15th July.
It is not ours to decide upon professional questions between men of such superior talents; and, having barely alluded to the topic, we leave Moreau at Augsburg, where he finally concluded an armistice[531] with General Kray, as a consequence of that which Buonaparte had established in Italy after the battle of Marengo. Thus much, therefore, is due in justice to Moreau. His campaign was, on the whole, crowned in its results with distinguished success.[532] And when it is considered, that he was to manœuvre both with reference to the safety of the first consul's operations and his own, it may be doubted whether Buonaparte would, at the time, have thanked him for venturing on more hazardous measures; the result of which might have been either to obtain more brilliant victory for the army of the Rhine, in the event of success, or should they have miscarried, to have ensured the ruin of the army of Italy, as well as of that commanded by Moreau himself. There must have been a wide difference between the part which Moreau ought to act as subsidiary to Buonaparte, (to whom it will presently be seen he despatched a reinforcement of from fifteen to twenty thousand men,) and that which Buonaparte, in obedience to his daring genius, might have himself thought it right to perform. The commander-in-chief may venture much on his own responsibility, which must not be hazarded by a subordinate general, whose motions ought to be regulated upon the general plan of the campaign.
We return to the operations of Napoleon during one of the most important campaigns of his life, and in which he added—if that were still possible—to the high military reputation he had acquired.
PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN.
In committing the charge of the campaign upon the Rhine to Moreau, the first consul had reserved for himself the task of bringing back victory to the French standards, on the fields in which he won his earliest laurels. His plan of victory again included a passage of the Alps, as boldly and unexpectedly as in 1795, but in a different direction. That earlier period had this resemblance to the present, that, on both occasions, the Austrians menaced Genoa; but in 1800, it was only from the Italian frontier and the Col di Tende, whereas, in 1795, the enemy were in possession of the mountains of Savoy, above Genoa. Switzerland, too, formerly neutral, and allowing no passage for armies, was now as open to the march of French troops as any of their own provinces, and of this Buonaparte determined to avail himself. He was aware of the Austrian plan of taking Genoa and entering Provence; and he formed the daring resolution to put himself at the head of the army of reserve, surmount the line of the Alps, even where they are most difficult of access, and, descending into Italy, place himself in the rear of the Austrian army, interrupt their communications, carry off their magazines, parks, and hospitals, coop them up betwixt his own army and that of Massena, which was in their front, and compel them to battle, in a situation where defeat must be destruction. But to accomplish this daring movement, it was necessary to march a whole army over the highest chain of mountains in Europe, by roads which afford but a dangerous passage to the solitary traveller, and through passes where one man can do more to defend, than ten to force their way. Artillery was to be carried through sheep-paths and over precipices impracticable to wheel-carriages; ammunition and baggage were to be transported at the same disadvantages; and provisions were to be conveyed through a country poor in itself, and inhabited by a nation which had every cause to be hostile to France, and might therefore be expected prompt to avail themselves of any opportunity which should occur of revenging themselves for her late aggressions.[533]
The strictest secrecy was necessary, to procure even the opportunity of attempting this audacious plan of operations; and to ensure this secrecy, Buonaparte had recourse to a singular mode of deceiving the enemy. It was made as public as possible, by orders, decrees, proclamations, and the like, that the first consul was to place himself at the head of the army of reserve, and that it was to assemble at Dijon. Accordingly, a numerous staff was sent, and much apparent bustle took place in assembling there six or seven thousand men with great pomp and fracas. These, as the spies of Austria truly reported to their employers, were either conscripts, or veterans unfit for service; and caricatures were published of the first consul reviewing troops composed of children and disabled soldiers, which was ironically termed his army of reserve.[534] When an army so composed was reviewed by the first consul himself with great ceremony, it impressed a general belief that Buonaparte was only endeavouring, by making a show of force, to divert the Austrians from their design upon Genoa, and thus his real purpose was effectually concealed. Bulletins, too, were privately circulated by the agents of police, as if scattered by the Royalists, in which specious arguments were used to prove that the French army of reserve neither did, nor could exist—and these also were designed to withdraw attention from the various points on which it was at the very moment collecting.[535]
The pacification of the west of France had placed many good troops at Buonaparte's disposal, which had previously been engaged against the Chouans; the quiet state of Paris permitted several regiments to be detached from the capital. New levies were made with the utmost celerity; and the divisions of the army of reserve were organized separately, and at different places of rendezvous, but ready to form a junction when they should receive the signal for commencing operations.
CHAPTER XIX.
The Chief Consul leaves Paris on 6th May, 1800—Has an Interview with Necker at Geneva on 8th—Arrives at Lausanne on the 13th—Various Corps put in motion to cross the Alps—Napoleon, at the head of the Main Army, marches on the 15th, and ascends Mont St. Bernard—On the 16th, the Vanguard takes possession of Aosta—Fortress and Town of Bard threaten to baffle the whole plan—The Town is captured—and Napoleon contrives to send his Artillery through it, under the fire of the Fort, his Infantry and Cavalry passing over the Albaredo—Lannes carries Ivrea—Recapitulation—Operations of the Austrian General Melas—At the commencement of the Campaign, Melas advances towards Genoa—Actions betwixt him and Massena—In March, Lord Keith blockades Genoa—Melas compelled to retreat—Enters Nice—Recalled from thence by the news of Napoleon's having crossed Mont St. Bernard—Genoa surrenders—Buonaparte enters Milan—Battle of Montebello—The Chief Consul is joined by Desaix—Battle of Marengo on the 14th—Death of Desaix—Capitulation on the 15th, by which Genoa, &c., are yielded—Napoleon returns to Paris on the 2d July.