The construction of lines in Turkey is of the most defective description, and the materials used very inferior. The lines pass over the steepest and most inaccessible hills; and this state of things is made worse by a very inadequate inspection, by men who are both too few in number, wretchedly paid, and generally incompetent. Repairers are compelled to provide and keep a horse out of their pay of 300 piastres ($13.04) per month. The chiefs of stations, and all other employees, are Turks, whose lazy habits and incompetency cannot be wondered at, when the smallness of their pay is considered. Added to these difficulties, the service has to endure very frequent and arbitrary occupation of the wires by the government, interrupting, on many occasions, business of the most pressing nature, for the transmission of some trivial communication, which would lose nothing by a short delay. It may be imagined that as the service is in the hands of government, much depends upon the director-general of the department. Unfortunately, this official is in the unenviable position of holding office on such a poor tenure that it may be said he has a daily apprehension of being turned out, and replaced by one of those numerous intriguers who swarm about the cabinets of the ministers, or work through the more effectual influence of the harem,—the great bane of the country. It has been proposed to the Turkish government to employ a large staff of English inspectors and operators, but the natural jealousy of employing foreigners stands in the way. The Turks insist upon having all messages sent through in Turkish, so that frequently, when retranslated, they bear very slight resemblance to the original.
All the important telegraphic intercourse between Europe and India passes through the Turkish dominions. The effect of the control of the Turkish government over the telegraph is most disastrous, and renders this important connection with India almost worthless.
Repeated efforts have been made by the English telegraph companies, who have so great an interest in the successful operation of these lines, to induce the Turkish government to relinquish its management of them, but thus far without success.
REASONS
WHY
GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT ENTER INTO COMPETITION WITH THE PEOPLE IN THE OPERATION OF THE TELEGRAPH.
The foregoing presentation of facts has shown that there are no sufficient grounds for destroying the value of the investments of the people in existing telegraph companies by governmental competition, the telegraph system of this country being unrivalled in its extent, unequalled in its administration, and unparalleled for the low rates which it has always maintained.
In this country the people have not been accustomed to rely upon the government to provide those things for them which they are able to secure by their own exertions. If this principle is right in regard to one enterprise, it is also in relation to all others; and if infringed upon in the case of the telegraph companies, what pursuit will be safe from governmental interference?
It is undoubtedly true that, were tariffs designed simply to provide a revenue to support the lines, they are capable of reduction, provided present arrangements with railroad companies and others could be maintained, by which the labor of the one is utilized in the service of the other. But for this the country makes no demand. It recognizes the telegraph as a legitimate enterprise for the investment of the capital and labor of its citizens. If false counsels guide its development, public reprobation is ready with its remedy. Its absorption by government would not only be a public calamity, but a breach of the theory and spirit of our institutions, and would soon result in its necessary return to individual control.
POLITICAL REASONS WHY GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT CONTROL THE TELEGRAPH.
One of the most serious objections to the government of the United States assuming the control of the telegraph is the political one. In monarchical countries, where the sovereignty is a patrimony of a particular family, and where no change is made except by revolution, everything which tends towards the permanence of the reigning dynasty is looked upon as in the interest of law and order, and for these reasons the absorption of the telegraphs by the government is regarded as a proper and legitimate act, and consistent with the public weal; but in a republic, where the rulers are changed periodically, and where the purity of the elections is of the first importance, the placing of so great a power in the hands of the government would be a public calamity. It might be supposed that rulers could be elected who would not take advantage of the control of the telegraph for selfish purposes, but the temptation to do so would be great, and, even if not yielded to, the suspicions of the people would be constantly aroused, and confidence in its impartial administration would be destroyed. In every election the whole army of postmasters and the machinery of the department is enlisted in the service of the party in power. Shall we give it the telegraph also? What would be the influence on election returns?
The censorship of telegraphic correspondence, always a subject of public disapprobation, is generally exercised by all governments which have its management. In France the control of the telegraph by government is loudly complained of, in consequence of notorious abuses which result from it. Amongst other things, it is well known that the authorities of the Bourse, in Paris, have opportunities of seeing every telegram which reaches or leaves that city on matters relating to the stock exchange operations.