While yet in Italy, Buonaparte had suggested to the Directory (13th September, 1797,) the advantage which might be derived from seizing upon Malta, which he represented as an easy prize. The knights, he said, were odious to the Maltese inhabitants, and were almost starving; to augment which state of distress, and increase that incapacity of defence, he had already confiscated their Italian property. He then proceeded to intimate, that being possessed of Corfu and Malta, it was natural to take possession of Egypt. Twenty-five thousand men, with eight or ten ships of the line, would be sufficient for the expedition, which he suggested might depart from the coasts of Italy.[350]

EXPEDITION TO EGYPT.

Talleyrand, then minister for foreign affairs, (in his answer of 23d September,) saw the utmost advantage in the design upon Egypt, which, as a colony, would attract the commerce of India to Europe, in preference to the circuitous route by the Cape of Good Hope. This correspondence proves, that even before Buonaparte left Italy he had conceived the idea of the Egyptian expedition, though probably only as one of the vast and vague schemes of ambition which success in so many perilous enterprises had tended to foster. There was something of wild grandeur in the idea, calculated to please an ambitious imagination. He was to be placed far beyond the reach of any command superior to his own, and left at his own discretion to the extending conquests, and perhaps founding an empire, in a country long considered as the cradle of knowledge, and celebrated in sacred and profane history, as having been the scene of ancient events and distant revolutions, which, through the remoteness of ages, possess a gloomy and mysterious influence upon the fancy. The first specimens of early art also were to be found among the gigantic ruins of Egypt, and its time-defying monuments of antiquity. This had its effect upon Buonaparte, who affected so particularly the species of fame which attaches to the protector and extender of science, philosophy, and the fine arts. On this subject he had a ready and willing counsellor at hand. Monge, the artist and virtuoso, was Buonaparte's confidant on this occasion, and, there is no doubt, encouraged him to an undertaking which promised a rich harvest to the antiquarian, among the ruins of temples and palaces, hitherto imperfectly examined.

But, although the subject was mentioned betwixt the Directory and their ministers and Buonaparte, yet, before adopting the course which the project opened, the general was probably determined to see the issue of the revolution of the 18th Fructidor; doubting, not unreasonably, whether the conquerors in that struggle could so far avail themselves of the victory which they had obtained over the majority of the national representatives, as to consolidate and establish on a firm foundation their own authority. He knew the Directory themselves were popular with none. The numerous party who were now inclined to a monarchical government, regarded them with horror. The army, though supporting them, rather than coalesce with the Royalists, despised and disliked them; the violent Republicans remembered their active share in Robespierre's downfall, and the condemnations which followed the detected conspiracy of Babœuf, and were in no respect better disposed to their domination. Thus, despised by the army, dreaded by the Royalists, and detested by the Republicans, the Directorial government appeared to remain standing, only because the factions to whom it was unacceptable were afraid of each other's attaining a superiority in the struggle, which must attend its downfall.[351]

This crisis of public affairs was a tempting opportunity for such a character as Buonaparte; whose almost incredible successes, unvaried by a single reverse which deserved that name, naturally fixed the eyes of the multitude, and indeed of the nation at large, upon him, as upon one who seemed destined to play the most distinguished part in any of those new changes, which the mutable state of the French Government seemed rapidly preparing.

The people, naturally partial to a victor, followed him every where with acclamations, and his soldiers, in their camp-songs, spoke of pulling the attorneys out of the seat of government, and installing their victorious general. Even already, for the first time since the commencement of the Revolution, the French, losing their recent habits of thinking and speaking of the nation as a body, began to interest themselves in Napoleon as an individual; and that exclusive esteem of his person had already taken root in the public mind, which afterwards formed the foundation of his throne.

ARMIES OF ITALY AND THE RHINE.

Yet, in spite of these promising appearances, Napoleon, cautious as well as enterprising, saw that the time was not arrived when he could, without great risk, attempt to possess himself of the supreme government in France. The soldiers of Italy were indeed at his devotion, but there was another great and rival army belonging to the Republic, that of the Rhine, which had never been under his command, never had partaken his triumphs, and which naturally looked rather to Moreau than to Buonaparte as their general and hero.

Madame de Staël describes the soldiers from these two armies, as resembling each other in nothing, save the valour which was common to both.[352] The troops of the Rhine, returning from hard-fought fields, which, if followed by victory, had afforded but little plunder, exhibited still the severe simplicity which had been affected under the republican model; whereas the army of Italy had reaped richer spoils than barren laurels alone, and made a display of wealth and enjoyment which showed they had not neglected their own interest while advancing the banners of France.

It was not likely, while such an army as that of the Rhine existed, opposed by rivalry and the jealousy of fame to the troops of Buonaparte, that the latter should have succeeded in placing himself at the head of affairs. Besides, the forces on which he could depend were distant. Fortune had not afforded him the necessary pretext for crossing, as he termed it, the Rubicon, and bringing twenty thousand men to Lyons. Moreau, Jourdan, Kleber, had all high reputations, scarce inferior to his own; and the troops who had served under them were disposed to elevate them, even to an equality with the Conqueror of Italy. Buonaparte also knew that his popularity, though great, was not universal. He was disliked by the middle classes, from recollection of his commanding during the affair of the Sections of Paris; and many of the Republicans exclaimed against him, for his surrendering Venice to the Austrians. In a word, he was too much elbowed and incommoded by others to permit his taking with full vigour the perilous spring necessary to place him in the seat of supreme authority, though there were not wanting those who would fain have persuaded him to venture on a course so daring.[353] To such counsellors he answered, that "the pear was not ripe,"—a hint which implied that appetite was not wanting, though prudence forbade the banquet.