Section XCIII.
Means Of Promoting Credit.
One of the most efficient means of promoting credit consists in legislation intended to dry up the source of bad debts, by placing obstacles in the way of reckless or usurious credits [pg 280] for objects of luxury or pleasure, to bad customers.[556] But the application of these laws should be clear and simple as to their matter, and require no inquiries, relating to the person, impracticable for a business man to make.[557] Thus, for instance, a short period of limitation established by statute in the matter of advances made for ordinary money-claims is a beneficial restraint, as well on the creditor as on the debtor, since it prevents the accumulation of a multitude of small debts which almost imperceptibly but at the same time irresistibly overpower the debtor under their weight.[558] Another [pg 281] efficient means is associations of business men to circulate lists of bad debtors, and to prosecute their own demands in common.[559] On the other hand, experience has shown that imprisonment for debt, as a means of enforcing a creditor's claim, where the amount of the debt is very small and such as only very poor debtors are apt to incur, is of little service. It is even injurious, because a great many sellers would rely on that means of compelling payment in the future instead of demanding it immediately, as they should do in the interest both of themselves and of their customers. As a rule, it is only rich creditors who can resort to it with success, a class who compel payment through this means by wringing it from the debtor's relations more frequently than from the debtor himself. The working out of debts in correctional institutions seems, for the same reasons, to fail of its object, since even well governed institutions scarcely cover their current expenses from the income derived from this source.[560] The inequitable character of imprisonment for debt lies in this, that it punishes the unfortunate debtor as severely as it does the malicious one. It must be clearly distinguished from the imprisonment recognized by the courts as a punishment for reckless or fraudulent bankruptcy.[561] We must pass a judgment [pg 282] similar to that on the imprisonment of the person of the debtor on the seizure of his wages not yet due, so far, at least, as an amount absolutely necessary to save himself and family from want, is not excepted. The prohibition of such seizure, beyond this, would amount to a declaration that all workmen without capital, even the best, should be considered unworthy of credit.[562] We may also include in this category such laws as except from execution the necessary tools of a tradesman, since to deprive him of them would be to prevent [pg 283] his employing even his labor to satisfy[563] his creditors' claims.
Section XCIV.
Letters Of Respite (Specialmoratorien).
Special letters of respite (Specialmoratorien) are a suspension of the laws relating to debt, made in favor of an individual. (Quinquennalia.) They were intended to protect not only the debtor, but also the aggregate of creditors against the short-sighted severity of one of their number. They were wont to be given especially when the debtor showed that immediate execution would not only have the effect of ruining himself, but of sending his creditors away empty handed; while, if time were given him, he would be able to satisfy every one.[564] But the granting of such letters has, in recent times, been prohibited[565] in nearly all countries as arbitrary, and [pg 284] as a species of cabinet-justice. Nor should the granting of them be compared with the pardoning power. In the case of a pardon, the offended State forgives. In this case it sacrifices the unquestionable right of one party to the very doubtful advantage of another. Where such letters are granted in great numbers, credit cannot fail to suffer. “Quinquinnellen gehören in die Hollen!”
Yet in troublous times, when a great many debtors are insolvent at the same time, the question of modifying the laws relating to debt, temporarily, has been mooted. It has been urged on such occasions, that it would be a matter of enormous difficulty to treat, lege artis, thousands as bankrupts at once; that thousands of businesses would have to be closed, their stocks cast upon the market at mock prices, and their employees thrown out of employment. But, if certain privileges were to be accorded to all who should declare themselves unable to meet their obligations before a certain day, it would be known, at least, that the others were in a solid condition; and this would have the effect to strengthen the credit which had been before universally shaken. We must, however, leaving all cases of abuse out of the question, remember, that a really unrightful favor, granted to the debtor, may possibly entail the ruin of his creditor. Besides, the uncertainty of the law would have a much worse effect on credit than uncertainty as to the personal status of individuals.[566] Where, as is the case generally in inferior stages of civilization, debtors and creditors form two distinct classes, the question of right is not, indeed, changed, but there is a solid basis afforded for the political admeasurement of opposing interests. In another [pg 285] work I have shown how, after great wars, land owners, who became involved in debt, have been protected against capitalists. (See Roscher, Nationalökonomik des Ackerbaues, § 137, ff.)[567][568]