[286] Jomini, tom. iv., pp. 450, 462; Baron Fain, tom. ii., p. 384; Baron d'Odeleben, tom. ii., p. 32; Savary, tom. iii., p. 117.
[287] See Sir Howard Douglas's work on Military Bridges.—S.
[288] Jomini, tom. iv., pp. 465, 480; Baron Fain, tom. ii., p. 403.
[289] Manuscript de 1813, par le Baron Fain, tom. ii., p. 420.
[290] This story was at first doubted, and it was supposed that Napoleon had commanded the bridge to be blown up, with the selfish purpose of securing his own retreat. But, from all concurring accounts, the explosion took place in the manner, and from the cause, mentioned in the text. There is, notwithstanding, an obscurity in the case. A French officer of engineers, by name Colonel Monfort, was publicly announced as the person through whose negligence or treachery the post was left to subordinate keeping. Nevertheless, it is said, that the only officer of that name, in the engineer service of Buonaparte's army, was actually at Mentz when the battle of Leipsic took place. This is alluded to by General Grouchy, who, in a note upon his interesting Observations on General Gourgaud's Account of the Campaign of 1815, has this remarkable passage.—"One would wish to forget the bulletin, which, after the battle of Leipsic, delivered to the bar of public opinion, as preliminary to bringing him before a military commission, Colonel Monfort of the engineer service, gratuitously accused of the breaking down the bridge at Leipsic." Neither the colonel nor the non-commissioned officer was ever brought to a court-martial.—S.
[291] His body was found, and his obsequies performed with great military pomp; both the victors and vanquished attending him to the tomb, with every honour which could be rendered to his remains.—S.
[292] "The French were computed to have lost 50,000 men, including the sick abandoned in the hospitals at Leipsic, and 250 guns."—Lord Burghersh, Operations, &c., p. 28.
[293] "The hasty journey of the King of Naples through France created general surprise. The first idea excited by it was, that the Emperor had commissioned him to assemble the army and form a junction with the force under the viceroy, in order to protect Italy from an invasion, which appeared to be contemplated, and the execution of which was at that time rendered probable, by the movements of the English troops in Sicily. Nobody attributed his return to any other object."—Savary, tom. iii., p. 126.
[294] This account of Blucher's march is derived from Lord Burghersh's "Memoir of the Operations of the Allied Armies in 1813 and 1814," pp. 35, &c.—Ed. (1842.)
[295] Three to one, according to the general rule of war, is the proportion of a blockading army to the garrison which it masks. But where there is little apprehension of relief or of strong sorties, the number may be much reduced.—S.