OGLALA WOMAN
Pine Ridge, 1909. Photographed by W. K. Moorehead.
“The Indian wars of the Plains were more the result of a combination of causes, added to those already mentioned. First, our Government commenced a wishy-washy, desultory course with the Indians, instead of taking a bold, firm stand with them, and bringing out enough soldiers to overawe and make them respect the Government by showing them how strong it was, thus making them understand what to expect if they did not behave themselves. The Government policy was so weak at the beginning, that the Indians actually laughed at it and said: ‘The Government is afraid of us; it dare not punish us’; and this was their real belief. I heard some Kiowas braggingly say, ‘Why, we can whip the United States, for it has been fighting Texas for years and cannot whip her. We go and sweep down upon her settlements, kill, burn, and destroy, drive off stock, take women and children prisoners, and make the settlers glad to hide.’ This was at the time of the Civil War, and the Kiowas thought the Government was fighting only Texas.
“Now then, as I have said, the Government began with the Indians in a very feeble way and sent a few troops after them, which, of course, the Indians bested and forced to retreat. Then a large force was sent which also was beaten, and, after repeated little fights and skirmishes, large armies were sent out. Usually, however, the Indians got the best of the troops and were thus emboldened and given new confidence in themselves and their strength.
“I have been a stockman all my life, and whenever my cattle became ‘breachy’, if the break they made in my fence was poorly mended, it was broken through again and again. Each time we repaired the fence a little better than before, but each time, also, the cattle acquired fresh skill and force in breaking down the fence. At last, it was impossible to fix the fence in a way that my herds could not break through. If I had made the fence good and strong when first repairing it, the trouble would have been settled at once, and the cattle would never have broken it down the second time. A comparison between my haphazard fence and breachy cattle, and the Government’s Indian policy of years ago is the most fitting I can make.”
Wright believes that the military authorities at Washington were rather responsible for continuation of an unwise policy toward the Indians, and is somewhat critical as to the plans of campaign. It was a great mistake to send infantry against Indians, but this was repeatedly done. In the Fetterman massacre, the troops were infantry. The cavalry horses of the ’60’s and ’70’s were grain-fed, and extra large. Cavalry commands were accompanied by a wagon-train in which grain and hay were hauled. Hence, prior to Custer’s later campaigns, the American cavalry made little progress as against Indians. The latter went very light, carrying a little dried buffalo meat, guns and ammunition. Each Indian warrior always possessed an extra horse—his war pony—which was never ridden except in battle. He rode his ordinary pony, and led the other. In this way the Indian soldiers had an advantage over the white cavalry. Mr. Wright says that the Indians feared winter attacks on their camps. They seldom made war during cold weather. The warriors endeavored to lead the troops away from their permanent villages.
“General Sully found this out, in 1868, when he supposed he was marching upon an Indian village from which the families had been removed and hidden in another direction, while the warriors led Sully on a wild-goose chase into the Wichita Mountains. It is a wonder his whole command was not annihilated, and if he had followed the Indians a little further, not a soldier would have escaped, the trap was so well set. But Sully realized the danger just in time, turned around, got out of the mountains almost by a miracle, returning to Fort Dodge for reinforcements, with the Indians harassing him all the way back. This ambush and defeat was a source of great mortification to General Sully. General Custer then took the field with big reinforcements, and surprised the Indian camp on the Wichita River; but, after the attack, Custer, too, was forced to beat a hasty retreat to Camp Supply, as he found himself greatly outnumbered nearly ten to one. He inflicted on the Indians a severe punishment, taking nearly two hundred women and children prisoners, which greatly disheartened the Indians for a while. But this success was in the dead of winter, and might have resulted differently had it happened in the summer season, with the Indian fighting according to his views of proper war tactics. (See picture, page [302].)
“It was a big mistake of the National Government to appoint civilians and representatives of different religious denominations as Government Agents. We should have appointed army officers instead, at a post where there was also an agency. This was merely a necessity of the times and conditions, clearly visible to anybody in the least acquainted with the needs of the situation. Soldiers were always stationed at an agency, the commander of that post was always subject to the orders of the Agent, a civilian often wholly unqualified to direct military movements or frontier exploits, and the ideas of commander and Agent were nearly always in conflict. The officer bitterly resented being subject to the Agent’s orders and certainly the former, familiar as he was with the border and Indian, knew better than the Agent could know, coming as he did, as a rule, direct from civilized centers. While treating them kindly and fairly, an army officer would have governed the Indian with a firm hand, and with none of the little less than criminal weakness displayed by many of the Agents. Moreover, most of the Agents were not good men, and not only robbed the Indian but starved him. I personally knew of graft practised by several Agents by which the Indian suffered greatly. Let me cite one of many instances of weakness that fell under my own observation. Mr. Darlington, Agent of the Cheyenne and Arapaho, was a good old Quaker, but weak and unsophisticated to a marked degree. I was sutler for the soldiers at this agency, and these Indians had stolen a lot of horses and mules from me. One issue day, the Indians rode in, and I saw several of my horses and mules, bearing my brand, among their stock. Now, the Indians who had possession of my horses belonged to Stone Calf’s band. Stone Calf was one of the head chiefs of the Cheyennes, a man of more than ordinary intelligence, and a pretty truthful Indian. I went to Mr. Darlington, told my story, and asked him to recover my stock for me. He promised to do so, sent for Stone Calf, and said to him: ‘This young man is truthful and honest, and he says you have a lot of his stock (describing the brand). Now, Stone Calf, you are a good, honest, truthful Indian, and I have always found you square; give this young man back his stock.’ Stone Calf drew himself up with superb dignity and fairly breathed disdain at the Agent’s suggestion. ‘I have no doubt that this stock did belong to the young man,’ he replied, ‘but it belongs to me now. I took it when I was at war, and I never give back anything I take when I am at war.’ That settled the matter and I never recovered my stock. An army officer in the Agent’s place would have said: ‘This stock belongs to Wright; give it up to him at once!’ and he would have been obeyed and nothing more would have come of it.
“Again, had military instead of civilian Agents been appointed, the wholesale robbery of the Indians already mentioned, and system of graft in general that went on would have been largely avoided, the Indian benefited, and trouble averted. Remote as he always was from surveillance, with large quantities of Government supplies entrusted to his care for the use of the Indians, the temptation to dishonest practices for private gain was great to every Agent. Mr. Darlington, already mentioned as Agent of the Cheyennes, was as honest an old man as ever lived and, being so, seemed to think everyone else honest too, but his employees stole from the Indians right and left, and robbed them right along, under his very eye, and he was not aware of what was going on. The graft of the agencies was notoriously well-known on the frontier, and many an Agent became actually rich from the spoils of his office. The Indians realized the state of affairs and resented it, and added it as another brand to the fire of their hostility against the Whites. The big old chief Red Cloud once said: ‘I don’t see why the Government changes our Agents. When one Agent gets rich at his trade of looking after us and has about all he wants, he may stop his stealing and leave us the property which belongs to us, if he keeps his place. But when one man grows fat at our expense, he is removed and a lean man sent to take his place, and we must fill his belly till he is fat also, and give way to another lean one!’”
Mr. Wright calls attention to the fact that the army officer was a better judge of human nature than the civilian and he further had the advantage of discipline. Surrounded as he was by numerous associates aspiring to promotion, he dared not steal Government supplies lest he be found out, and drummed out of the army. With a civilian it was very different.
“History gives no more striking example in proof of feeble Governmental policy with the Plains Indians in combination with the pitiful incapacity of some of the civilian Agents, than the story of the last Indian raid through western Kansas and Nebraska in 1878. It seems that for no better reason than that they wished to have all the Cheyenne Indians in one band, the Indian officials of the Government gave orders for the removal of the Northern Cheyennes from their agency in Dakota, to that of the Southern Cheyennes at Fort Reno, in what is now Oklahoma. The Northern Cheyennes did not wish to move and protested vigorously, but in vain. Being unused to the southern climate, it was not long after their arrival at Fort Reno, before malaria appeared among them, numbers became sick and many died. Terror-stricken at this almost unknown experience, they became possessed with the idea that the water they had to drink in the new country was poisoned, and that all would die if they remained. Going to the Agent, they begged to be allowed to return to their northern home, but were refused. Then provisions began to grow scarce. The Cheyennes applied to the Agent for permission to go on a buffalo hunt to gain food. Permission was granted, but the buffalo had been practically exterminated in that locality, and, though they hunted for days, not a buffalo could be found, and the poor savages were in worse condition than before. They were forced to kill their few scrawny ponies for meat to sustain life until they could return to the agency, and there they killed their dogs and lived upon them for a while. Again they begged to be permitted to return to the North, and again they were refused. In pity for their distress, however, the Commander of the fort gave orders that a small ration should be distributed among them, but it is almost certain that a large portion of this was confiscated by unscrupulous assistants, and that very little of it ever reached the needy Indians. Their condition rendered them fairly desperate. They resolved to return to Dakota at any cost. ‘We may as well die fighting,’ said Dull Knife, the Cheyenne chief and leader, ‘as to stay here and die of starvation.’ They began stealing and concealing guns, ammunition, and what provisions they could spare from their scanty stock. When ready to start, they stole horses, and, with a few mounted warriors, their foraging operations were rapidly extended until an abundance of mounts, arms, and provisions were obtained. Women and children took part in the exodus, and the march was very leisurely, but notwithstanding this fact, the troops sent in pursuit were defeated in battle about sixty miles from Reno, and afterwards proceeded in so careless a fashion, that the Indians were not again overtaken till they reached Sand Creek, about forty miles south of Dodge City. Here, however, the troops completely surrounded the Indian camp and might have recaptured the fugitives with ease, but the superior cunning and energy of the Indians were here again strikingly apparent, for they managed to slip away in safety during the night, the soldiers not discovering the escape until two days after it occurred. The flight and leisurely pursuit was resumed, but the Indians had killed very few Whites until they reached White Woman creek in Western Kansas. Here they were again overtaken by the soldiers and an engagement fought. If Colonel Lewis, who had joined the pursuing detachment with reinforcements, had not been killed, it is probable the Indians would have been defeated and recaptured, but the troops, deprived of a leader in Lewis’s death, showed the white feather, and once more allowed the Cheyennes to slip away in safety. From thence onward, emboldened by success and filled with contempt for the Whites by the indolence of the troops, the progress of the Indians was marked by horrible bloodshed and devastation. Their course was practically unchecked, and they reached the northern agency, at length, thus attaining the object of their expedition.