Paper Money—A Curse Or A Blessing?
Considering the double-edged-sword character of this mighty instrument,[946] and the frightful consequences which its [pg 462] abuse produces, it is easy to conceive why so many political economists have expressed such serious doubts as to whether, on the whole, the invention of paper money has been more of a curse or of a blessing to mankind. The controversy is an idle one to a certain extent, since no mature nation (or individual), and no nation which considers itself mature will renounce the possibility of a brilliant growth simply because it fears that it may not be able to withstand the temptations to dangerous abuse connected therewith. Politically, the best safeguard against such temptation is a so-called moderate constitution, which compels the supreme power in the state by wise and appropriate counterweights, to allow all rightful interests to assert themselves, or at least to find expression; and itself to make use not only of the most skillful but also of the most highly esteemed instruments and measures. Such a constitution, indeed, cannot be made; it must be the ripe fruit of a long continued and well conducted national life.[947] Of the extremes of forms of government, unlimited monarchy and democracy are about equally exposed to the paper-money disease.[948] Aristocracies are less exposed to it, for the reason that from their very nature they eschew centralization; and the [pg 463] paper-money system is intimately connected with the latter. Nothing so strengthens the central authority as the paper-prerogative with an unlimited power over the prices of all commodities; and, on the other hand, whenever paper money is to have a wide field for action, there is supposed[949] a far-reaching and intimate interwearing of the different members of the nation's economy with one another. And in what concerns the various economic stages, paper money is far removed from all medieval times; and for the same reasons that make external commerce here preponderant and condense all commerce into caravans, staple-towns, fairs, and recommend the collection of treasure etc.[950] Later, on the other hand, we find two stages especially adapted to paper money. We have first, as yet undeveloped but intellectually active (and therefore desirous of progress) colonial countries, possessed in abundance of natural means of production without however being able to concentrate them into the hands of an undertaker (Unternehmer) for [pg 464] want of money.[951] Here both the saving of the precious metals and the facilitation of transportation effected by means of paper money are of greatest utility. And then we have very highly developed and rich countries; not only because their economic popular education may protect them against the dangers of paper money, but because the rich man has relatively least need of money and may dispense with stores of specie most readily, because of his influence over the supply of others.[952]
Footnotes
[1.]The author's preface to the twelfth edition is confined to pointing out the improvements etc., made in the eleventh. There is no new preface to the thirteenth edition of the original, which appeared in 1877.—Translator.[2.]“We shall never thoroughly understand the reason of customary law unless we also have a knowledge of that which is not customary. The one is connected and bound to the other. We have no slaves; why vex ourselves with questions about slaves?—Words worthy of a novice.”[3.]“I am a man; I think nothing foreign to me that pertains to man.”[4.]“That excellent and glorious philosophy.”[5.]Introduction to the Civilistisches Magazin.[6.]Dunoyer, De la Liberté du Travail.[7.]Cicero, De Leg., I.[8.]Discours Préliminaire du Code Civil.[9.]Cicero, De Leg., II, 4. “Legem neque hominum ingeniis excogitatam, nec scitum aliquod esse populorum, sed æternum quiddam quod universum mundum regeret, imperandi, prohibendique sapientia.” Ibid.[10.]Revue de Législ. et de Jurispr. (1841, XIII, p. 39.) Montesquieu says: “The relations of justice and equity are anterior to all positive laws.”[11.]Mr. Wolowski translated the second edition of Roscher's Principles into French, and prefixed the present essay thereto as a preface. Since Wolowski's translation appeared, the original work has gone through eleven editions, been largely increased in size, and enriched with new notes, the result of nearly twenty additional years of research and thought. The thirteenth German edition, from which the present translation is made, is larger than the first by one hundred and seventy pages.—Translator's note.[12.]
And he adds: “Animals which yield only to an impulse or blind instinct, come together only fortuitously or periodically and in a manner destitute of all morality. But in the case of men, reason is mixed up more or less with every act of their lives. Sentiment is found side by side with desire, and right succeeds instinct. I discover a real contract in the union of the two sexes.”
It would be impossible to present a more complete or eloquent refutation of the definition of the Roman jurisconsults which debases marriage to the level of the promiscuous coming together of animals, and which limits the natural law to the law common to man and beast. “Jus naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit; nam jus istud non humani generis proprium, sed omnium animalium quæ in terra, quæ in mare nascuntur, avium quoque commune est. Hinc descendit maris atque feminæ conjunctio, quam nos matrimonium appellamus, hinc liberorum procreatio, hinc educatio; videmus etenim cætera quoque animalia, feras etiam, istius juris peritia censeri.” D. L. I. De Just. et Jure.
In one of his latest productions (Ueber die sogennante historische und nicht historische Rechtsschule, Archives du Droit Civil, Heidelberg, XXI 1838) the veteran of the philosophical school, resuming a debate begun a quarter of a century before, energetically defends himself against the erroneous interpretations which it was sought to give to his thoughts. “Does it follow,” he inquires, “that because a man is desirous of reform, he must surrender the study of the past? And if there be new laws to construe, how could his evil genius deter him from the necessary knowledge of ancient laws? Is there a single jurisconsult, who, in the hope of a better future, despises the meaning and spirit of that which still exists? I do not know even one.... And when I am accused of passing by the institutions of the past with coldness and hatred in my heart, because I was one of the first to express the hope of a better future, a charge is laid at my door which is perfectly incomprehensible ... I am reproached with despising the history of law. It is a slander on me. Although I have only laughed at these reports, one man's mistake grieved me; for that man's name was Niebuhr.... When he [Niebuhr] returned from Italy to devote himself entirely to science, in his retreat at Bonn, he passed through Heidelberg, where he remained five or six days. During a great part of that time we came frequently together. He was at first a little cold; but Cicero made us friends. After a happy word let drop concerning that writer, he asked me what I thought of him. I answered laconically: ‘If they were burning all the Latin authors, and I were permitted to grant a pardon to one of them, I should say, without hesitation: Spare the works of Cicero.’ He joyfully exclaimed: ‘I have at last found a man who judges rightly of Cicero. I share your admiration for him, and that is the reason I have given my boy the name of Marcus.’ The ice was now broken, and he frankly told me that he could not understand how I could be an inveterate enemy of Roman law and of the history of law. I gave him to understand that I had simply been slandered, and I added, that, in order to live entirely with the classics, I had always refused to give legal advice, or act as a counsellor, although I might have made a fortune in that way. I told him that I owed my gayety and vigor, in great part, to my love for the classics of all ages, even those outside the domain of jurisprudence; but that I held, above all things, to the good qualities of the German nation, and that I did not hesitate to say with Facciolatus: ‘Expedit omnes gentes Romanis legibus operam dare, suis vivere.’
“When he heard those words of mine, he exclaimed with his usual energy and vivacity: ‘Habes me consentientem, labes me consentientem.’ From that moment all coldness between us was at an end, and we approached, without any embarrassment, a host of questions in one conversation in which I endeavored, as I had before, to learn from him.