Government and Administration of the United States

by Westel Woodbury Willoughby; William F. Willoughby

The second fundamental question spoken of in the beginning of this chapter as underlying national politics, is concerning the nature of our union and the rights of state nullification and secession.

A final answer to these questions cannot of course be here attempted, but that which can be done, is to state in a few words just what their meaning is, and the points upon which they have turned. When we come to the consideration of the course of politics in the United States we shall see the answers that history has given to them.

The government of the United States is the judge of its own powers, for it is in its own supreme judicial tribunal that the constitutionality of both State and Federal laws is finally determined. More than once has a practical answer been demanded to the question What is to be done by a State or States when, in their estimation, the National Government has transcended its powers and legislated in an unconstitutional manner? Obedience, nullification, or, in the last resort, secession from the Union, have been the various alternatives that have offered themselves to the States. Different views of the nature of our Union have sustained the propriety of the selection of different ones of these alternatives.

According to the nullification theory, the constitution is held to be of the nature of a compact between the States as one party and the Federal Government as the other; and that, as in all contracts, if the agreements contained therein are broken by the one party, the other party has the right to refuse its assent thereto. Therefore, if the United States government attempts the exercise of powers not granted in the compact, the States have the right to interpose the "rightful remedy" of "nullification." That is to say, that each State has the right to determine for itself when an unwarranted power has been assumed by the general government, and in such a case to declare the obnoxious law null and of no force within her own boundaries.

In considering the question of nullification, it is necessary to distinguish between the theory or rather method of nullification propounded by Madison and Jefferson in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, from that of Calhoun brought forward at the time of South Carolina's resistance to, and attempted nullification of, the Tariff laws of 1828, and 1832. In the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions the Alien and Sedition Acts were solemnly declared to be unconstitutional, that the Union was a compact, and the States had the right to interpose the remedy of nullification; but open resistance was not proposed. By the Jeffersonian theory, it was proposed to obtain the opinion of three-fourths of the States that the acts were unconstitutional, and thus to "nullify" them after the manner of a constitutional amendment. Until such nullification, the laws were to be obeyed.

The Calhoun doctrine was something entirely different from this. According to his doctrine, any single State might order at once a suspension of the law within her borders, and not until three-fourths of the States in national convention had overruled the nullification could the State be forced to obey the obnoxious law. To use Calhoun's own words, his theory was, that "it belongs to the State, as a member of the Union, in her sovereign capacity in convention, to determine definitely, as far as her citizens are concerned, the extent of the obligation which she has contracted; and if, in her opinion, the act exercising the power in dispute be unconstitutional, to declare it null and void, which declaration would be obligatory on her citizens." The sum and substance of this was, as Von Holst has pointed out,[1] to give to one-fourth of the States the power if they saw fit to deprive the Federal Government of every power entrusted to it, that is, to alter the constitution at will.

[Footnote 1: Constitutional History of the United States, Vol. I, p. 474, note.]

The right of secession follows as a logical outcome of the theory of nullification rigidly carried out. Federal laws are general in their nature, and if binding anywhere, must be binding everywhere. If then, a minority of States insist on their right of nullification, the federal government will be obliged either to admit that every act of Congress is without any force in a State until it has obtained the tacit approval of the people of that State, or else it will be driven to the necessity of obtaining the enforcement of the law by arms. Such employment of force would of course be but the prelude to secession. Indeed, South Carolina, in her Ordinance of Nullification, declared that she would secede, if the United States did not repeal the obnoxious laws, or if she should attempt to enforce the collections of the tariff duties provided for by the acts in dispute. According to the Unionist view, it is held that in no case has the individual State the right to resist the operation of a federal law, much less does it possess the actual power to pass a law affecting its relation to, or continuance in, the Union. This view is supported by an interpretation of the constitution that denies to that instrument the character of a compact between the States and the National Government. The constitutional theory of this school is that the National Government was formed by the people as a whole, and not by the States. That the States accepted this government, but were in no sense parties to an agreement between them and the Nation. According to this view, the Union began with the first acts of resistance taken in common by the colonies, and is thus, in a sense, older than the state governments, which were not formed until after the Declaration of Independence. Also, that when the States gave in 1788 their consent to the constitution, their consent was irrevocable. Two quotations from decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States will make clear the arguments and theory of the Unionists.

Said Chief Justice Marshall:[1] "The convention which promulgated the constitution was indeed elected by the state legislatures, but the instrument when it came from their hands, was a mere proposal, without obligations or pretentious to it. It was reported to the then existing Congress of the United States, with a request that it might 'be submitted to a convention of delegates chosen in each State by the people thereof, under recommendation of its legislature for their assent and ratification.' This mode of proceeding was adopted, and by the conventions, by Congress, and by the state legislatures, the instrument was submitted to the people. They acted upon it in the only way in which they can act safely, effectually, and wisely on such a subject, by assenting in convention. It is true they assembled in their several States, an where could they have assembled? From these conventions the constitution derives its whole authority. The government proceeds directly from the people. The assent of the States in their sovereign capacity is implied in calling the convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the people. But the people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it, and their decision was final. It required not the affirmance of, and could not be negatived by, the state governments. The constitution when adopted was of complete obligation, and bound the state sovereignties. The government of the Union then, is emphatically and truly a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit."

[Footnote 1: McCulloch v. Md., 4 Dall., 316.]