[CHAPTER XVIII]
DUFFERIN'S MISSION
Lord Dufferin's arrival at Cairo on the 6th November placed matters there on an entirely new footing. Up to that point Riaz Pasha and the rest of the Khedive's Ministers had been doing pretty much as they liked, subject only to Malet's weak supervision. But Dufferin was a man of another mould, and soon showed the Khedive that his position while in Egypt was to be that of master, not adviser. He paid little attention to his tales, and not much, I believe, to Malet's, but opened the doors of his Embassy to every one who could give information. Mackenzie Wallace, his chief assistant, in a very few days acquired a good general knowledge of what had been going on in Egypt during the last two years, and his book about it gives more of the truth than any other yet published in English. Dufferin, though an idle man, was a rapid worker, and where he had something serious to do, knew how easiest to do it.
Nevertheless, for the first fortnight after Dufferin's arrival, and until he had quite assured himself of his ground, the prosecution of Arabi was allowed to work on in its own casual way, swayed by the Khedive's ever shifting impulses of a desire to conceal the truth on the one hand, and an unwillingness on the other to let go his prey. These will be best recorded by simply reproducing the letters and telegrams which now passed almost daily between me in London and Messrs. Broadley and Napier at Cairo, as will the successive steps by which a compromise of the trial was eventually come to.
Broadley to Blunt, November 6th (in answer to his letter of November 2nd):
"I entirely concur in all you say, and shall exercise the greatest prudence. I am completing a perfect case for defence, showing:
"(1) Purity, honesty of Arabi's inspirations.
"(2) Perfect concurrence of Tewfik till July 12.
"(3) Perfect concurrence of the Sultan throughout.
"(4) Universality of the movement.
"(5) Wholly illegal constitution of the Court Martial.
"(6) Absurdity of the white flag (on which subject Napier has secured A 1 deposition from Lambton).
"(7) Abnormal humanitarian character of Arabi.
"(8) Abnormal iniquity of all proceedings until our arrival.
"(9) Torture of prisoners.
"(10) Letters from Tewfik to Constantinople against England.
"(11) Systematic falsification of the 'Moniteur.'
"Shall demand release of all the accused. Keep this private.
"Now all I fear is the enormous expense of a protracted trial of eight or nine months. Arabi alone calls 400 witnesses.... I spend freely. I entertain the correspondents. I have wheedled the 'Egyptian Gazette' into being our special organ. I have turned public opinion here quite in favour of Arabi. We are obliged to employ a dozen interpreters at salaries varying from £1 to £2 10s. a week.... My absence from Tunis means utter loss of all there. All my pending cases have been given up, including some of great magnitude. Bourke will tell you I have one retainer alone of £250 a year, and another of £100.... I hope you will take all this into consideration.... I only say I believe all will depend on liberal if not lavish expenditure. Remember we have every one against us, and people don't work without a reward here.... An Arabi fund should be raised. The nine months' Tichborne trial is a specimen. But I don't think we should exceed one-tenth of that at the worst.... All I say hinges on expenses. Don't think of me but only of incidental expenses.... I work sixteen hours a day.... Napier is invaluable."
Napier to Blunt, November 6th:
"You seem to be doubtful about the acte d'accusation. We have not had it officially communicated. It is not proposed by the prosecution to frame it until the close of the evidence. But in substance it is fairly stated in a telegram I think to the 'Times':
"(1) The abuse of the White Flag.
"(2) Complicity in massacres and pillage, June 11.
"(3) Complicity in destruction by fire of the city.
"(4) Carrying war into territory of the Sultan.
"(5) General acts of mutiny and rebellion against the Khedive and the Sultan."
Broadley to Blunt, November 7th (telegraphed):
"If you don't mind expense great success sure—see my yesterday's letter. I shall crush Tewfik and his crew past hope of redemption."
Napier to Blunt, November 10th:
"I have seen Dufferin to-day. He received me most kindly, though he declined to enter on business at once. He had only just received his instructions. Broadley and I are to meet him to-morrow.
"There seems to be a desire to burk inquiry into the rebellion question. The Government and all the papers are pledged to the ridiculous rebel cry, the one of all others that incenses me most. It is an old trick that has been played in Afghanistan, the Cape, and elsewhere. Any one can see that it may be smashed into a cocked hat at once.... Proposals for a compromise must come from the other side, must be put in writing, and must contain all that you claim—indeed I think they ought to amount to unconditional surrender. Of this of course more fully afterwards. You may be assured that we will not consent to anything without communication with you, and fullest deliberation."
Napier to Blunt, November 15th:
"I suppose you can guess the innumerable difficulties with which we have to deal. In the first place since we were not permitted to be present at the examination of the witnesses, it is necessary for us not only to have the whole of the evidence copied, but also to submit the whole of it to each of the prisoners for his observation and consideration.... There are 136 witnesses who will be brought against us. Besides these, 125 prisoners have been interrogated, and their answers will be used against each other. Then anybody who pleases seems to have been allowed to write letters to the Court, among others, H. H. the Khedive and, I believe, the Ministers, or some of them.... Not one word of the evidence is on oath, and most of it consists of hearsay and opinion.... 'In your opinion is Arabi a rebel?' 'I don't know.' 'You bad, wicked man, why don't you know?' 'I can't tell why I don't know.' 'Then think it over, and to-morrow bring a written statement of what you do know.' To-morrow the wretch arrives with a written statement that the prisoner in question is a rebel and incendiary.
"Then again the translations afforded us are not correct translations from the originals, and the originals are not true records of the evidence of the witnesses themselves....
"Thank Heaven they have imprisoned a man named Rifaat. [He had been Secretary to the Government and Director of the Press.] They could not have done anything so destructive to their own case. Not only does he know French well, but he has good literary ability, and a very fair knowledge of all these tortuous and involved intrigues rolled up one within another the untanglement of which is a business enough to make the head reel. How if it were to appear that the Abdin, Sept. 9, demonstration had been got up by the Khedive as the best means of ridding him of the disagreeable tutelage of Riaz and his Ministry! And how if the dark deeds of June 11 were plotted in the Palace to force the English and French to crush the now uncontrolled and uncontrollable National movement!
"I have been in hopes all along that the Government would not face the trial, and that they would find some means to put an end to the scandal that must ensue. But I begin to think that that will not be so. Many people in high places are prompted by motives of revenge, and still hope to wreak it upon their enemies. Others hope that by the unworthy devices of the Court a fair trial may yet be prevented. And I have no doubt they will in a great measure succeed. Again, perhaps it is the policy of the English Cabinet to insist upon the matter being threshed out, so as to give them time to meet the storm, and an opportunity of throwing over the Turks and perhaps Tewfik. If the trial is to go on I cannot tell what the expense will be, but I fear it will be very great."