[CONTENTS]
| PAGE | ||
| Introduction | [1] | |
| PART I | ||
| General Theory of Knowledge | [11] | |
| 1. | The Formation of Concepts | [11] |
| 2. | Science | [13] |
| 3. | The Aim of Science | [13] |
| 4. | Concrete and Abstract | [16] |
| 5. | The Subjective Part | [17] |
| 6. | Empirical Concepts | [18] |
| 7. | Simple and Complex Concepts | [19] |
| 8. | The Conclusion | [24] |
| 9. | The Natural Laws | [28] |
| 10. | The Law of Causation | [31] |
| 11. | The Purification of the Causal Relation | [34] |
| 12. | Induction | [38] |
| 13. | Deduction | [40] |
| 14. | Ideal Cases | [44] |
| 15. | The Determinateness of Things | [47] |
| 16. | The Freedom of the Will | [50] |
| 17. | The Classification of the Sciences | [53] |
| 18. | The Applied Sciences | [57] |
| PART II | ||
| Logic, the Science of the Manifold, and Mathematics | [61] | |
| 19. | The Most General Concept | [61] |
| 20. | Association | [63] |
| 21. | The Group | [65] |
| 22. | Negation | [68] |
| 23. | Artificial and Natural Groups | [69] |
| 24. | Arrangement of the Members | [75] |
| 25. | Numbers | [78] |
| 26. | Arithmetic, Algebra, and the Theory of Numbers | [79] |
| 27. | Co-ordination | [80] |
| 28. | Comparison | [82] |
| 29. | Numbers | [85] |
| 30. | Signs and Names | [86] |
| 31. | The Written Language | [89] |
| 32. | Pasigraphy and Sound Writing | [92] |
| 33. | Sound Writing | [96] |
| 34. | The Science of Language | [97] |
| 35. | Continuity | [101] |
| 36. | Measurement | [107] |
| 37. | The Function | [109] |
| 38. | The Application of the Functional Relation | [112] |
| 39. | The Law of Continuity | [113] |
| 40. | Time and Space | [118] |
| 41. | Recapitulation | [124] |
| PART III | ||
| The Physical Sciences | [127] | |
| 42. | General | [127] |
| 43. | Mechanics | [128] |
| 44. | Kinetic Energy | [132] |
| 45. | Mass and Matter | [136] |
| 46. | Energetic Mechanics | [138] |
| 47. | The Mechanistic Theories | [140] |
| 48. | Complementary Branches of Mechanics | [144] |
| 49. | The Theory of Heat | [147] |
| 50. | The Second Fundamental Principle | [150] |
| 51. | Electricity and Magnetism | [154] |
| 52. | Light | [156] |
| 53. | Chemical Energy | [159] |
| PART IV | ||
| The Biologic Sciences | [163] | |
| 54. | Life | [163] |
| 55. | The Storehouse of Free Energy | [168] |
| 56. | The Soul | [171] |
| 57. | Feeling, Thinking, Acting | [174] |
| 58. | Society | [179] |
| 59. | Language and Intercourse | [182] |
| 60. | Civilization | [184] |
| Index | [187] | |
[INTRODUCTION]
Natural science and natural philosophy are not two provinces mutually exclusive of each other. They belong together. They are like two roads leading to the same goal. This goal is the domination of nature by man, which the various natural sciences reach by collecting all the individual actual relations between the natural phenomena, placing them in juxtaposition, and seeking to discover their interdependence, upon the basis of which one phenomenon may be foretold from another with more or less certainty. Natural philosophy accompanies these specialized labors and generalizations with similar labors and generalizations, only of a more universal nature. For instance, while the science of electricity, as a branch of physics, deals with the relation of electrical phenomena to one another and to phenomena in other branches of physics, natural philosophy is not only concerned with the question of the mutual connection of all physical relations, but also endeavors to include in the sphere of its study chemical, biological, astronomical, in short, all the known phenomena. In other words, natural philosophy is the most general branch of natural science.
Here two questions are usually asked. First, how can we define the boundary line between natural philosophy and the special sciences, since, obviously, sharp lines of demarcation are out of the question? Secondly, how can we investigate and teach natural philosophy, when it is impossible for any one person to master all the sciences completely, and so obtain a bird's-eye view of the general relations between all the branches of knowledge? To the beginner especially, who must first learn the various sciences, it seems quite hopeless to devote himself to a study that presupposes a command of them.
Since a discussion of the two questions will afford an excellent preliminary survey of the work in hand, it will be well to consider them in detail. In the first place, the lack of complete and precise boundary lines is a general characteristic of all natural things, and science is a natural thing. If, for instance, we try to differentiate sharply between physics and chemistry, we are met with the same difficulty. So also in biology if we try to settle beyond the shadow of a doubt the line of separation between the animal and the vegetable kingdoms.
If, despite this well-known impossibility, we consider the division of natural things into classes and orders as by no means useless and do not discard it, but regard it as an important scientific work, this is practical proof that such classification preserves its essential usefulness, even if it does not attain ideal definiteness. For, this imperfection notwithstanding, classification reaches its end, which is a comprehensive view, and thus a mastery, of the manifoldness of phenomena. For example, with the overwhelming majority of organic beings there is no doubt whether they are animals or plants. Similarly, most phenomena of inorganic nature can readily be designated as physical or chemical. For all such cases, therefore, the existing classification is good and useful. The few cases presenting difficulty may very well be considered by themselves wherever they occur, and we need merely take cognizance of them here. It follows from this, to be sure, that classification will be all the better fitted to its purpose the less frequently such doubtful cases arise, and that we have an interest in repeatedly testing existing classifications with a view to finding out if they cannot be supplanted by more suitable ones.