After the revolution of 9th Thermidor, Siêyes came in with the moderate party, and had the merit to propose the recall of the members who had been forcibly expelled by the Jacobin faction on the fall of the Girondists. He was one of the committee of eleven, to whom was given the charge of forming the new constitution, afterwards called that of the year Three. This great metaphysical philosopher and politician showed little desire to share with any colleagues the toil and honour of a task to which he esteemed himself exclusively competent; and he produced, accordingly, a model entirely of his own composition, very ingenious, and evincing a wonderfully intimate acquaintance with political doctrines, together with a multitude of nice balances, capacities, and disqualifications, so constituted as to be checks on each other. As strongly characteristic of the genius of the man, we shall here give an account of his great work.
His plan provided that the constitution, with its powers of judicature and of administration, should emanate from the people; but lest, like that unnatural parent the sow, the people should devour their own nine farrow, the functionaries thus invested with power were to be placed, when created, out of the reach of the parents who had given them birth. The mode in which it was proposed to effect this, was both singular and ingenious. The office-bearers were thus to be selected out of three orders of the state, forming a triple hierarchy. 1. The citizens of each commune were to name one-tenth of their number, to be called the Communal Notables. From these were to be selected the magistrates of the communes, and the justices of peace. 2. The Communal Notables were again to choose a tenth part of their number, who were called the Departmental Notables. The prefects, judges, and provincial administrators, were selected from this second body. 3. The Departmental Notables, in like manner, were to elect a tenth of their number, computed to amount to about six thousand persons; and from this highest class of citizens were to be filled the most dignified and important situations in the state,—the ministers and members of government, the legislature, the senate, or grand jury, the principal judges, ambassadors, and the like. By this system it will be perceived, that instead of equality, three ranks of privileged citizens were to be established, from whose ranks alone certain offices could be filled. But this species of nobility, or, as it was called, Notability, was dependent not on birth, but on the choice of the people, from whom, though more or less directly, all officers without exception received their commissions. The elections were to take place every five years.
To represent the national dignity, power, and glory, there was to be an officer called the Grand Elector, who was to have guards, a revenue, and all the external appendages of royalty; all acts of government, laws, and judicial proceedings, were to run in his name. This species of Roi-fainéant was to possess no part of the royal authority, except the right of naming two consuls, one for peace, and the other for war; and the farther right of selecting, from lists of candidates to be supplied by the three ranks of the hierarchy, the individuals who were to fill official situations as they should become vacant. But having exercised this privilege, the grand elector, or proclaimer general, was functus officio, and had no active duties to perform, or power to exercise. The two consuls, altogether uncontrolled by him or each other, were to act each in their own exclusive department of peace or war; and the other functionaries were alike independent of the grand proclaimer, or elector, so soon as he had appointed them. He was to resemble no sovereign ever heard of but the queen bee, who has nothing to do but to repose in idleness and luxury, and give being to the active insects by whose industry the business of the hive is carried on.
The government being thus provided for, the Abbé Siêyes's system of legislature was something like that of France in the time of the Parliament. There was to be a Legislative Body of two hundred and fifty deputies; but they were to form rather a tribunal of judges, than a popular and deliberative assembly. Two other bodies, a Council of State on the part of the Government, and a Tribunate of one hundred deputies, on the part of the people, were to propose and discuss measures in presence of this Legislative Council, who then proceeded to adopt or reject them upon scrutiny and by vote, but without any oral delivery of opinions. The Tribunate was invested with the right of guarding the freedom of the subject, and denouncing to the Convocative Senate such misconduct of office-bearers, or ill-chosen measures, or ill-advised laws, as should appear to them worthy of reprobation.
But, above all, Abbé Siêyes piqued himself upon the device of what he determined a Conservative Senate, which, possessing in itself no power of action or legislation of any kind, was to have in charge the preservation of the constitution. To this Senate was given the singular power, of calling in to become a member of their own body, and reducing of course to their own state of incapacity, any individual occupying another situation in the constitution, whose talents, ambition, or popularity, should render him a subject of jealousy. Even the grand elector himself was liable to this fate of absorption, as it was called, although he held his crown of Cocaign in the common case for life. Any exertion on his part of what might seem to the Senate an act of arbitrary authority, entitled them to adopt him a member of their own body. He was thus removed from his palace, guards, and income, and made for ever incapable of any other office than that of a senator. This high point of policy was carrying the system of checks and balances as far as it could well go.
The first glance of this curious model must have convinced a practical politician that it was greatly too complicated and technical to be carried into effect. The utility of laws consists in their being of a character which compels the respect and obedience of those to whom they relate. The very delicacy of such an ingenious scheme rendered it incapable of obtaining general regard, since it was too refined to be understood save by profound philosophers. To the rest of the nation it must have been like a watch to a savage, who, being commanded to regulate his time by it, will probably prefer to make the machine correspond with his inclinations, by putting backward and forward the index at pleasure. A man of ordinary talent and honest disposition might have been disqualified for public life by this doctrine of absorption, just as a man ignorant of swimming would perish if flung into a lake. But a stout swimmer would easily gain the shore, and an individual like Buonaparte would set at defiance the new species of ostracism, and decline to be neutralized by the absorption of the Senate. Above all, the plan of the abbé destroyed the true principle of national representation, by introducing a metaphysical election of members of legislation, instead of one immediately derived from the direct vote of the people themselves. In the abbé's alembic, the real and invaluable principle of popular representation was subtilized into smoke.
For these, or other reasons, the commissioners of the year Three did not approve of the plan proposed by Siêyes; and, equally dissatisfied with the constitution which they adopted, he withdrew himself from their deliberations, and accepted the situation of ambassador to Prussia, where he discharged with great ability the task of a diplomatist.
DUCOS—GOHIER—MOULINS.
In 1799, Siêyes returned from Berlin to Paris, full of hope to establish his own favourite model on the ruins of the Directorial Constitution, and, as a preliminary, obtained, as we have said, Rewbel's seat in the Directory. Merlin and Lepaux, menaced with impeachments, were induced to send in their resignation. Treilhard had been previously displaced, on pretext of an informality in the choice. Instead of them were introduced into the Directory Roger Ducos, a Modéré, or rather a Royalist, with Gohier and Moulins, men of talents too ordinary to throw any opposition in the path of Siêyes.[447] Barras, by his expenses and his luxurious mode of life, his connexion with stock-jobbers, and encouragement of peculation, was too much in danger of impeachment, to permit him to play a manly part. He truckled to circumstances, and allied himself with, or rather subjected himself to, Siêyes, who saw the time approaching when the constitution of the year Three must fall, and hoped to establish his own rejected model in its stead. But the revolution which he meditated could only be executed by force.
The change in the Directory had destroyed the government by bascule, or balance, and that intermediate and trimming influence being removed, the two parties of the Modérés and the Republicans stood full opposed to each other, and ready to try their strength in a severe struggle. Siêyes, though no Royalist, or at least certainly no adherent of the House of Bourbon, stood, nevertheless, at the head of the Modérés, and taxed his sagacity for means of ensuring their victory. The Modérés possessed a majority in the Council of the Ancients; but the Society of the Manège, Republicans if not Jacobins, had obtained, at the last election, a great superiority of numbers in the Council of Five Hundred. They were sure to be in decided opposition to any change of the constitution of the year Three; and such being the case, those who plotted the new revolution, could not attempt it without some external support. To call upon the people was no longer the order of the day. Indeed it may be supposed that the ancient revolutionary columns would rather have risen against Siêyes, and in behalf of the Society of the Manège. The proposers of a new change had access, however, to the army, and to that they determined to appeal. The assistance of some military chief of the first reputation was necessary. Siêyes cast his eyes upon Joubert, an officer of high reputation, and one of the most distinguished among Buonaparte's generals. He was named by the Directors to the command of the department of Paris, but shortly after was sent to Italy with hopes that, acquiring a new fund of glory by checking the progress of Suwarrow, he might be yet more fitted to fill the public eye, and influence the general mind, in the crisis when Siêyes looked for his assistance. Joubert lost his life, however, at the great battle of Novi, fought betwixt him and Suwarrow; and so opportunely did his death make room for the pretensions of Buonaparte, that it has been rumoured, certainly without the least probability, that he did not fall by the fire of the Austrians, but by that of assassins hired by the family of Napoleon, to take out of the way a powerful competitor of their brother. This would have been a gratuitous crime, since they could neither reckon with certainty on the arrival of Buonaparte, nor upon his being adopted by Siêyes in place of Joubert.