[312] Official Despatch; Muffling, pp. 8, 10, 18.
[313] Muffling, p. 17. Yet a story is told of Fouché, who is said to have sent intelligence of Buonaparte's movements to Lord Wellington. The courier was attacked and waylaid, as supposed by Fouché's contrivance, so that he had an excuse ready for both parties.
[314] Muffling, p. 64, allows that the position at Ligny was too much extended to the left, but the object of this was to have a line of communication with the Meuse and Cologne; a fault alluded to as arising from having two armies, and two chiefs, with different objects in view.
[315] Grouchy, p. 47; Gourgaud, Liv. ix., p. 102.
[316] It is hardly to be supposed that an officer of Ney's bold and enterprising character, with so much at stake, would have hesitated to attack at Quatre-Bras, if he had had his troops in readiness; but it appears that he could not have had time to move to that point at the early hour stated by Buonaparte. Ney had, also, too much experience of the nature of the troops he was opposed to, to act rashly.
[317] The French did not attack until three P.M., the different corps not being arrived to make the necessary arrangements at an earlier hour.—Grouchy, p. 36; Rogniat, p. 341.
[318] Ney's Letter to the Duc d'Otranto. Paris, 1815.—Muffling, p. 14.
[319] Muffling, pp. 15-64.—Blucher had employed his reserves to support his right at St. Amand, and was not prepared for this change of attack. Muffling, however, considers, that, instead of his cavalry, had he moved his infantry from St. Amand to retake Ligny, he would have succeeded and gained the action.
[320] Grouchy, p. 10, shows how little decisive the battle was. "La bataille de Ligny n'a fini que vers la neuf heure de soir, seulement alors la retraite des Prussiens a été présumée."
[321] Here it was that Blucher was so nearly falling into the hands of the French cavalry.