is better, and which is in our opinion the true one. We mean that which is usually called the "vision-hypothesis."

The phenomenon which has to be accounted for is the apostolic belief that, after he had been dead and buried, Jesus "was seen" [———] by certain persons. The explanation which we offer, and which has long been adopted in various forms by able critics,1 is, that doubtless Jesus was seen, but the vision was not real ^and objective, but illusory and subjective; that is to say: Jesus was not himself seen, but only a representation of Jesus within the minds of the beholders. This explanation not only does not impeach the veracity of those who affirmed that they had seen Jesus, but, accepting to a certain extent a subjective truth as the basis of the belief, explains upon well-known and natural principles the erroneous inference deduced from the subjective vision. It seems to us that the points to be determined are simple and obvious: Is it possible for a man to mistake subjective impressions for objective occurrences? Is it possible that any considerable number of persons can at the same time receive similar subjective impressions and mistake them for objective facts? If these questions can be answered affirmatively,

and it can be shown that the circumstances, the characters, the constitution of those who believed in the first instance, favoured the reception of such subjective impressions, and the deduction of erroneous inferences, it must be admitted that a satisfactory explanation can thus be given of the apostolic belief, on other grounds than the reality of a miracle opposed to universal experience.

No sooner is the first question formulated than it becomes obvious to every one who is acquainted with psychological and physiological researches, or who has even the most elementary knowledge of the influence of the mind upon the body, that it must at once be answered in the affirmative. Indeed the affirmation that subjective impressions, in connection with every sense, can be mistaken for, and believed to be, actual objective effects, is so trite that it seems almost superfluous to make it. Every reader must be well acquainted with illustrations of the fact. The only difficulty is to deal authoritatively with such a point within moderate compass. We must limit ourselves to the sense of sight "There are abundant proofs," says Sir Benjamin Brodie, "that impressions may be made in the brain by other causes simulating those which are made on it by external objects through the medium of the organs of sense, thus producing false perceptions, which may, in the first instance, and before we have had time to reflect on the subject, be mistaken for realities."(1) The limitation here introduced: "before we have had time to reflect on the subject," is of course valid in the case of those whose reason is capable of rejecting the false perceptions, whether on the ground of natural

law or of probability; but, in anyone ignorant of natural law, familiar with the idea of supernatural agency and the occurrence of miraculous events, it is obvious, reflection, if reflection of a sceptical kind can even be assumed, would have little chance of arriving at any true discrimination of phenomena. Speaking of the nervous system and its functions, and more immediately of the relation of the Cerebrum to the Sensorium and the production of spectral illusions, Dr. Carpenter says, in his work on the "Principles of Mental Physiology," which is well worth the study of those interested in the question we are discussing: "Still stronger evidence of the same associated action of the Cerebrum and Sensorium, is furnished by the study of the phenomena designated as Spectral Illusions. These are clearly sensorial states not excited by external objects; and it is also clear that they frequently originate in cerebral changes, since they represent creations of the mind, and are not mere reproductions of past sensations." Dr. Carpenter refers in illustration to a curious illusion to which Sir John Herschel was subject, "in the shape of the involuntary occurrence of Visual impressions, into which Geometrical regularity of form enters as the leading character. These were not of the nature of those ocular Spectra which may be attributed with probability to retinal changes."(1) Dr. Carpenter then continues: "We have here not a reproduction of sensorial impressions formerly received; but a construction of new forms, by a process which, if it had been carried on consciously, we should have called imagination. And it is difficult to see

how it is to be accounted for in any other way, than by an unconscious action of the cerebrum; the products of which impress themselves on the sensorial consciousness, just as, in other cases, they express themselves through the motor apparatus."(1) The illusions described by Sir John Herschel who, as he himself says, was "as little visionary as most people" should be referred to.

Of the production of sensations by ideas there can be no possible doubt(2) and, consequently, as little of the realisation by the person in whom they are produced of subjective impressions exactly as though they were objective. With regard to false perceptions, Dr. Carpenter says: "It has been shown that the action of ideational states upon the Sensorium can modify or even produce sensations. But the action of pre-existing states of Mind is still more frequently shown in modifying the interpretation which we put upon our sense-impressions. For since almost every such interpretation is an act of judgment based upon experience, that judgment will vary according to our mental condition at the time it is delivered; and will be greatly affected by any dominant idea or feeling, so as even to occasion a complete mis-interpretation of the objective source of the sense-impression, as often occurs in what is termed 'absence of mind.' The following case, mentioned by Dr. Tuke(3) as occurring within his own knowledge, affords a good example of this fallacy:—'A lady was walking one day from Penryn to Falmouth, and her mind being at that time, or recently, occupied by the subject of drinking-fountains, thought she saw