How incumbent upon us, then, is it become to guard against the effects, which a propagation of this principle will inevitably produce! Naval perfection is, I am well aware, like all other perfections, placed beyond human reach; but the road to excellence is open. In it we have advanced before our rivals in all branches of naval superiority but one: I mean ship-building. Our vessels want length, and in the construction of their bottoms are undeniably very inferior to those of our enemies. Hence the continual escapes of the French fleets from ours, by superior sailing, when we want to bring them to action, which no skill, diligence, or bravery in our commanders can surmount. We possess models from which we might learn to correct our errors, and supply our deficiencies; but these patterns we are more ready to destroy than to imitate, as if fearful lest comparison of them with our own productions should demonstrate our inferiority. Thus do we continue obstinately to grope on in a dark and superannuated track, merely because our ancestors preceded us in it. The truth is, the art of ship-building has been cultivated in France by men of science, enlightened by a previous study of its theory: whereas in England it has been committed to the management of those, who for the most part have certainly had no room to boast of a scientific education, or a laborious examination of principles; and who could justly lay claim to the merit of observation only. In a country so eminent for mathematical acquirements as ours, is it not extraordinary, that this most useful branch of knowledge should have been so rarely applied to national advantage? What treatises on this important subject can we oppose to those, which have been published by French academicians, and by Bouguier in particular?
“Oh! for a bridge to pass over two hundred thousand sans-culottes!” I hear often exclaimed. Not that bridge which, according to Milton, Death consolidated across Chaos, could be more fatal to the remaining innocence of our first parents, than such a structure, in the shape of a superior fleet, would prove to their English descendants. To prevent its erection, or to have a chosen band of pioneers ready to destroy it, must be our concern. I am, however, well convinced, that hitherto they have never seriously intended to invade us. This bug-bear has now for more than a century been employed to affright us; to cramp our foreign efforts; to diminish our sum of productive labour, one of the most important of national considerations; and to debauch the manners of our artisans and peasants in camps and barracks[D].
I have been curious to hear their account of the signal defeat, which they experienced on the first of June. This ship was not in their fleet, having been launched since; but Captain Le Franq commanded on that day L’Entreprenant, of 74 guns, and some of the other officers were also parties concerned. Not the invincible superiority of British seamen in fighting and managing their ships, but “Treason! treason! joined to the ignorance, obstinacy, and cowardice of Jean Bon St. André, caused the loss of the day.” This naval dictator, who from a Hugonot curate at the foot of the Pyrenees was raised to be a member of the convention, and delegated by that body to superintend the equipment, and direct the manœuvres, of a great fleet, is never mentioned but with execration. His star set with that of his master, Robespierre. I have heard an officer assert, that he saw him, in the heat of the engagement, seized with a sudden emotion, start from Admiral Villaret, near whom he was standing, in the stern-gallery of La Montagne, and run pale and breathless down to the lower gun-deck, under a pretence of encouraging the men; nor could he be drawn thence, until the danger was over. “His seamanship,” continued this gentleman, “consisted in having made one short passage. He might be a good ecrivain ou secretaire; but for the marine! Oh! le vilain——!” But for him, they say, the action would have been renewed, agreeably to the wishes and representations of Monsieur Villaret; for “the English were beaten, and might have been destroyed.”—I cannot help thinking, that if Jean Bon St. André really did prevent a renewal of the battle, he is not altogether so obnoxious to the reproaches of his fellow-citizens as they describe him to be, France is not the first republic which has profited, by declining to combat a victorious enemy.—A second cause of the disaster of the day arose from Lord Howe having gained possession of a copy of the French signals, which was procured by “the guineas of Pitt;” so that he was enabled to divine all their intentions, and to counteract them. It is certain, that some of their captains were gullotined, after the return of the fleet to Brest, but whether on a suspicion of cowardice, or perfidy, I know not. How consolatory to French vanity are these satisfactory solutions of this dreadful overthrow! Happy people! who, in all your conflicts against other nations, conquer by superior skill and bravery only; and are never vanquished but by disparity of number on the side of your enemy, or by treachery among yourselves!
An error, which you with myself, and all other Englishmen, have fallen into about this engagement, I must beg leave to correct, or at least to offer you my reasons for believing it to be one.—Lord Howe’s account of the action states, that two ships of the enemy were sunk. Of Le Vengeur we will not speak; here proof is positive. But I am persuaded she was the only one. This the French positively assert; and I beg leave so far to join with them, as to observe, that when in Admiral Montagu’s squadron (of which the Alexander formed a part) we were chased, on the ninth of June, by the shattered remnant of their fleet, which was steering to Brest, it was composed of nineteen sail of the line. Now, I apprehend it to be certain, that on the day of battle this fleet consisted but of twenty-six ships, six of which were captured and brought into England; so that it should appear the seventh, Le Vengeur, made up the original number. But beside the strong presumption which this circumstance affords, I have received assurances from so many quarters (and particularly from one not remarkably friendly to the present system) that I am convinced one ship only was sent to the bottom on the first of June. Indeed, in matters of this nature, owing to the passions of those engaged, and the innumerable causes which obstruct vision, we should always receive similar relations cum grano salis. In Lord Rodney’s action of the 12th of April 1782, a French ship, said to be Le Diademe, was supposed to be sunk; but I believe subsequent accounts clearly evinced that such an event did not happen. However, the French are more than even with us upon this head; for I have heard some of them positively affirm, that they saw three, and others four of our ships, among which was the Queen Charlotte, go down on the first of June. And when I assured the gentleman who furnished me with this last piece of information, “on the evidence of his own senses,” that he had been deceived, he only shook his head, and continued, like your friend, a sceptic.
The remainder of this letter shall be dedicated to a detail of those detached parts of their naval institutions, customs, and present state, which I have been enabled to pick up. In general I think them inferior, because less easily practicable, to our own, but many of them deserve consideration. “Fas est et ab hoste doceri.”
The discipline of their men struck me at the first view as contemptible; and yet I must confess that I was surprized by the state of subordination in which I afterwards found them. The seaman or soldier addresses his commander by the title of Citoyen, and receives in return the same appellation; but in the five weeks I have lived among them, I have witnessed only one instance of disobedience. The offender was a soldier, who refused to assist in performing some of the ordinary duties of the ship. A court-martial, or conseil de discipline as they call it, was immediately holden upon him, by order of Captain Le Franq, who prosecuted. It consisted of a lieutenant of the ship and three seamen, and of two serjeants and a corporal of the troops. The prisoner pleaded ignorance of the law on this head; and that when he had voluntarily enrolled himself to serve as a soldier, it was under an idea of not being compelled to do that which ought to be the result of inclination only. This defence was deemed so unsatisfactory, that the offender was sentenced to three months imprisonment on shore.
All the judicial institutions of their navy, and the punishments allowed to be inflicted, as well as the cases to which they apply, are strictly defined. The conseil de discipline is impowered to try only inferior officers and men. The officers of the état major (answering nearly to those of our ward-room) and all above them, can be tried only by a board of officers, who assemble in the admiral’s ship. Neither of these courts has the power of condemning to death: all offences of a capital nature must be tried before the revolutionary tribunal. The punishments enjoined are flogging in certain cases, the number of lashes being limited; running the gantlope; ducking from the yard-arm; confinement on shore, or in the lion’s den (boatswain’s store-room); stoppage of pay; and degradation. The three last extend to officers. A prisoner’s allowance of wine is always stopped. No man can be punished but by a sentence of the conseil de discipline; and, in carrying on the service of the ship, it is positively directed, that no “French citizen” shall, on any account whatever, be struck; but he may be pushed as violently as may be found necessary. For giving a box on the ear an officer would be cashiered; but to dash a man’s head against the ship’s side, so as to crush his nose, or beat out his teeth, by rushing suddenly upon him, is allowable.
The ranks of officers differ from ours: those only who command line-of-battle ships, and frigates carrying 18-pounders, are properly styled captains. Other frigates are commanded by lieutenants; and vessels of 20 guns or under by ensigns. Common courtesy, however, with them, as with us, annexes the title of Captain to all commanders. Agreeably to this classification the pay is regulated, but it is at present found so grievously inadequate, as to cause great complaints; and yet the French are unanimous in affirming, that all ranks are not only better paid, but better fed, clothed, and treated, than under the old government. Besides his pay, every officer, including the warrant officers and midshipmen, is allowed a traitement, in lieu of the table which was formerly kept at the king’s expence. The traitement of admirals and captains is very handsome, and suited to their rank, as they are enjoined to keep separate tables: that of Captain le Franq is 24 livres a day. No half-pay has yet been settled upon, or even promised to, the French officers. The seamen are divided into four classes: the pay of the highest class is 40½ livres a month; of the second 36½; of the third 33½; and of the lowest 30½.
Their gradations of command are very similar to our own, from the captain to the lieutenants, ensigns, and boatswain. The office of pilote, which formerly answered to that of master with us, is abolished. It is particularly enjoined, that the officers be put at five watches, if the state of the ship will allow of it. The lieutenant of the watch is stuck up on a little pedestal, which overlooks the helmsman, whence, except in emergencies, he never stirs during his guard, the ensign appointed to assist him, who is distinguished by wearing a gorget, being charged to superintend the execution of his orders.
The general uniform of both their navy and army is a blue coat, with a red waistcoat and breeches: the naval facing is white edged with red, and that of the soldiery red; both services wear gold epaulettes. The naval button is an anchor, surmounted by the cap of liberty, and encircled by the words “La République Française.”