Stupendous efforts had repaired, the report stated, the losses of the artillery during the three disastrous years of 1812, 1813, 1814. Stores, ammunition, arms of every kind, were said to be provided in abundance. The remounting of the cavalry had been accomplished in such a manner as to excite the surprise of every one. Finally, there was, as a body in reserve, the whole mass of sedentary national guards, so called, because they were not among the chosen bands which had been declared moveable. But the bulk of these were either unfit for service, or unwilling to serve, and could only be relied on for securing the public tranquillity. Corps of Federates had been formed in all the districts where materials could be found of which to compose them.
From these forces Napoleon selected a grand army to act under his personal orders. They were chosen with great care, and the preparation of their matériel was of the most extensive and complete description. The numbers in gross might amount to 150,000; as great a number of troops, perhaps, as can conveniently move upon one plan of operations, or be subjected to one generalissimo. A large deduction is to be made to attain the exact amount of his effective force.
PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN.
Thus prepared for action, no doubt was made that Buonaparte would open the campaign, by assuming offensive operations. To wait till the enemy had assembled their full force on his frontier, would have suited neither the man nor the moment. It was most agreeable to his system, his disposition, and his interest, to rush upon some separate army of the allies, surprise them, according to his own phrase, in delict, and, by its dispersion or annihilation, give courage to France, animate her to fresh exertions in his cause, intimidate the confederated powers, and gain time for sowing in their league the seeds of disunion. Even the Royalists, whose interest was so immediately connected with the defeat of Buonaparte, were dismayed by witnessing his gigantic preparations, and sadly anticipated victories as the first result, though they trusted that, as in 1814, he would be at length worn out by force of numbers and reiterated exertions.
But though all guessed at the mode of tactics which Napoleon would employ, there was a difference of opinion respecting the point on which his first exertions would be made; and in general it was augured, that, trusting to the strength of Lisle, Valenciennes, and other fortified places on the frontiers of Flanders, his first real attack, whatever diversion might be made elsewhere, would take place upon Manheim, with the view of breaking asunder the Austrian and Russian armies as they were forming, or rather of attacking them separately, to prevent their communication in line. If he should succeed in thus overwhelming the advance of the Austrians and Russians, by directing his main force to this one point, before they were fully prepared, it was supposed he might break up the plan of the allies for this campaign.
But Buonaparte was desirous to aim a decisive blow at the most enterprising and venturous of the invading armies. He knew Blucher, and had heard of Wellington; he therefore resolved to move against those generals, while he opposed walls and fortified places to the more slow and cautious advance of the Austrian general, Schwartzenberg, and trusted that distance might render ineffectual the progress of the Russians.
PREPARATIONS OF WAR.
According to this general system, Paris, under the direction of General Haxo, was, on the northern side, placed in a complete state of defence, by a double line of fortifications, so that, if the first were forced, the defenders might retire within the second, instead of being compelled, as in the preceding year, to quit the heights and fall back upon the city. Montmartre was very strongly fortified. The southern part of the city on the opposite side of the Seine was only covered with a few field-works; time, and the open character of the ground, permitting no more. But the Seine itself was relied upon as a barrier, having proved such in 1814.
On the frontiers, similar precautions were observed. Intrenchments were constructed in the five principal passes of the Vosgesian mountains, and all the natural passes and strongholds of Lorraine were put in the best possible state of defence. The posts on the inner line were strengthened with the greatest care. The fine military position under the walls of Lyons was improved with great expense and labour. A tête-de-pont was erected at Brotteau; a drawbridge and barricade protected the suburb la Guillotière; redoubts were erected between the Saonne and Rhine, and upon the heights of Pierre Encise and the Quarter of Saint John. Guise, Vitri, Soissons, Chauteau-Thierry, Langres, and all the towns capable of any defence, were rendered as strong as posts, palisades, redoubts, and field-works could make them. The Russian armies, though pressing fast forward, were not as yet arrived upon the line of operations; and Napoleon doubtless trusted that these impediments, in front of the Austrian line, would arrest any hasty advance on their part, since the well-known tactics of that school declare against leaving in their rear fortresses or towns possessed by the enemy, however insignificant or slightly garrisoned, or however completely they might be masked.
About now to commence his operations, Napoleon summoned round him his best and most experienced generals. Soult, late minister of war for Louis XVIII., was named major-general. He obeyed, he says, not in any respect as an enemy of the King, but as a citizen and soldier, whose duty it was to obey whomsoever was at the head of the government, as that of the Vicar of Bray subjected him in ghostly submission to each head of the Church pro tempore. Ney was ordered to repair to the army at Lisle, "if he wished," so the command was expressed, "to witness the first battle." Macdonald was strongly solicited to accept a command, but declined it with disdain. Davoust, the minister-at-war, undertook to remove his scruples, and spoke to him of what his honour required. "It is not from you," replied the maréchal, "that I am to learn sentiments of honour," and persisted in his refusal. D'Erlon, Reille, Vandamme, Gerard, and Mouton de Lobau, acted as lieutenant-generals. The cavalry was placed under the command of Grouchy (whom Napoleon had created a maréchal.) Pajol, Excelmans, Milhaud, and Kellerman, were his seconds in command. Flahault, Dejean, Labédoyère, and other officers of distinction, acted as the Emperor's aides-de-camp. The artillery were three hundred pieces; the cavalry approached to twenty-five thousand men; the guard to the same number; and there is little doubt that the whole army amounted in effective force to nearly 130,000 soldiers, in the most complete state as to arms and equipment, who now marched to a war which they themselves had occasioned, under an Emperor of their own making, and bore both in their hearts and on their tongues the sentiments of death or victory.