I may as well tell you, what many people know, that although this was the beginning of the great Allied movement to reduce the strategic stronghold of Metz, with division after division massing behind us and to our right, the battalion of the white division to the left of the Three Hundred and Sixty-seventh rushed ahead at zero hour on the morning of the 10th, lost one hundred and fifty-six men in less than five minutes and withdrew to their trenches. The attack battalion of the Three Sixty-seventh sized up the situation and barely left their trenches so withering was the fire.
The troops of a part of a battalion of the Three Hundred and Sixty-sixth on our right rushed out to take a small wood that laid east of the positions we were to take, got almost to their objectives and rushed back owing to the accuracy and intensity of enemy fire. But it didn’t matter much outside of leaving my battalion’s right flank entirely wide open, for Bois de la tete d’Or and Bois Frehaut of our position far outflanked it and made it untenable for the Germans. A map of the positions involved tells the story. I tell you this not to discredit or belittle units on our right and left, but to prove that what the Second Battalion of the Three Hundred and Sixty-fifth Infantry there accomplished was far from easy and that when it came to defending Metz the enemy was decidedly on the job.
Bois Frehaut is a hilly, dense wood about five hundred yards east of the Moselle River, rising from low, flat, boggy land. This low ground extends around and eastward south of the wood, between it and the northern edge of East Pont-a-Musson, in the form of a broad swale gradually narrowing and rising from a point south of the center of the wood. This broad swale was no-man’s land. Behind Bois Frehaut to the north enemy ground continued to rise, culminating in a very high hill or mountain overlooking the wood, no-man’s land, Pont-a-Musson and the entire country for miles around. Near its summit was an exceptionally fine observation post, reached by a long tunnel.
In speaking of the action of Bois Frehaut or the capture of Bois Frehaut the places called Belle Aire Farm, Bois de la Tete d’Or and Ferme de Pence are included. They are parts of and join Bois Frehaut. This position was a separate and distinct place entirely surrounded by clear ground and most ideally situated for the enemy for defense purposes. My knowledge of what was done by units on our right and left was gained during the action through my efforts to keep in touch with and to establish liaison with those units on our flanks.
On three separate occasions during the preceding four months Allied troops had attempted to capture this Bois Frehaut. Once a French outfit, after considerable artillery preparation, got into the edge of it by a turning movement and stayed about ten minutes. Later French Senegalese troops penetrated its east flank a short distance and stayed less than one hour. At the time American troops reduced the St. Mihiel Salient they made a frontal attack on Bois Frehaut and Ferme de Belle Aire, an outpost position in front of and about half as wide as the wood proper. This advance or pinch was supposed to start east of Bois Frehaut and take it with the big salient, but it had to pivot on Bois Frehaut instead of straightening the line from Momeny, for this was near Metz and one of the strong outlying centers defending it, so the attackers never got through the outside systems of wire. As a result of this the Allied first line on the west side of the river was several kilometers in advance of our line on the east bank before we took Bois Frehaut and straightened it. I remember that as we went through the Ferme de Belle Aire wire I counted twenty-six American bodies or parts of bodies in one small section. They had been lying or hanging there since about September 13th.
Such, then, was the position the Second Battalion of the Three Hundred and Sixty-fifth Infantry, short two captains and nine lieutenants, its ranks badly thinned and the whole outfit dead tired, was ordered to capture and to hold. This was the morning of the ninth, the companies were widely separated, we were almost five miles behind our front line and we were to attack at five o’clock the next morning.
There was not a minute to lose. Early in the afternoon we were up in East Pont-a-Musson. We would spend the night completing our preparations there. Our first lines at the point where I had decided to leave them were just north of the edge of the town. From there, for several kilometers, they ran in a north-easterly direction, but my orders called for a head-on attack along the entire enemy front. Prospective casualties for us seemed not to concern those of my superiors and their assistants who had laid down the general outline for this affair and for several previous affairs. I haven’t time here to go into details as to that statement, but I assure you I am not telling anything imaginative or that I can not substantiate. I am saying little or nothing of any battalion or organization other than my own. What I say of it and things pertaining to it are not meant to apply to anything else. They are the result of personal knowledge and experience.
The commanding General had wished me luck and departed. The Lieutenant Colonel practically had put the regiment at my disposal and gone to Loisey. The whole thing was now up to us. There were a thousand things to think of and do and very little time in which to do them. I called the officers together and gave instructions about equipment of all sorts—ammunition, gas masks, sag paste, rations—things that had to be sent back for, and so on.
I sent for certain units of the Headquarters Company, and annexed a part of the officers and men of the First Battalion. By the way, its Major had been killed by the Germans a few days before. I also sent for the Regimental Machine Gun Company, for I had a foreboding that the company of the Brigade Machine Gun Battalion designated to report to me in the orders would not arrive in time. So I played safe. Then I spent about two hours inspecting and watching the preparations go forward. At six P. M. I sat down to study in detail and to systematize our plan of attack. Everything must be thought out and arranged in advance. All contingencies must, if possible, be foreseen and provided for. The foe we were going against was highly organized and knew his position. He was experienced, efficient and crafty in the art of war.
Promptly at eight-thirty, as ordered, the officers assembled at the house we were using as temporary Battalion Headquarters. The company from the Machine Gun Battalion had not arrived and for what we were about to undertake, machine guns were important. So I called Captain Allen and his lieutenants of our Regimental Machine Gun Company into the conference. Had the other company arrived, Captain Allen of the company I had sent for on my own initiative, probably would not now be lying buried in France. So works fate, as some call it. It’s a sad thing to have to order officers and men on missions of almost certain death, especially when they are so willing, even anxious to go, and when you know them as well as I knew mine, but such is war.