At this period, also, Buonaparte began first to display a desire of engrafting his own family upon the ancient dynasties of Europe, with whom he had been so long at war, and the ruin of most of whom had contributed to his elevation. The Elector of Bavaria had to repay the patronage which raised him to the rank of king, and enlarged his territories with the fine country of the Tyrol, by forming an alliance which should mix his ancient blood with that of the family connexions of the fortunate soldier. Eugene Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy, the son of Josephine by her first husband, and now the adopted son of Napoleon, was wedded to the eldest daughter of the King of Bavaria. Eugene was deservedly favoured by his father-in-law, Napoleon. He was a man of talents, probity, and honour, and displayed great military skill, particularly during the Russian Campaign of 1812. Stephanie Beauharnais,[214] the niece of Josephine, was married about the same time to the Hereditary Prince of Baden, son to the reigning duke, the neutrality of whose territories had been violated in the seizure of the Duke d'Enghien.
These various kingdoms and principalities, erected in favour of his nearest relations, imposed on the mind a most impressive image of Buonaparte's unlimited authority, who distributed crowns among his kinsfolk as ordinary men give vails to their domestics. But the sound policy of his conduct may be greatly doubted. We have elsewhere stated the obvious objections to the transference of cities and kingdoms from hand to hand, with as little ceremony as the circulation of a commercial bill payable to the holder. Authority is a plant of a slow growth, and to obtain the full veneration which renders it most effectual, must have arisen by degrees in the place which it overshadows and protects. Suddenly transferred to new regions, it is apt to pine and to perish. The theoretical evils of a long-established government are generally mitigated by some practical remedy, or those who suffer by them have grown callous from habit. The reverse is the case with a newly-established domination, which has no claim to the veneration due to antiquity, and to which the subjects are not attached by the strong though invisible chains of long habit.
Fox, in his own nervous language, has left his protest against the principle adopted at this time in Europe, of transferring the subjects of one prince to another by way of equivalents, and under the pretext of general arrangement. "The wildest schemes," he remarked, "that were ever before broached, would not go so far to shake the foundations of all established government, as this new practice. There must be in every nation a certain attachment of the people to its form of government, without which no government could exist. The system, then, of transferring the subjects of one prince to another, strikes at the foundation of every government, and the existence of every nation."[215]
These observations apply generally to violent alterations upon the European system; but other and more special objections arise to Buonaparte's system of erecting thrones in Holland, in Naples, and all through Europe, for the members of his own family. It was particularly impolitic, as marking too strongly his determination to be satisfied with nothing less than the dominion of the world; for while he governed France in his own person, the disposing of other countries to his brothers and near relations feudatories of France, and his dependents as well by blood as by allegiance, what else could be expected than that the independence of such kingdoms must be merely nominal, and their monarchs bound to act in every respect as the agents of Buonaparte's pleasure? This, indeed, was their most sacred duty, according to his own view of the matter, and he dilated upon it to Las Cases while at St. Helena. The following passage contains an express avowal of the principles on which he desired and expected his brothers to regulate the governments intrusted to them:—
"At another time the Emperor recurred to the subject of his relations, the little aid he had received from them, the embarrassment and mischief which they had caused him. He dwelt especially on that false idea upon their part, that when once placed at the head of a state, they ought to identify themselves with it to such an extent, as to prefer its interests to those of the common country. He agreed, that the source of this sentiment might be in some degree honourable, but contended that they made a false and hurtful application of it, when, in their whims of absolute independence, they considered themselves as in an isolated posture, not observing that they made only parts of a great system, the movements of which it was their business to aid, and not to thwart."[216]
SUBSIDIARY MONARCHIES.
This is explaining in few words the principle on which Napoleon established these subsidiary monarchies, which was not for the benefit of the people of whom they were respectively composed, but for the service of France, or more properly of himself, the sole moving principle by which France was governed. In devolving the crown of Holland on the son of Louis, after the abdication of Louis, [in July, 1810,] he repeats the same principle as a fundamental condition of its tenure. "Never forget," he said, "that in the situation to which my political system, and the interest of my empire have called you, your first duty is towards ME, your second towards France. All your other duties, even those towards the people whom I have called you to govern, rank after these."[217]
When Napoleon censures his delegate princes for preferring the interest of the kingdoms which he had assigned them, instead of sacrificing it to him and his government, he degrades them into mere puppets, which might indeed bear regal titles and regal attendance, but, entirely dependent on the will of another, had no choice save to second the views of an ambition, the most insatiable certainly that ever reigned in a human breast.
This secret did not remain concealed from the Dutch, from the Neapolitans, or other foreigners, subjected to these pageant monarchs; and as it naturally incensed them against Napoleon's government, so it prevented the authority which he had delegated from obtaining either affection or reverence, and disposed the nations who were subjected to it to take the first opportunity of casting the yoke aside.
The erection of these kindred monarchies was not the only mode by which Napoleon endeavoured to maintain an ascendency in the countries which he had conquered, and which he desired to retain in dependence upon France, though not nominally or directly making parts of the French empire. Buonaparte had already proposed to his council the question whether the creation of Grandees of the Empire, a species of nobility whose titles were to depend, not on their descents, but on their talents and services to the state, was to be considered as a violation of the laws of liberty and equality. He was universally answered in the negative; for, having now acquired an hereditary monarch, it seemed a natural, if not an indispensable consequence, that France should have peers of the kingdom, and great officers of the crown. Such an establishment, according to Buonaparte's view, would at once place his dignity on the same footing with those of the other courts of Europe, (an assimilation to which he attached a greater degree of consequence than was consistent with policy,) and by blending the new nobles of the empire with those of the ancient kingly government, would tend to reconcile the modern state of things with such relics of the old court as yet existed.