I. By predestination, we understand an efficient predetermination to bring about or accomplish any future event. But as God alone has knowledge to comprehend futurity, and power to direct and control future events; predestination, in a proper and strict sense, can only be used in reference to him. And with respect to God, predestination is that efficient determination which he has maintained from eternity, respecting the control, direction, and destiny of the laws, events, and creatures of the universe.—That God hath a predetermination of this kind, there can be no doubt; and therefore, on this fact, there can be no dispute. But the ground of controversy is, the unlimited extent to which some have carried this idea of predestination. Calvin, on this subject, says, “Every action and motion of every creature is governed by the hidden counsel of God, so that nothing can come to pass, but was ordained by him.” The Assembly’s Catechism is similar:—“God did, from all eternity, unchangeably ordain whatever comes to pass.” And Mr. Buck defines predestination to mean, “The decree of God, whereby he hath, for his own glory, foreordained whatever comes to pass.” With these definitions, which, it is seen, are the same in substance, agree all the Calvinistic divines in Europe and America.—To this view of predestination, others, and we confess ourselves of that number, have objected. We believe that the character and acts of intelligent beings, so far at least as their moral accountability is concerned, are not definitely fixed, and efficiently produced, by the unalterable purpose and efficient decree of God. Here therefore we are at issue. We believe, with the rigid predestinarians, that God hath fixed the laws of the physical and moral world, and that he hath a general plan, suited to all the various circumstances and contingencies of his government; but that it is no part of this plan, efficiently to control and actuate the human will. So far, therefore, as these ultra-predestinarians go beyond us, they affirm what we deny; and of course the burden of proof falls upon them. We shall first, then, hear and answer the arguments in defence of their system, and then bring up our arguments against it.[1]
The supporters of this system endeavour to establish their views by a threefold argument—the foreknowledge of God—the necessity of a plan—and Scripture testimony.
1. The first argument is founded on foreknowledge. It is sometimes contended that predestination and foreknowledge are the same. This, however, by the more judicious, is not now insisted on. For it is self-evident, that to know, and to decree, are distinct operations; and to every one acquainted with the common definition of the terms, they must convey distinct and different ideas. And if these are distinct operations in the human mind, they must be also in the Divine mind, unless it can be shown that these terms, when applied to God, have an entirely different meaning from that by which they are understood among men. And as this cannot be pretended, the more common and plausible argument is, that the foreknowledge of God necessarily implies predestination. “For how,” they ask, “can an action that is really to come to pass, be foreseen, if it be not determined? God foreknew every thing from the beginning; but this he could not have known, if he had not so determined it.” “God,” says Piscator, “foresees nothing but what he has decreed, and his decree precedes his knowledge.” And Calvin says, “God therefore foreknows all things that will come to pass, because he has decreed they shall come to pass.” But to this idea there are insuperable objections. Prescience is an essential attribute of the Divine nature. But a determination to do this or that, is not essential to the Divine nature. For aught we can see, God might determine to make a particular planet or not to make it, and in either case the perfection of his nature is not affected. But to know, is so essential to him, that the moment he ceases to know all that is, or will be, or might be, under any possible contingency, he ceases to be God. Is it not absurd, then, to say the least, to make an essential attribute of Deity depend upon the exercise of his attributes?—the Divine prescience depend upon his decrees and determinations? It would seem, by this argument, that, if not in the order of time, at least, in the order of thought, and in the order of cause and effect, the exercise of an attribute preceded the attribute itself; and, in short, the attribute must be exercised, as a cause, to bring it into existence! To this monstrous conclusion we are led by following out this argument. And connected with it is another, equally monstrous and absurd. If God must predetermine events in order to know them, then, as the cause is in no case dependent on the effect, the decrees of God must be passed and his plan contrived, independently of his knowledge, which only had an existence as the effect of these decrees. What must be the character of that plan, and of those decrees, which were formed and matured without knowledge, we will not stop to examine, for the idea borders too closely upon the ludicrous to be dwelt upon in a serious discourse. And yet I cannot see how this conclusion can be avoided, reasoning from such premises. It seems to us, therefore, altogether more consistent to consider that, in the order of cause and effect, the exercise of the Divine attributes is consequent upon their existence; and that the plan of the Almighty is the result of his infinite knowledge; and that the decrees of his throne flow forth from the eternal fountain of his wisdom. This idea, moreover, accords with the Scriptures:—“For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son.” “Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father.” In these passages predestination and the decree of election are most clearly founded on foreknowledge. This, therefore, must settle the question: God foreknows in order to predestinate; but he does not predestinate in order to foreknow.[2]
But foreknowledge is pressed into this argument in another form. “The foreknowledge of God,” it is said, “is tantamount to a decree; because, inasmuch as God cannot be in a mistake, whatever he foreknows must take place—his knowledge makes it certain.” This is indeed shifting the argument; for if God’s knowledge makes an event certain, of course it is not his predetermination. But, according to this notion, every thing contained in the idea of predestination is implied in foreknowledge, which is only throwing the subject back on the ground first glanced at, that knowledge and decree are both one, which is obviously absurd. Beside, such an idea would make the scriptures that represent God’s foreknowledge as distinct from his decree and antecedent to it, worse than unmeaning: “Whom he did foreknow, them he did predestinate,” would mean, “whom he did predestinate, them he did predestinate”—and, “Elect according to the foreknowledge of God,” would only mean, “that the decree of election was according to the decree of election!” the absurdity of which is too apparent to need comment. And it may be urged, farther, in reply to this argument, that knowledge or foreknowledge cannot, in the nature of things, have the least possible influence in making an event certain. It is not at all difficult to conceive how the certainty of an event can beget knowledge; but if any one thinks that knowledge is the cause of certainty, let him show it—to me such a connection is inconceivable. Whatever God foreknows or foresees, will undoubtedly come to pass. But the simple question is, Does the event take place because it is foreknown, or is it foreknown because it will take place? Or, in other words, Does God know an event to be certain because it is certain, or does his knowing it to be certain make it certain? The question thus stated, at once suggests the true answer; for he would be considered a fool or a madman who should seriously assert that a knowledge of a certainty produced that certainty. According to that, a certainty must exist in order to be foreknown; and it must be foreknown in order to exist! From all which it appears that foreknowledge can have no influence in making a future event certain. Since, therefore, foreknowledge is not predestination; and does not, according to Scripture or reason, follow predestination as a consequence, and has no possible influence in making an event certain, no proof can be drawn from the Divine prescience in favour of the doctrine that God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass.
2. But predestination is argued from the necessity of a Divine plan. “It cannot be conceived,” it is said, “that God would leave things at random, and have no plan. But no alteration of his plan can take place upon condition that his creatures act in this or that way.” But this argument is easily answered, at least for the present. For it assumes what ought to be proved; and what has not, to my knowledge, ever been proved, viz. that to deny Calvinian predestination, is to deny that God has a perfect plan. We acknowledge and maintain that God has a plan, one part of which is, to govern his responsible subjects, without controlling their will, by a fixed decree—to punish the incorrigible, and save those who repent and believe. Does such a plan imply the necessity of a change, “on condition that his creatures act in this or that way?” If, indeed, it was necessary for God to decree an event, in order to foreknow it, this inference might be just. But as this is seen to be false, it follows that a perfect God, whose eye surveys immensity and eternity at a glance, and who necessarily knows all possibilities and contingencies; all that is, or will be, can perfectly arrange his plan, and preclude the possibility of a disappointment, although he does not, by a decree of predestination, fix all the volitions and acts of his subjects. Even in human governments, where the rulers can have no knowledge of the individuals who will transgress, or of the nature and extent of the transgressions, the principles and plan of government undergo no change to accommodate themselves to the contingent acts of the subjects. How absurd, then, to suppose that the all-wise Ruler of the universe will be subject to disappointment, unless he predestinate the transgressions of sinners, and the obedience of his saints! The truth is, in my view, this idea detracts from the wisdom of God; for the perfection of his plan, as they maintain it, is predicated on the imperfection of his attributes. But our view of the Divine plan accords well with our idea of his infinite nature. Over the universe, and through eternity, he throws his all-pervading knowledge—as he is in every point of wide immensity, so he is in every moment of long eternity—and can such a God be disappointed?
3. “But,” say the advocates of this system, “supposing there are difficulties in this subject, the Scriptures abound with passages which at once prove the doctrine.” If this is true, then indeed we must submit. But the question is, where are these passages? After such a strong assertion, it would probably appear surprising to one unacquainted with this subject, to learn that there is not a single passage which teaches directly that God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass. Yet this is the fact. If this doctrine is taught in Scripture, it is in an indirect manner. Nor will it follow, because God hath predestinated some things, that he hath, therefore, decreed all things. All those passages then which have been so frequently quoted as proof of this doctrine, which only go to prove, that God hath predetermined certain events, are not proof in point. Where are the passages that say he hath decreed all things? We know of many which say of certain events that have come to pass, that God did not command them, nor will them; so that the abundant Scripture proof seems altogether on the other side of the question. It is argued, however, that certain acts of moral agents, even those acts for which they are held responsible, are, according to the Scriptures, the results of God’s predetermination, and therefore it is reasonable to infer that all are. This general conclusion, however, is not contained in the premises; nevertheless, if the premises are true, if it can be proved from Scripture that God holds his creatures responsible for the results of his own decrees, such Scripture proofs would be strong arguments to ward off the objections that are brought against this system. For if it is consistent with a righteous God to make a moral agent responsible for one event which was the result of a Divine decree, upon the same principle, perhaps, he might make him responsible for all, though all were decreed. Let us then look at those scriptures, “As for you,” says Joseph to his brethren, speaking of their injustice to him, “ye thought evil against me, but God meant it for good.” Now without stopping here to inquire whether Joseph was inspired to utter this sentiment, we are ready to acknowledge, that there are a number of similar scriptures which teach that, in the results of the wicked acts of wicked men, God had a design and a controlling influence, and thereby made them subservient to his own purposes. He hath wisdom and power “to make the wrath of man praise him, and to restrain the remainder of wrath.” But does he therefore decree the wrath itself? And is this wrath necessary to the accomplishment of his purposes? As well might it be said, that because a government, in quelling a rebellion, replenished its exchequer from the confiscated estates of the rebels, therefore that government decreed the rebellion, and was dependent upon it for the prosperity of the nation. Let it be distinctly understood then, that to overrule and control the results of an act is altogether different from making the act itself the result of an overruling and controlling power.
Again it is said, “The Lord hath made all things for himself, yea, even the wicked for the day of evil.” That the Lord hath made all things for his own glory, is a proposition easily understood, and doubted, I trust, by none; and this is evidently the meaning of the former member of this passage. The latter clause, if it helps the cause for which it is quoted at all, must mean, that the Lord has predestinated men to be wicked, that he might make them miserable. But it is not necessary to make the text speak this shocking sentiment. We should do the text no violence to explain it thus—The Lord hath destined the wicked for the day of evil, and this shall be for his glory.
But there is another class of passages like the following:—“He doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth.” “He worketh all things after the counsel of his will.” “I will do all my pleasure.” But these passages establish nothing, in opposition to our views, unless it should first be proved, by other passages, or in some other way, that it is God’s will and pleasure to work all things, even wickedness, in the wicked. These scriptures prove that all God’s works are in accordance with his own will and pleasure; and that he will accomplish them in spite of the opposition of sinners. If it pleases him to form his moral government, so as to leave the responsible acts of his subjects unnecessitated by his decree, this he will do, for “he will do all his pleasure.”
But there is still another class of texts, which are supposed to favour the doctrine we are opposing, more than any others, viz. those passages which seem to represent God as bringing about and procuring the wickedness of the wicked. Like the following:—“And I will harden Pharaoh’s heart, that he should not let the people go.” “Now therefore the Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy prophets.” “He hath blinded their eyes and hardened their hearts.” “Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands ye have crucified and slain.” On these and similar passages it may be remarked, that God blinds men and hardens their hearts judicially, as a just punishment for their abuse of their agency. And for this act of his, in blinding and hardening them, he does not make them responsible. But he holds them responsible for that degree of wickedness which made it just and necessary to give them over to this hardness of heart and blindness of mind. And since there are wicked men and lying spirits, they become fit instruments in deceiving and tormenting each other; and therefore God gives them power and liberty to go abroad, “deceiving and being deceived.” But how does this prove that God hath decreed sin? The idea that God hath made sin and wicked spirits the instruments of hardening and tormenting the incorrigible sinner, and finally of shutting the door of hope against him, has no kind of affinity to the idea, that he decreed the sin which occasioned this hardness, or ordained the wickedness of this lying spirit.
As to the passage from the Acts, none of us deny but that Jesus Christ was delivered up to suffer and die, by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God; but it is most emphatically denied, that this or any other scripture proves, that the taking and slaying of Jesus Christ by wicked hands, was the result of the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God. If any think otherwise, let them prove it.