Before this utterance Disraeli had stated that the Convention’s object was not only to confirm “tranquillity and order,” but to safeguard India. “We have a substantial interest in the East; it is a commanding interest, and its behest must be obeyed.”—“In taking Cyprus,” he continued, “the movement is not Mediterranean, it is Indian;” and, speaking of Russia’s temptation to profit by a state of things which tended to resolve the societies of Asia Minor and the countries beyond into the anarchy of original elements, he used the familiar words: “... There is no reason for these constant wars, or fears of wars between Russia and England. Before the circumstances which led to the recent disastrous war, when none of those events which we have seen agitating the world had occurred, and when we were speaking in another place of the conduct of Russia in Central Asia, I vindicated that conduct, which I thought was unjustly attacked, and I said then, what I repeat now, there is room enough for Russia and England in Asia.”
On the other hand, in another speech alluding to Austria’s trusteeship of Bosnia, he said it permitted us to check, “... I should hope for ever, that Pan-Slavist confederacy and conspiracy which has already proved so disadvantageous to the happiness of the world.” Nobody acquainted with Austria’s desire for Salonica, Italy’s dread of that possibility, and the fear of one at any rate of these powers lest Greece should absorb Albania, can fail to grasp the relevance of this hope.
It should be borne in mind that at the time these deliverances were made Abdul Hamid[129] was not what he seems since to have become. He was then—and the late Sir William White was my informant—an enthusiastic reformer, with the wise and accomplished Midhat for his inspirer. Had he remained so Turkey would have achieved much for Asia Minor. Even now, Abdul may perhaps be sometimes excused for mistrusting the cant of reform on the part of unreforming powers. Perhaps it is impossible long to be Sultan of Turkey without falling into the faults bred by habitual suspicion. Perhaps the varying conduct of Western Powers conduces to cynicism. But at this period the Armenians themselves were hopeful. With the Russian aspiration I sympathise. Russia is destined to expansion and greatness; she is a cold power desiring to be warm, pushed by a military power eager to be forward. But she is also that strange anomaly—a new empire with a mediæval standard. With the freezing officialism of Russia, giant in profession and pigmy in practice, I entertain no sympathy at all. Nor are the Cossack barbarities a whit less infamous than those of the Bashi-Bazouks. What is always to be dreaded is the periodical recurrence of race-hatreds and barbarism on the confines of both countries. Turkey comprises many more races than Russia; at such times, therefore, when bad governors incense brutalised men, unspeakable horrors eclipse imagination and baffle even sympathy. Bulgarian or Servian Slavs massacre Macedonian Greeks, Albanians butcher Macedonian Serbs, and Turks both massacre and torture Macedonian Slavs. The name of the particular province inflamed at a specific time by revolutionary committees is constantly used as if designating the natural uprising of a united people or of a single race; but this is not the case. The recent blood-orgy, however, connived at by more than one of the powers, would seem to disgrace the Ottoman beyond any other single group concerned. And yet the normal Turk—soldier or peasant—is not naturally brutal. It is only when insulted fanaticism dements him that he becomes so; and his fanaticism seldom fans the flames unprovoked by foreign designs. Of course nothing could be more desirable than a practical, a permanent understanding with Russia; nothing more desirable than a complete reform of European Turkey, which the joint powers could enforce if they would unite. Both are consummations devoutly to be wished. But bearing in mind the panther tread of Russian diplomacies, their recent developments in China and Japan, their constant designs on India and in Persia, their stealthy hankering after Constantinople, their earlier annexation even of American territory, as Disraeli pointed out—is the former practical? By all means let Russia expand, as she has a right to expand; but by all means let England ascertain the due spheres of her expansion, and retain her own empire, that gives justice and freedom to countless races once oppressed. Nor let any cant of whatever nature blind her eyes to the hard issues.
Throughout his pronouncements on foreign affairs is to be discerned his construction of “balance of power” and of “interference.” As regards the first, his principles are well defined in a speech of 1864. “... The proper meaning of ‘balance of power’ is security for communities in general against a predominant and particular power.” It also follows “that you have to take into your consideration states and influences that are not to be counted among the European powers.” Every crisis in Europe bears on America and the colonies. So early as 1848 he had pointed out that, though insulted, “... yet our welfare as a great colonial power was so intimately connected with European politics, that in seasons of crisis we could only retire from interference at the expense not only of our prestige but of our safety.” The “balance of power” principle he derived from Bolingbroke; he also adopted from Bolingbroke his principle of “interference.”
“... There are conditions,” he laid it down in 1860, “under which it may be our imperative duty to interfere. We may clearly interfere in the affairs of foreign countries when the interests or the honour of England are at stake, or when, in our opinion, the independence of Europe is menaced. But a great responsibility devolves upon that minister who has to decide when those conditions have arisen; and he who makes a mistake upon that subject, he who involves his country in interference or in war under the idea that the interests or honour of the country are concerned, when neither is substantially involved, he who involves the country in interference or war because he believes the independence of Europe is menaced, when, in fact, it is not in danger, makes of course a great, a fatal mistake. The general principle that we ought not to interfere in the affairs of foreign nations, unless there is a clear necessity, and that, generally speaking, it ought to be held a political dogma that the people of other countries should SETTLE THEIR OWN AFFAIRS without the introduction of foreign influence or foreign power, is one which I trust the House ... will cordially adhere to....” To this let me add a passage from the great Denmark speech of 1864. It is its corollary—
“... By the just influence of England in the councils of Europe, I mean an influence contradistinguished from that which is obtained by intrigue and secret understanding; I mean an influence that results from the conviction of foreign powers that our resources are great, and that our policy is moderate and steadfast.... I lay this down as a great principle which cannot be controverted in the management of our foreign affairs. If England is resolved upon a particular policy, war is not probable.”
One illustration is worth many arguments. At the Berlin Congress affairs at a time began to march ill. The Russian plenipotentiary was making mischief. Disraeli quietly pencilled some requisitions on the part of England and forwarded them to him. “If you accept these,” he said, “peace—if not, war.”
Bearing these two further principles of foreign policy in mind, let me endeavour to sketch Disraeli’s attitude towards various other powers. With America I deal separately in the next chapter.
Friendship with France amounted with him almost to a passion, and none would have rejoiced more heartily at the amity which our King has recently renewed. He himself knew the French well, and in the ’forties had met with the most cordial welcome on two occasions from the King, the Court, the lights of literature and science, the politicians and the people. He thought that with French alliance other powers might exclaim as Shakespeare’s Constance exclaimed—
“France friends with England, what become of me!”