"The first is refuted by a large number of examples. St. Paul, for instance, describes it as the special privilege of the Jews that they had the keeping of 'the oracles of God' (Rom. iii. 2). Can we suppose that he meant anything else but the Old Testament Scriptures by this expression? Is it possible that he would exclude the books of Genesis, of Joshua, of Samuel and Kings, or only include such fragments of them as professed to give the direct sayings of God? Would he, or would he not, comprise under the term the account of the creation and fall (1 Cor. xi. 8 sq.), of the wanderings in the wilderness (1 Cor. x. 1 sq.), of Sarah and Hagar (Gal. iv. 21 sq.)? Does not the main part of his argument in the very next chapter (Rom. iv.) depend more on the narrative of God's dealings than His words? Again, when the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews refers to 'the first principles of the oracles of God' (v. 12), his meaning is explained by his practice; for he elicits the Divine teaching quite as much from the history as from the direct precepts of the Old Testament. But if the language of the New Testament writers leaves any loophole for doubt, this is not the case with their contemporary Philo. In one place, he speaks of the words in Deut. x. 9, 'The Lord is his inheritance,' as an 'oracle' ([Greek: logion]); in another he quotes as an 'oracle' ([Greek: logion]) the narrative in Gen. iv. 15: 'The Lord God set a mark upon Cain, lest anyone finding him should kill him.' [125:3] From this and other passages it is clear that with Philo an 'oracle' is a synonyme for a Scripture. Similarly Clement of Rome writes: 'Ye know well the sacred Scriptures, and have studied the oracles of God;' [125:4] and immediately he recalls to their mind the account in Deut. ix. 12 sq., Exod. xxxii. 7 sq., of which the point is not any Divine precept or prediction, but the example of Moses. A few years later Polycarp speaks in condemnation of those who 'pervert the oracles of the Lord." [126:1]
He then goes on to refer to Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Basil, but I need not follow him to these later writers, but confine myself to that which I have quoted.
"When Paul writes in the Epistle to the Romans iii. 2, 'They were entrusted with the oracles of God,' can he mean anything else but the Old Testament Scriptures, including the historical books?" argues Dr. Lightfoot. I maintain, on the contrary, that he certainly does not refer to a collection of writings at all, but to the communications or revelations of God, and, as the context shows, probably more immediately to the Messianic prophecies. The advantage of the Jews, in fact, according to Paul here, was that to them were first communicated the Divine oracles: that they were made the medium of God's utterances to mankind. There seems almost an echo of the expression in Acts vii. 38, where Stephen is represented as saying to the Jews of their fathers on Mount Sinai, "who received living oracles ([Greek: logia zônta]) to give unto us." Of this nature were the "oracles of God" which were entrusted to the Jews. Further, the phrase: "the first principles of the oracles of God" (Heb. v. 12), is no application of the term to narrative, as Dr. Lightfoot affirms, however much the author may illustrate his own teaching by Old Testament history; but the writer of the Epistle clearly explains his meaning in the first and second verses of his letter, when he says: "God having spoken to the fathers in time past in the prophets, at the end of these days spake unto us in His Son." Dr. Lightfoot also urges that Philo applies the term "oracle" ([Greek: logion]) to the narrative in Gen. iv. 15, &c. The fact is, however, that Philo considered almost every part of the Old Testament as allegorical, and held that narrative or descriptive phrases veiled Divine oracles. When he applies the term "oracle" to any of these it is not to the narrative, but to the Divine utterance which he believes to be mystically contained in it, and which he extracts and expounds in the usual extravagant manner of Alexandrian typologists. Dr. Lightfoot does not refer to the expression of 1 Pet. iv. 11, "Let him speak as the oracles of God" ([Greek: hôs logia Theou]), which shows the use of the word in the New Testament. He does point out the passage in the "Epistle of Clement of Rome," than which, in my opinion, nothing could more directly tell against him. "Ye know well the sacred Scriptures and have studied the oracles of God." The "oracles of God" are pointedly distinguished from the sacred Scriptures, of which they form a part. These oracles are contained in the "sacred Scriptures," but are not synonymous with the whole of them. Dr. Lightfoot admits that we cannot say how much "Polycarp" included in the expression: "pervert the oracles of the Lord," but I maintain that it must be referred to the teaching of Jesus regarding "a resurrection and a judgment," and not to historical books.
In replying to Dr. Lightfoot's chapter on the Silence of Eusebius, I have said all that is necessary regarding the other Gospels in connection with Papias. Papias is the most interesting witness we have concerning the composition of the Gospels. He has not told us much, but he has told us more than any previous writer. Dr. Lightfoot has not scrupled to discredit his own witness, however, and he is quite right in suggesting that no great reliance can be placed upon his testimony. It comes to this: We cannot rely upon the correctness of the meagre account of the Gospels supposed to have been written by Mark and Matthew, and we have no other upon which to fall back. Regarding the other two Gospels, we have no information whatever from Papias, whether correct or incorrect, and altogether this Father does little or nothing towards establishing the credibility of miracles and the reality of Divine Revelation.
V.
MELITO OF SARDIS—CLAUDIUS APOLLINARIS—POLYCRATES.
Throughout the whole of these essays, Dr. Lightfoot has shown the most complete misapprehension of the purpose for which the examination of the evidence regarding the Gospels in early writings was undertaken in Supernatural Religion, and consequently he naturally misunderstands and misrepresents its argument from first to last. This becomes increasingly evident when we come to writers, whom he fancifully denominates: "the later school of St. John." He evidently considers that he is producing a very destructive effect, when he demonstrates from the writings, genuine or spurious, of such men as Melito of Sardis, Claudius Apollinaris and Polycrates of Ephesus, or from much more than suspected documents like the Martyrdom of Polycarp, that towards the last quarter of the second century they were acquainted with the doctrines of Christianity and, as he infers, derived them from our four Gospels. He really seems incapable of discriminating between a denial that there is clear and palpable evidence of the existence and authorship of these particular Gospels, and denial that they actually existed at all. I do not suppose that there is any critic, past or present, who doubts that our four Gospels had been composed and were in wide circulation during this period of the second century. It is a very different matter to examine what absolute testimony there is regarding the origin, authenticity, and trustworthiness of these documents, as records of miracles and witnesses for the reality of Divine Revelation.
I cannot accuse myself of having misled Dr. Lightfoot on this point by any obscurity in the statement of my object, but, as he and other apologists have carefully ignored it, and systematically warped my argument, either by accident or design, I venture to quote a few sentences from Supernatural Religion, both to justify myself and to restore the discussion to its proper lines.
In winding up the first part of the work, which was principally concerned with the antecedent credibility of miracles, I said:—
"Now it is apparent that the evidence for miracles requires to embrace two distinct points: the reality of the alleged facts, and the accuracy of the inference that the phenomena were produced by supernatural agency … In order, however, to render our conclusion complete, it remains for us to see whether, as affirmed, there be any special evidence regarding the alleged facts entitling the Gospel miracles to exceptional attention. If, instead of being clear, direct, the undoubted testimony of known eye-witnesses free from superstition and capable, through adequate knowledge, rightly to estimate the alleged phenomena, we find that the actual accounts have none of these qualifications, the final decision with regard to miracles and the reality of Divine Revelation will be easy and conclusive." [130:1]