This story, we have some reason to believe, is true. One of the marvels of our times is how Fouché, after having been the mainspring of such a complication of plots and counterplots, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary intrigues, contrived after all to die in his bed!—S.—On the second restoration, Louis XVIII. saw himself reduced to the sad necessity of admitting Fouché to his counsels. But the clamours raised against his profligacy and treachery convincing him that it would be dangerous to continue in France, he resigned in September, and was sent ambassador to Dresden. In January, 1816, he was denounced as a regicide by both Chambers, and condemned to death, in case he re-entered the French territory. He died at Trieste, December 26, 1820, in his sixty-seventh year, leaving behind him an immense fortune.
[154] Some people have been silly enough to consider the Duke of Wellington's being surprised as a thing indisputable, because the news of the French advance first reached him in a ball-room. It must be supposed that these good men's idea of war is, that a general should sit sentinel with his truncheon in his hand, like a statue in the midst of a city market-place, until the tidings come which call him to the field.
"Free is his heart who for his country fights;
He on the eve of battle may resign
Himself to social pleasure—sweetest then,
When danger to the soldier's soul endears
The human joy that never may return."
Home's Douglas.—S.
"The fiction of the Duke of Wellington having been surprised on this great occasion, has maintained its place in almost all narratives of the war for fifteen years. The duke's magnanimous silence under such treatment, for so long a period, will be appreciated by posterity. The facts of the case are now given from the most unquestionable authority. At half-past one o'clock, P.M., of Thursday the 15th, a Prussian officer of high rank arrived at Wellington's headquarters in Brussels, with the intelligence of Napoleon's decisive operations. By two o'clock, orders were despatched to all the cantonments of the duke's army, for the divisions to break up and concentrate on the left of Quatre-bras his grace's design being that his whole force should be assembled there by eleven o'clock on the next night, Friday the 16th. It was at first intended, to put off a ball announced for the evening of Thursday, at the Duchess of Richmond's hotel in Brussels; but on reflection it seemed highly important that the population of that city should be kept, as far as possible, in ignorance as to the course of events, and the Duke of Wellington desired that the ball should proceed accordingly; nay, the general officers received his commands to appear in the ball room, each taking care to quit the apartment as quietly as possible at ten o'clock, and proceed to join his respective division en route. This arrangement was carried into strict execution. The duke himself retired at twelve o'clock, and left Brussels at six o'clock next morning for Quatre-bras."—Hist. of Nap. Buonaparte, Family Library, vol. ii., p. 309.
[155] Savary, tom. iv., p. 75.
[156] He gave the same explanation when on board of the Northumberland. General Gourgaud had inaccurately stated that the Emperor had mistaken the corps of Bulow for that of Grouchy. Napoleon explained, that this was not the case, but that he had opposed a sufficient force to those Prussians whom he saw in the field, and concluded that Grouchy was closing up on their flank and rear.—S.
[157] Baron Muffling's account of the British army must interest our readers:—"There is not, perhaps, in all Europe, an army superior to the English in the actual field of battle. That is to say, an army in which military instruction is entirely directed to that point, as its exclusive object. The English soldier is strongly formed and well fed, and nature has endowed him with much courage and intrepidity. He is accustomed to severe discipline, and is very well armed. The infantry opposes with confidence the attack of cavalry, and shows more indifference than any other European army when attacked in the flank or rear. These qualities explain why the English have never been defeated in a pitched field since they were commanded by the Duke of Wellington.
"On the other hand, there are no troops in Europe less experienced than the English in the light service and in skirmishes; accordingly, they do not practise that service themselves. The English army in Spain formed the standing force round which the Spaniards and Portuguese rallied. The Duke of Wellington acted wisely in reserving his English troops for regular battles, and in keeping up that idea in his army.
"If, on the one hand, a country is worthy of envy which possesses an army consisting entirely of grenadiers, that army might, on the other hand, experience great disadvantage if forced to combat unassisted against an able general, who understands their peculiarities, and can avoid giving them battle excepting on advantageous ground. However, it is to be supposed that the English will seldom make war on the Continent without allies, and it appears their system is established on that principle. Besides, such an army as the English is most precious for those they may act with, as the most difficult task of the modern art of war is to form an army for pitched battles." The Baron adds, in a note upon the last sentence,—"The people who inhabit other quarters of the world, and are not come to the same state of civilisation with us, afford a proof of this. Most of them know better than Europeans how to fight man to man, but can never attain the point of gaining a battle over us. Discipline, in the full extent of the word, is the fruit of moral and religious instruction."—Histoire de la Campagne de l'Armée Angloise, &c., sous les ordres du Duc de Wellington, et de l'Armée Prussienne, sous les ordres du Prince Blucher de Wahlstadt, 1815, Par 6 de 10. Stutgart et Tubingue. 1817.—S.