My Colored Battalion

by Warner A. Ross

That, I take it, is enough to prove that no success was achieved by units advancing or to advance on our left. It is necessary to prove that for the benefit of only a very few, for the overwhelming majority of Americans (owing to the effort to give all units equal credit and imply that all concerned succeeded) are ignorant, or seriously in doubt whether the 92nd Division or any of its units achieved any real success anywhere.

Now let us see about our brigade—the 183rd, which comprised the 365th and 366th infantry and the 350th Machine Gun Battalion. The Brigade report says, latter part of paragraph 2 on page 149, same book, “The object of this attack was to capture and hold the Boise Frehaut and the Bois Voivrotte (Bois Voivrotte is the name of the small wood I spoke of in the lecture, to our right) with the object of advancing the line of observation of the Marbache sector to the northern boundary of these woods.” So our brigade orders were to capture and hold these two woods, and, as we were advancing from the south, the line we were to hold respectively, was the northern boundary of both these woods.

Page 149, paragraph 3 of Brigade report: “The attack was to be made on the Bois Frehaut by the 2nd Bn. 365th Inf., Major Warner A. Ross, commanding. The attack on the Bois Voivrotte was to be made by two platoons, 2nd Bn. 366th Inf. At the zero,” etc.

At the early hour of 8:12, the report says, page 150, a message had been relayed from Division headquarters to Brigade headquarters to the effect that Bois Voivrotte was completely occupied. It was very small compared to the positions the 2nd Bn. 365th Inf. was attacking. And the next entry, as given on page 150, is: “At 9 a. m. a message was received that sharp fighting by machine guns was going on in the Bois Voivrotte and the Bois Frehaut.” This was the case in Bois Frehaut at that time and at 8:30 when I sent that particular message relative to Bois Frehaut by pigeon. Now, the fact that machine gun fighting was going on in Bois Voivrotte means that either the 8:12 message about it being completely occupied was premature or that machine guns had been sent in by the enemy after the platoons of the 2nd Bn. 366th Inf. “completely occupied” it. For if enemy machine gunners were occupying and fighting in the wood it could not be said to be “completely occupied” by our troops.

After the 2nd Battalion, 365th Infantry had completely occupied Bois Frehaut and established our line along the northern boundary and also the eastern boundary of that wood (it was much farther north than the northern boundary of Bois Voivrotte) it became impracticable for the enemy to send or keep troops in Bois Voivrotte unless he drove my Battalion from Bois Frehaut. He was still at liberty, however, to rain artillery fire upon it. But here it is officially from the commander of the 2nd Bn. 366th Inf. On page 151, Brigade report: “3:05 p. m. Telephone message from C. O. 2nd Bn. 366th Inf. that he had withdrawn his lines to southern edge of Bois Voivrotte because of heavy enemy shelling—high explosives and gas in woods.” This final cessation of their efforts to hold Bois Voivrotte and withdrawal of their lines to the southern edge of it was one reason for the next entry on same page: “3:55 p. m. Orders received from Commanding General 92nd Division not to launch attack as planned for 5 p. m., but to consolidate positions gained, holding them at all costs against possible counter attacks.” For how could the other units that were supposed to attack through the units supposed to be holding Bois Voivrotte advance beyond its northern boundary when as a matter of fact according to the Battalion C. O.—directly in command—they were only holding the southern boundary. Obviously it was necessary to recapture Bois Voivrotte and hold it—all of it, before they could consider capturing anything beyond, or north of it.

The other reason for the calling off by the Division Commander of the attack scheduled to be launched from the northern boundaries of Bois Frehaut and Bois Voivrotte at 5 p. m., on the 10th, was equally obvious. For how could the units scheduled to attack through the 2nd Battalion of the 365th then holding the northern boundary of Bois Frehaut, be expected to advance beyond us when they had never succeeded, due to enemy artillery fire, in reaching even the southern boundary of Bois Frehaut.

At the time when the attack beyond Bois Voivrotte was almost due to be launched by other units of the 366th they were not holding Bois Voivrotte but had withdrawn their line to the southern edge and were holding what previously had been no-man’s land—very much narrower there than in front of Ferme de Belle Aire. As can readily be seen, this failure to hold, on their part, left me in a precarious condition should the enemy in force attempt to envelop us through Bois Voivrotte. This was largely the cause for the order to the artillery mentioned in the Division Report, page 160: “11 Nov. 3:59—Artillery directed to put down barrage on northern edge of Bois Voivrotte, this point not being occupied by our troops.” I think, bearing in mind General Pershing’s brief remarks relative to attacks on the 11th of November, that this covers them all, including troops of the 7th Division attacking through the C. R. adjoining the 367th on the left.

What does all this mean? It means that of all the battalions concerned or engaged in attacking toward Metz during the drive that started the morning of November 10th, the only battalion that accomplished its mission, or in other words, the only one that was able to carry out its orders—the only one that captured and held anything, was the 2nd Battalion of the 365th Infantry. Had this battalion not succeeded in capturing and holding Bois Frehaut, in fact had it not succeeded in all of its various missions at all times, and had its companies, as companies, not succeeded in all their various missions, I would not be publishing any book about it at all, let alone praising the battalion as I have.

But let us see some more quotations from things included in Dr. Scott’s History. Ralph W. Tyler, the colored war correspondent, writing, necessarily from hearsay mostly, at a time when the confusion and din of battle made it impossible to foresee results, could, however, see the landscape in general and he knew who was attacking and later who was holding Bois Frehaut. He also visited Bois Frehaut after the armistice, so among other things he wrote, page 289: “... and so the 2nd Battalion went into action with but one white officer, the Major. No unit in the advance had a more difficult position to take and hold than the position assigned to the 2nd Battalion of the 365th. The Bois Frehaut was a network of barbed-wire entanglements, and the big guns in Metz had nothing to do but sweep the woods with a murderous fire, which they did most effectively. French and Senegalese in turn had failed to hold these woods, for it was worse than a hell—it had become the sepulchre of hundreds. I (Ralph W. Tyler) was over and through these woods; I saw the mass of barbed-wire entanglements; I saw the nests in the trees in which Germans had camouflaged machine guns that rained a fire upon the Allied troops.

“It is impossible to describe this scene of carnage. The order to the colored men of the 365th was to ‘take and hold’ although it was believed, almost to a certainty, that they could not hold it, even if they did take it. But they did take and hold it, and these men of the 2nd Battalion, with Spartan-like courage; with an endurance unbelievable, would be holding the position at this writing had not the armistice been signed or had they not received orders to retire.”