C. The moneyed oligarchy which prevailed in Rome caused the adoption of exceedingly severe measures against delinquent debtors. (Plut., Lucull., 20. Cic., ad. Att. V. 21, VI.), although its members themselves incurred debts in the most reckless manner. Cæsar, in the year A.C. 62, excluding his active (activen), owed debts to the amount of 25,000,000 sesterces; M. Antonius, in the year 24, 6,000,000; in the year 38, 40,000,000; Curio, 60,000,000; Milon, 70,000,000. (Mommsen, Römische Geschichte, III, 486.) Compare Gellius, XX, 1, XV, 14.
Concerning the arguments by which the commercial restrictions of the middle ages were defended, see below. They were, for the most part, well founded for the age in which they were advanced. A judicious education will often be compelled to provide limitations, but always with the intention, by this means, of making possible a really greater independence. Thus the current of commerce may be too weak in a poor and thinly settled country in order that supply and demand should always and everywhere meet and be satisfied. Under such circumstances, their artificial concentration at certain points is among the most efficient means of promoting the economy of the whole people. The policy of freedom of commerce was recommended even in the seventeenth century by J. Child, by North and Davenant. W. Roscher, Zur Geschichte der englisch. Volkswirthschaftslehre, 65 ff., 85 ff., 113 ff., 142 ff. And earlier yet, in Holland, by Salmasius, De Usurus, 1638, 583 and de la Court. Compare Tübinger Ztschr., 330 ff. Thus Boisguillebert says: Il n'y avait qu'à laisser faire la nature et la libertê, qui est le commissionaire de cette même nature. (Factum de la France, 1707, ch. 5.) See, also, Dissertation sur la Nature des Richesses, ch. VI; Détail de la France, 1697, II, ch. 13; Tr. des Grains, II, 8. For the most part dictated by a reaction against Colbertism.
See further, Mélon, Essai Politique sur le Commerce, 1734, ch. 2. M. Decker, Essay on the Causes of the Decline of Foreign Trade, 1744, 31 ff, 106 ff. J. Tucker, Essay on the advantages and disadvantages which respectively attend France and Great Britain with regard to Trade, 1750. Forbonnais, Elémens du Commerce, 1754, I, 63. Genovesi, c. I, 17, 3, is of opinion that at least in case of doubt, commerce stood more in need of freedom than of protection. Verri, in his Meditazioni, goes still farther. The Physiocrates, with their laissez aller and laissez faire recommend competition as the best means to increase the net income of a people. According to Dupont, 147 ff, éd. Daire, the province of legislation is confined to declaring the laws of nature. His motto is: liberté and propriété. Adam Smith asks that the state should do only three things: insure protection against foreign states, the administration of justice at home, the establishment and maintenance of certain institutions of advantage to the whole community, but which private interest could not establish for want of means to cover the expenses attending them. (Wealth of Nations, V, ch. I, 2.) Hence he demands (III, ch. 2) the abolition of all kinds of fidei commissa, of royalty in mines (I, ch. 11, 2), of all corporate and exclusive privileges, of all protective duties etc. (IV, ch. I ff), but especially of the colonial policy hitherto in vogue. (IV, ch. 8.)
The attacks of the Socialists on freedom of competition were begun by Fichte, Geschlossener Handelsstaat, 126, in which it is called a robber-system or system of spoliation. He would have the state have more solicitude for human industry than if men were so many swallows. See further, Sismondi, N. Principes, passim, who everywhere demands the protection of the government for the weaker. Fourier, N. Monde industriel, 396, who thinks that le monopole général is always a preservatif contre le commerce. Bastiat, Harmonies économiques, ch. 10, has a very valuable refutation of these follies. Recently, Rodbertus, Hildebrand's Jahrbücher, 1865, II, 272, is of opinion that “social individualism” has ever had in history the task of dissolving decaying societies, as, for instance, under the Cæsars.
Such exceptions there certainly are, even if it were not true “that the most godly cannot rest in peace unless he is acceptable to his ungodly neighbor.” Nations that furnish the same products as we do may, indeed, “spoil our market,” just as at home the selfish shoemaker may desire the prosperity of all wearers of shoes, that is of all other industries, but not that of all other producers of shoes. The view that long prevailed, that one man's gain was always some other man's loss (Th. Morus, Utopia 79, ed. Colon. 1555; Baco., Sermones fideles, cap. 15; quid-quid alicubi adiicitur, alibi detrahitur; M. Montaigne, Essais I, 21: les prouficit de l'un est le dommage de l'autre) prevailed much longer in international affairs where observation is much more difficult than in national affairs; although even here, P. de la Court, Maximes politiques, 1658, contrasts the economic interest of Holland with that of the rest of the Netherlands and prefers it to theirs. Even Voltaire says: “The desire of the greatness of the Fatherland includes the desire of evil to our neighbor. Evidently no country can gain except what another loses.” (Dict. philosophique, v. Patrie.) Compare, however, the peut-être in his Histoire de la Russie, I, 1, on the occasion of the English-Russian treaty of commerce. Similarly, Galiani, Della Moneta, I, 1, IV, 1; Verri, Opuscoli, 335, and recently v. Cancrin who says that “in every-day life, property is acquired only at some other person's expense.” (Weltreichthum, 1821, 119. Oekonomie der menschl. Gesellschaft, 1845, 23.) The cosmopolitan view (Xenoph., Cyrop., III, 2, 17. Hier., 10) which prevails in Adam Smith's school was introduced by Hume, Essays, 1752, On the Jealousy of Trade. Quesnay, Encyclopédie, v. Grains, 294, ed. Daire; A. Smith, Theory of moral Sentiments, 1759, p. 6, sec. 2, ch. 2. Pinto, Lettre sur la Jalousie de Commerce, 1771, and J. Tucker, Four Tracts on commercial and political Subjects, 1776, 34 ff and 42 ff. “The system of states exercises no influence whatever on the world's commerce.” (Lotz, Handbuch I, 11.) More recently, R. Cobden, in his Russia, Edinb., 1836, among others argued, that the conquest of Turkey by the Russians would be useful to England, because then more (?) English products would probably be sold there. Russia would become no stronger thereby, as conquests always injure the conqueror more than they benefit him. The idea of European equilibrium is therefore a chimera, because no state can be prevented from having an internal growth, as great as may be. Thus, in the summer of 1853, we heard the London Times sometimes preach that every cannon-shot fired by the English at the Russians might kill an English debtor or an English customer. The Venetians entertained a similar view at the beginning of the fifteenth century. Compare M. Sanudo in Muratori, Scriptores, XXII, 950 ff. See above, § [12].
Moreover, Malthus had recognized that there were natural rivalries between nations which produced exceptions to Tucker's laws. (Principles, Preface.) Similarly Garve, in Cicero's Pflichten (1783), III, 146 ff.
The wrong definitions of money may be divided into two classes: those which convey the idea that it is more than a commodity, and those which imply that it is less.
This was a point which was contested even among the Greeks. There were many who claimed that wealth consisted exclusively in the possession of much money; as we find, for instance, in the pseudo-Platonic dialogue Eryxias; while others insisted that money was something purely imaginary (λῆρος), and the creation, exclusively, of human laws. (Aristot., Polit., I, 3, 16, Schn.) Νόμισμα σύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἔνεκα. (Plato, De Rep., II, 371.) Anacharsis compares money to counters. (Plutarch, De Profectt in Virtute.) Aristotle, himself, subscribed to the second opinion, although he saw clearly, that only useful and current things (χρείαν εὐμεταχείριστον πρὸς τὸ ζῆν) could be used as money. (Polit., I, 3, 14 ff. Eth. Nicom., V, 5, 6, Rhet., II, 16.) Xenophon ascribed properties to money which no other commodity possessed; especially when he said that it could never be too plentiful, and that its price could never fall. (De Vectt. Ath., 4.) The finest ancient explanation of the nature of money is that of the jurisconsult Paullus, L. I.; Digest, XVIII, 1; and it well deserves the long commentary devoted to it by P. Neri, Osservazioni etc., in Custodi, P.A., VI, 324, ff.
Among the moderns, Melancthon., Corp. Ref., XVI, 498, and Seb. Frank, Chronik., 760, consider money as a mere symbol. On the other hand, the over-estimation in which the precious metals were held by the adherents of the Mercantile System was owing, without doubt, to their very superior utility as money; for we very frequently find that the adherents of that school insist that the precious metals must circulate. (See § [9] and § 210.) v. Schröder, Fürstl. Schatz- und Rentkammer, III f., considers new copper coins as an increase of the national wealth, but not other copper which is merely a commercial commodity. He frequently calls money, the pendulum commercii, and expresses ideas concerning it as enthusiastic as they are obscure (p. 86.) Horneck, in his Oesterreich über Alles wenn es will, 1864, calls gold and silver “our best blood, the very marrow of our strength,” and “the two most indispensable universal instruments of human activity and existence.” (p. 188.) Th. Mun, England's Treasure by forraign Trade, 1664, (ch. 2) considers cash-money and resources as synonymous in every way. Only, he says (ch. 4) that it is sometimes advisable to allow one's money to remain in foreign countries, and to use bills of exchange, banks etc., at home, as a substitute. F. Gee, Trade and Commerce of Gr. Britain, edition of 1738, laments the “stiff-necked folly of those who think money a commodity like any other.” It is one of the most common demands of the adherents of the Mercantile System that the home mines of gold and silver should be worked at no matter what sacrifice, since the money employed in working them continues to remain in the country and the newly coined precious metal is clear gain. Compare Schröder, loc. cit. 109 ff., 181. Horneck, loc. cit. 173. Broggia, Della Monete, 1743, cap. 33; v. Fusti, Staatswirthschaft, 1755, I, 246: Forbonnais, Finances de France, 1758, I, 148. Ulloa, Noticias Americanas, 1772, ch. 12. We seldom meet with the correct view on this subject in the seventeenth century. Sully, of whom Henry IV. said that he never found anything to be possessed of beauty which cost double its real value, had it at times. (Economies royales, LXXIII.) So had v. Seckendorff, Teutscher Fürstenstaat, 1655, 5th edition.
It is in accordance with the usual course of human development that the exaggerations of the Mercantile System led to a reaction characterized by an exaggeration in the opposite direction. Even Davanzati, Sulle Monete, 1588, traces the value of money back to human convention and refuses to find it in nature. A natural calf, he thinks, is più nobile than a golden one; although he elsewhere expresses his admiration of the precious metals, calls them cagioni seconde della vita beata, and lauds them because they procure us tutt'essi beni (20, 21, Cust.) Montanari (ob., 1687) demonstrates from the use of leather money etc., that the authority of the state is the only power which gives money its character as money. (Della Moneta, 35.) Davenant (ob., 1714) carries his inclination to call money “the servant of trade, measure of trade,” so far as to compare it to a ticket or counter. (Works, I, 355, 444.) Strongly as Law, himself, opposes the convention theory (Trade and Money, ch. I; Sur l' Usage des Monnaies, 1720, p. 1.), his disciple Dutot, in his Réflexions polit. sur le Commerce et les Finances, 1738, 905, éd. Daire, contrasts not only paper money but also gold and silver as representative wealth, with real wealth. Berkeley, Querist, 1735, teaches that the real notion of money is not that of a “commodity, standard, measure, pledge, but [No. 23] ticket or counter, entitling to power and fitted to record and transfer such power.” (441, 475.) Even if the names, livre, shilling etc., remain, and the metal is dropped, every article may still as well as before be counted and sold, industry promoted and the course of commerce preserved. (p. 440.) According to Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, XXI, 22, gold and silver are a richesse de fiction ou de signe. Compare Lettres persanes, II, 18. Benjamin Franklin also maintains that the value of gold, for instance, is principally a credit-value. Remarks relative to the American Paper-Money, 1765, Works, II, Sparks' edition. Forbonnais, Finances de France, I, 86 f., calls money, simply a means to put commodities, which alone have value originally, in circulation. Hence it is, in itself, a matter of indifference whether, for a given quantity of coin, a person gives one thaler, or ten. In the Elements de Commerce, I, 11, II, 67 ff., he draws a distinction between richesses naturelles (raw material), artificielles (manufactured products), and richesses de convention (money.) von Schlözer, Aufangsgründe, 1805, 100, 138, calls money something imagined; and Th. Smith, Essay on the Theory of Money and Exchange, 1807, asserts, that true money is only an ideal measure of value, of which coins in turn are only the representatives. Compare, however, Edinb. Review, Oct., 1808. Oppenheim, Die Natur des Geldes, 1855, grants that in the beginnings of trade, money possessed the character of a commodity; but says that as soon as the services of circulation of the money-commodity prevailed over its services in consumption, it lost all its importance for the latter purpose, and that all relations dependent thereon ceased. At present, he claims money is only the representative of commodities, but no commodity itself. See, on the other hand, Roscher's critical analysis in the Literarisches Centralblatt, 1855, December.