, but was merely a dismissal of an unfaithful agent. The state now resumed the duties formerly delegated to that agent. The ordinance of secession was a declaration of this fact and also a proposition to form a new government similar to the old. All were urged to sign the ordinance, not to express approval, but to give notice to their enemies that the people were not divided. “I now ask that the vote may be taken,” he said.

CIVIL WAR LEADERS.

Alexander Hamilton Stephens. William Lowndes Yancey.
General L. P. Walker,
First Confederate Secretary of War. President of Convention of 1875.
William R. Smith,
Leader of Coöperationists in 1861.
Jere Clemens.

The ordinance was called up. It was styled “An Ordinance to dissolve the Union between Alabama and other States united under the Compact styled ‘The Constitution of the United States of America.’” The preamble stated that the election of Lincoln and Hamlin by a sectional party avowedly hostile to the domestic institutions, peace, and security of Alabama, preceded by many dangerous infractions of the Constitution by the states and people of the North, was a political wrong of so insulting and menacing a character as to justify the people of Alabama in the adoption of prompt and decided measures for their future peace and security. The ordinance simply stated that Alabama withdrew from the Union and that her people resumed the powers delegated by the Constitution to the Federal government. A coöperationist amendment expressed the desire of the people to form with the other southern states a permanent government, and invited a convention of the states to meet in Montgomery on February 4, 1861, for consultation in regard to the common safety. The ordinance was passed by a vote of 69 to 31, every delegate voting. Fifteen coöperationists voted for secession and 22 signed the ordinance.