The spirit of defection extended even to those who were nearest to the Emperor. Murat, discouraged and rendered impatient by the incessant misfortunes of his brother-in-law, took leave, under pretence, it was said, of bringing forces up from the French frontier, but in reality to return to his own dominions, without further allying his fortunes to those of Napoleon.[293] Buonaparte, as if influenced by some secret presentiment that they should never again meet, embraced his old companion-in-arms repeatedly ere they parted.
The Poles who remained in Napoleon's army showed a very generous spirit. He found himself obliged to appeal to their own honour, whether they chose to remain in his service, or to desert him at this crisis. A part had served so long under his banners, that they had become soldiers of fortune, to whom the French camp served for a native country. But many others were men who had assumed arms in the Russian campaign, with the intention of freeing Poland from the foreign yoke under which it had so long groaned. The manner in which Napoleon had disappointed their hopes could not be forgotten by them; but they had too much generosity to revenge, at this crisis, the injustice with which they had been treated, and agreed unanimously that they would not quit Napoleon's service until they had escorted him safely beyond the Rhine, reserving their right then to leave his standard, of which a great many accordingly availed themselves.
ERFURT—HANAU.
Napoleon passed nearly two days at Erfurt, during which the re-organisation of his troops advanced rapidly, as the magazines and stores of the place were sufficient to recruit them in every department. Their reassembled force amounted to about 80,000 men. This, together with the troops left to their fate in the garrison towns in Germany, was all that remained of 280,000, with which Napoleon had begun the campaign. The garrisons amounted to about 80,000, so that the loss of the French rose to 120,000 men. These garrisons, so imprudently left behind, were of course abandoned to their fate, or to the discretion of the enemy; Napoleon consoling himself with the boast, "that if they could form a junction in the valley of the Elbe, 80,000 Frenchmen might break through all obstacles." Instructions were sent to the various commanders, to evacuate the places they held, and form such a junction; but it is believed that none of them reached the generals to whom they were addressed.
It is probable that, but for the relief afforded by this halt, and the protection of the citadel and defences of Erfurt, Napoleon, in his retreat from Leipsic, must have lost all that remained to him of an army. He had received news, however, of a character to preclude his longer stay in this place of refuge. The Bavarian army, so lately his allies, with a strong auxiliary force of Austrians, amounting in all to 50,000, under Wrede, were hurrying from the banks of the Inn, and had reached Wurtzburg on the Mayne, with the purpose of throwing themselves in hostile fashion between the army of Napoleon and the frontier of France. In addition to this unpleasing intelligence, he learned that the Austrians and Prussians were pressing forward, as far as Weimar and Laugensalza, so that he was once more in danger of being completely surrounded. Urged by these circumstances, Napoleon left Erfurt on the 25th of October, amid weather as tempestuous as his fortunes.
An unfortunate determination of the allied councils directed Marshal Blucher to move in pursuit of Napoleon by Giessen and Wetzlar, and commanded him to leave the direct road to the banks of the Rhine, by Fulda and Gelnhaussen, open for the march of an Austrian column, expected to advance from Schmalkald.[294] The most active and energetic of the pursuers was thus turned aside from Napoleon's direct path of retreat, and the Austrians, to whom it was yielded, did not come up in time to overtake the retreating enemy. The French were still followed, however, by the arrival of Cossacks under their adventurous leaders, Platoff, Czernicheff, Orloff-Denizoff, and Kowaiski, who continued their harassing and destructive operations on their flanks and their rear.
In the meanwhile, General Wrede, notwithstanding the inferiority of his forces to those of Buonaparte, persevered in his purpose of barring the return of Napoleon into France, and took up a position at Hanau for that purpose, where he was joined by the chiefs of the Cossacks already mentioned, who had pushed on before the advance of the French army, in hopes that they might afford Wrede their assistance. If Blucher and his troops had been now in the rear of Napoleon, his hour had in all probability arrived. But Wrede's force, of whom he had been unable to bring up above 45,000 men, was inferior to the attempt, almost always a dangerous one, of intercepting the retreat of a bold and desperate enemy upon the only road which can lead him to safety. It was upon a point, also, where the Bavarians had no particular advantage of position, which might have presented natural obstacles to the progress of the enemy.
Upon the 30th, the Bavarians had occupied the large wood of Lamboi, and were disposed in line on the right bank of a small river called the Kintzig, near a village named Neuhoff, where there is a bridge. The French threw a body of light troops into the wood, which was disputed from tree to tree, the close fire of the sharpshooters on both sides resembling that of a general chasse, such as is practised on the continent. The combat was sustained for several hours without decided success, until Buonaparte commanded an attack in force on the left of the Bavarians. Two battalions of the guards, under General Curial, were sent into the wood to support the French tirailleurs; and the Bavarians, at the sight of their grenadier-caps, imagined themselves attacked by the whole of that celebrated body, and gave way. A successful charge of cavalry was at the same time made on Wrede's left, which made it necessary for him to retreat behind the Kintzig. The Austro-Bavarian army continued to hold Hanau; but as the main road to Frankfort does not lead directly through that town, but passes on the south side of it, the desired line of retreat was left open to Napoleon, whose business it was to push forward to the Rhine, and avoid farther combat. But the rear-guard of the French army, consisting of 18,000 men, under command of Mortier, was still at Gelnhaussen; and Marmont was left with three corps of infantry to secure their retreat, while Buonaparte, with the advance, pushed on to Williamstadt, and from thence to Hockstadt, in the direction of Frankfort.
On the morning of the 31st, Marmont made a double attack upon the town of Hanau, and the position of Wrede. Of the first, he possessed himself by a bombardment. The other attack took place near the bridge of Neuhoff. The Bavarians had at first the advantage, and pushed a body of 1000 or 1200 men across the Kintzig; but the instant attack and destruction of these by the bayonet, impressed their general with greater caution. Wrede himself was at this moment dangerously wounded, and the Prince of Oettingen, his son-in-law, killed on the spot. General Fresnel, who succeeded Wrede in the command, acted with more reserve. He drew off from the combat; and the French, more intent on prosecuting their march to the Rhine than on improving their advantages over the Bavarians, followed the Emperor's line of retreat in the direction of Frankfort.
An instance of rustic loyalty and sagacity was displayed during the action, by a German miller, which may serve to vary the recurring detail of military movements. This man, observing the fate of the battle, and seeing a body of Bavarian infantry hard pressed by a large force of French cavalry, had the presence of mind to admit the water into his mill-stream when the Bavarians had passed its channel, and thus suddenly interposed an obstacle between them and the pursuers, which enabled the infantry to halt and resume their ranks. The sagacious peasant was rewarded with a pension by the King of Bavaria.