It is worth while to catalogue the supernatural incidents of this episode. 1 The vision; 2 Companions hearing the voice but seeing no man, or not hearing the voice but seeing the light; 3 Paul's blindness; 4 Vision of Ananias; 5 Restoration of sight to Paul; 6 Trance of Paul in Jerusalem. Such a narrative cannot be received in evidence.
The whole of the testimony before us, then, simply amounts to this: Paul believed that he had seen Jesus some years after his death: there is no evidence that he ever saw him during his life.(1) He states that he had "received" that he was seen by various other persons, but he does not give the slightest information as to who told him, or what reasons he had for believing the statements to be correct. And still less does he narrate the particulars of the alleged appearances or even of his own vision. Although we have no detailed statements of these extraordinary phenomena, we may assume that, as Paul himself believed that he had seen Jesus, certain other people of the circle of his disciples likewise believed that they had seen the risen Master. The whole of the evidence for the Resurrection reduces itself to an undefined belief on the part of a few persons, in a notoriously superstitious age, that after Jesus had died and been buried they had seen him alive. These visions, it is admitted, occurred at a time of the most intense religious excitement, and under circumstances of wholly exceptional mental agitation and distress. The wildest alternations of fear, doubt, hope and
indefinite expectation added their effects to oriental imaginations already excited by indignation at the fate of their Master, and sorrow or despair at such a dissipation of their Messianic dreams. There was present every element of intellectual and moral disturbance. Now must we seriously ask again whether this bare and wholly unjustified belief can be accepted as satisfactory evidence for so astounding a miracle as the Resurrection? Can the belief of such men, in such an age, establish the reality of a phenomenon which contradicts universal experience? It comes to us in the form of bare belief from the Age of Miracles, unsupported by facts, uncorroborated by evidence, unaccompanied by proof of investigation, and unprovided with material for examination. What is such belief worth? We have no.hesitation in saying that it is absolutely worth nothing.
We might here well bring our inquiry to a close, for we have no further evidence to deal with. The problem, however, is so full of interest that we cannot yet lay it down, and although we must restrain our argument within certain rigid limits, and wholly refrain from entering into regions of mere speculation, we may further discuss the origin and nature of the belief in the Resurrection. Recognizing the fact that, although its nature and extent are very indefinite, there existed an undoubted belief that, after his death, Jesus was seen alive; the argument is advanced that there must have been a real basis for this belief.
"The existence of a Christian society," says an apologetic writer, "is the first and (if rightly viewed) the final proof of the historic truth of the miracle on which it was founded. It may indeed be said that the Church was founded upon the belief in the Resurrection, and not upon the Resurrection itself: and that the testimony must therefore be limited to the attestation of the belief, and cannot reach to the attestation of the fact. But belief expressed in action is for the most part the strongest evidence which we can have of any historic event. Unless, therefore, it can be shown that the origin of the apostolic belief in the Resurrection, with due regard to the fulness of its characteristic form, and the breadth and rapidity of its propagation can be satisfactorily explained on other grounds, the belief itself is a sufficient proof of the fact."(1) This is obviously Paley's argument of the Twelve men(2) in a condensed form. Belief in action may be the strongest evidence which we can have of any historic event; but when the historic event happens to be an event in religious history, and an astounding miracle like the Resurrection, such bare evidence, emanating from such an age, is not very strong evidence, after all. The breadth and rapidity of its propagation absolutely prove nothing but belief in the report of those who believed; although it is very far from evident that people embraced Christianity from a rational belief in the Resurrection. No one pretends that the Gentiles who believed made a preliminary examination of the truth of the Resurrection. If breadth
and rapidity of propagation be taken as sufficient proof of the truth of facts, we might consider Buddhism and Mahomedanism as satisfactorily attested creeds. There could not be a greater fallacy than the supposition that the origin of a belief must be explained upon other grounds, or that belief itself accepted as a sufficient proof of the fact asserted. The truth or falsehood of any allegation is determined by a balance of evidence, and the critic is no more bound to account for the formation of erroneous belief than he is bound to believe because he may not, after a great lapse of time, be able so clearly to demonstrate the particular manner in which that erroneous belief originated, that any other mode is definitely excluded. The belief that a dead man rose from the dead and appeared to several persons alive is at once disposed of upon abstract grounds. The alleged occurrence is contrary to universal experience; but on the other hand the prevalence of defective observation, mistaken inference, self-deception and credulity, any of which might lead to such belief, are only too well known to it. Is it necessary to define which peculiar form of error is present in every false belief, before, with this immense preponderance of evidence against it, we finally reject it? We think not. Any explanation consistent with universal experience must be adopted, rather than a belief which is contradictory to it.