Still the system which was actually adopted, bore, in point of form, some faint resemblance to the model of Siêyes. Three Consuls were appointed; the first to hold the sole power of nominating to public offices, and right of determining on public measures; the other two were to be his indispensable counsellors. The first of these offices was designed to bring back the constitution of France to a monarchical system, while the second and third were added merely to conciliate the Republicans, who were not yet prepared for a retrograde movement.
The office of one of these supplementary consuls was offered to Siêyes, but he declined to accept of it, and expressed his wish to retire from public life. His disappointment was probably considerable, at finding himself acting but a second-rate part, after the success of the conspiracy which he had himself schemed; but his pride was not so great as to decline a pecuniary compensation. Buonaparte bestowed on him by far the greater part of the private treasure amassed by the ex-directors. It was said to amount to six hundred thousand francs, which Siêyes called une poire pour la soif; in English, a morsel to stay the stomach.[503] He was endowed also with the fine domain and estate of Crosne;[504] and to render the gift more acceptable, and save his delicacy, a decree was issued, compelling him to accept of this manifestation of national gratitude. The office of a senator gave him dignity; and the yearly appointment of twenty-five thousand francs annexed to it, added to the ease of his situation.[505] In short, this celebrated metaphysician disappeared as a political person, and became, to use his own expression, absorbed in the pursuit of epicurean indulgences, which he covered with a veil of mystery. There is no doubt that by thus showing the greedy and mercenary turn of his nature, Siêyes, notwithstanding his abilities, lost in a great measure the esteem and reverence of his countrymen; and this was a consequence not probably unforeseen by Buonaparte, when he loaded him with wealth.
CONSULAR GOVERNMENT.
To return to the new constitution. Every species of power and faculty was heaped upon the chief consul, with a liberality which looked as if France, to atone for her long jealousy of those who had been the administrators of her executive power, was now determined to remove at once every obstacle which might stand in the way of Buonaparte to arbitrary power. He possessed the sole right of nominating counsellors of state, ministers, ambassadors, officers, civil and military, and almost all functionaries whatsoever. He was to propose all new laws, and take all measures for internal and external defence of the state. He commanded all the forces, of whatever description, superintended all the national relations at home and abroad, and coined the public money. In these high duties he had the advice of his brother consuls, and also of a Council of State. But he was recognised to be independent of them all. The consuls were to be elected for the space of ten years, and to be re-eligible.
The Abbé Siêyes's plan of dividing the people into three classes, which should each of them declare a certain number of persons eligible to certain gradations of the state, was ostensibly adopted. The lists of these eligible individuals were to be addressed by the various electoral classes to the Conservative Senate, which also was borrowed from the abbé's model. This body, the highest and most august in the state, were to hold their places for life, and had a considerable pension attached to them. Their number was not to exceed eighty, and they were to have the power of supplying vacancies in their own body, by choosing the future senator from a list of three persons; one of them proposed by the chief consul, one by the Legislative Body, and one by the Tribunate. Senators became for ever incapable of any other public duty. Their duty was to receive the national lists of persons eligible for official situations, and to annul such laws or measures as should be denounced to their body, as unconstitutional or impolitic, either by the Government or the Tribunate. The sittings of the Senate were not public.
The new constitution of France also adopted the Legislative Body and the Tribunate proposed by the Abbé Siêyes. The duty of the Legislative Body was to take into consideration such laws as should be approved by the Tribunate, and pass or refuse them by vote, but without any debate, or even an expression of their opinion.
The Tribunate, on the contrary, was a deliberative body, to whom the chief consul, and his Council of State, with whom alone lay the initiative privilege, were to propose such laws as appeared to them desirable. These, when discussed by the Tribunate, and approved of by the silent assent of the Legislative Body, passed into decrees, and became binding upon the community. The Legislative Body heard the report of the Tribunate, as expressed by a deputation from that body; and by their votes alone, but without any debate or delivery of opinion, refused or confirmed the proposal. Some of the more important acts of government, such as the proclamation of peace or war, could only take place on the motion of the chief consul to the Tribunate, upon their recommending the measure to the Legislative Body; and, finally, upon the legislative commissions affirming the proposal. But the power of the chief consul was not much checked by this restriction, for the discussion on such subjects was only to take place on his own requisition, and always in secret committee; so that the greatest hinderance of despotism, the weight of public opinion formed upon public debate, was totally wanting.
A very slight glance at this Consular form of government is sufficient to show, that Buonaparte selected exactly as much of the ingenious constitution of Siêyes as was applicable to his own object of acquiring supreme and despotic authority, while he got rid of all, the Tribunate alone excepted, which contained, directly or indirectly, any check or balance affecting the executive power. The substitution of lists of eligible persons or candidates, to be made up by the people, instead of the popular election of actual representatives, converted into a metaphysical and abstract idea the real safeguard of liberty. It may be true, that the authority of an official person, selected from the national lists, might be said originally to emanate from the people; because, unless his name had received their sanction, he could not have been eligible. But the difference is inexpressibly great, between the power of naming a single direct representative, and that of naming a thousand persons, any of whom may be capable of being created a representative; and the popular interference in the state, which had hitherto comprehended the former privilege, was now restrained to the latter and more insignificant one. This was the main error in Siêyes's system, and the most fatal blow to liberty, whose constitutional safety can hardly exist, excepting in union with a direct and unfettered national representation, chosen by the people themselves.
All the other balances and checks which the Abbé had designed to substitute instead of that which arises from popular election, had been broken and cast away; while the fragments of the scheme that remained were carefully adjusted, so as to form the steps by which Buonaparte was to ascend to an unlimited and despotic throne. Siêyes had proposed that his elector-general should be merely a graceful termination to his edifice, like a gilded vane on the top of a steeple—a sovereign without power—a roi fainéant,[506] with two consuls to act as joint Maires des palais. Buonaparte, on the contrary, gave the whole executive power in the state, together with the exclusive right of proposing all new laws, to the chief consul, and made the others mere appendages, to be thrown aside at pleasure.
Neither were the other constitutional authorities calculated to offer effectual resistance to the engrossing authority of this all-powerful officer. All these bodies were, in fact, mere pensioners. The Senate, which met in secret, and the Legislative Body, whose lips were padlocked, were alike removed from influencing public opinion, and being influenced by it. The Tribunate, indeed, consisting of a hundred persons, retained in some sort the right of debate, and of being publicly heard. But the members of the Tribunate were selected by the Senate, not by the people, whom except in metaphysical mockery, it could not be said to represent any more than a bottle of distilled liquor can be said to represent the sheaf of grain which it was originally drawn from. What chance was there that, in a hundred men so chosen, there should be courage and independence enough found to oppose that primary power, by which, like a steam-engine, the whole constitution was put in motion? Such tribunes were also in danger of recollecting, that they only held their offices for four years, and that the senators had their offices for life; while a transition from the one state to the other was in general thought desirable, and could only be gained by implicit obedience during the candidate's probation in the Tribunate. Yet, slender as was the power of this tribunate body, Buonaparte showed some jealousy even of this slight appearance of freedom; although, justly considered, the Senate, the Conservative Body, and the Tribunate, were but three different pipes, which, separately or altogether, uttered sound at the pleasure of him who presided at the instrument.