To resume my narrative. On the 18th of September, several of the principal members of the diplomatic corps left Paris. Their departure gave rise to a good deal of discussion, and much has been written and said upon the subject. The diplomatic corps, as a body, never left Paris. A few days before the siege, Lord Lyons called upon Jules Favre. Favre suggested that if the diplomatic corps wished to leave Paris—and it was natural that they should—he was prepared to accompany them. Lord Lyons replied that he saw no necessity for departure at that time. Favre thereupon said that, in this case, he should stay too.
On the morning of the 18th, Prince Metternich, the Austrian Embassador, came very early to the British Embassy, and said that he meant to go away that afternoon in company with the Turkish Embassador and the Italian Minister, and hoped that Lord Lyons would accompany them. Lord Lyons replied that he saw no necessity for haste, for Bismarck would let them go at any time. Metternich answered, "I don't want to ask any favors of Bismarck, and my Government doesn't want me to." Lord Lyons then finding that the Great Powers of Europe had left, or were about to leave, Paris, consented to go too, and called again upon Favre. But Favre told him that he had then made his arrangements to stay; but that he should send Count Chaudordy to represent his department at Tours.
As soon as it was known that the representatives of several of the Great Powers had left Paris, a meeting of the corps was called by the Nuncio, at the request of several of its members. The question was put, Shall the diplomatic corps leave Paris? and decided in the negative.
But the members departed one by one, till but a few were left. Another meeting was then called, and again it was decided not to leave Paris.
It is quite generally supposed that Mr. Washburne was the only Minister who remained during the whole siege. This is incorrect. There were six in all—the representatives of Northern powers—Norway and Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and the United States. In their relations to the French Government, and in their correspondence with Count Bismarck upon their right to communicate with their respective governments during the siege, and to due notice in case of proposed bombardment, these gentlemen acted in unison as the diplomatic corps at Paris.
The division of diplomatic representatives into embassadors and ministers appears to me to be a mistake. It is certainly pleasant for the embassadors. They have the right of direct communication with the sovereign, for they are held to represent the person of their own sovereign, which the ministers do not. At Paris, at the court festivities, they occupied arm-chairs by the side of the Emperor and Empress, while the ministers were seated on benches in a loge. They had precedence on the reception-days of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. A minister might have waited two hours; an embassador dropped in, and entered before him. Some of them, like Lord Lyons, did not abuse this privilege. He transacted his business as quickly as possible, and gave place to another. The Turkish Embassador, on the other hand, used to gossip by the hour. That he kept a dozen of his colleagues waiting seemed rather to please him. I once heard Lord Lyons remonstrate with him for doing so, and he giggled as if he thought it rather a good joke. In Prussia this is not permitted: first come, first served, is the rule at Berlin, and it seems to me to be the just one. Mr. Bancroft got this rule established, and deserves great credit for the stout fight he made on the occasion. Count Bismarck is stated to have said that if there had been no embassadors, there would have been no war; for the French Government could not have invented the story that their Embassador had been insulted by the King. However this may be, there can be no doubt that the system leads to the formation of cliques, and, consequently, to separate action by a clique instead of by the whole corps. This is bad under any circumstances, but particularly unfortunate in great emergencies.
In regard to the right of free communication with their respective governments claimed by the diplomatic corps at Paris, Count Bismarck refused to accord it. He argued that if these gentlemen saw fit to shut themselves up in a besieged place when they could go away for the asking, and when the French Government had made provision for this case by establishing a branch of the Government at Tours, they must take the consequences; but as a favor he would permit correspondence if it were left unsealed. Of course the corps declined these terms. To Mr. Washburne he wrote (and Bismarck writes and speaks admirable English) that his position as protector of the North Germans in France entitled him to a different answer; that as an evidence of his gratitude for the fidelity and energy with which the duties of this position had been discharged, it had given him great pleasure to obtain from the King permission for Mr. Washburne to receive a sealed bag containing his dispatches and his private correspondence as often as military necessities would permit.
There has been much difference of opinion expressed as to the right of a diplomatic body voluntarily remaining in a besieged place to receive and answer dispatches in sealed correspondence. Mr. Washburne contended that they had such a right; and in this he was energetically supported by Mr. Fish. I confess, however, that to my mind the right is by no means clear. To me Bismarck's argument is unanswerable. "You see fit to stay when the Great Powers of Europe have gone, and when the French Government has made arrangements for the due discharge of your duties elsewhere. By so doing you put yourselves in the position of other inhabitants of the besieged place, and can claim no privileges not accorded to them." In the case of Mr. Washburne, charged with the protection of the Germans at the request of the German Government itself, the necessity for remaining at Paris may have existed. At all events, if he thought that it did, it did not lie in the mouth of that Government to say that it did not. By choosing as their agent the representative of a friendly and independent power, they left his judgment unfettered as to the manner of discharging his duties. The same remark applies to M. Kern, the Minister of Switzerland, who was charged with the protection of the Bavarians and the Badois. But as regards the other gentlemen, I can not but agree with Count Bismarck. I was confirmed in this view, after the siege was over, by General Sheridan. Dining at my table one day in company with Mr. Washburne, he said to him, "If I had been in Moltke's place, you would not have had your bag."
The siege commenced on the 19th of September. For some days previous the streets of Paris had presented an unwonted and curious appearance. They were thronged with the quaintest-looking old carts, farm-wagons, Noah's arks of every kind, loaded with the furniture of the poor inhabitants of the neighborhood flying to Paris for safety. On the other hand, the stations were thronged with the carriages of the better classes leaving the city. The railroads were so overworked that they finally refused to take any baggage that could not be carried by the passenger himself. Imagine the painful situation of some of our fair countrywomen, Worth's admirers and patrons! To have come to Paris amidst all the dangers of war to procure something to wear, to have procured it, and then to be unable to carry it away! But what will not woman's wit and energy do under such circumstances? A clever and energetic friend of mine hired a bateau-mouche, one of the little steamers that ply on the Seine from one part of Paris to another, and, embarking with her "impedimenta," sailed triumphantly for Havre.