[A3-7-1] Colbert advised the companies in Lyons to consider the privileges granted them only as crutches, by means of which they might learn to walk the soonest possible, it being the intention afterwards to do away with them. (Journ. des Econom., Mai, 1854, p. 277.) Thiers said, in the chamber of deputies, in 1834: Employé comme représailles,[TN 132] le tarif est funeste; Comme faveur, il est abusif; Comme encouragement à une industrie exotique, qui n'est pas importable il est impuissant et inutile. Employé pour protéger un produit, qui a chance de réussir, il est bon; mais il est bon temporairement, il doit finer quand l'education de l'industrie est finie, quand elle est adulte. Schmitthenner, Zwölf Bücher vom Staate, I, 657 ff., admits that full freedom of trade between England and Germany would be advantageous to the world in general; but that England might here secure the entire gain even at the cost of Germany, in part. Schmitthenner's view is distinguished from that of List's, against which Schmitthenner zealously seeks to maintain the priority of his own (II, 365), disadvantageously enough, by this, that it contains no pledge of subsequent freedom of trade. List, on the contrary, considers universal freedom of trade, not only as the ideal, but also as the object which is to be striven for by temporary limitations on trade; an object, indeed, attainable only where there are a great many nations highly developed and in an equal degree, just as perpetual peace supposes a plurality of states equal in power. Ges. Schr., II, 35; III, 194. Compare, on this point, Hildebrand, N. O. der Gegenwart und Zukunft, I, 87. That Carey advocates a perpetual protective tariff is connected with his absolute inability to conceive the Malthusian law of population. (Held, Carey's Socialwissenschaft und das Merkantilsystem,[TN 133] 1866, p. 166.)
Thus, for instance, the prohibition of foreign cloths in Florence begins in 1393, that is, at a time when the protected industry had long been developed, so that its products were exported on a great scale, but when it began to fear the young, vigorous, competition of the Flemings.
[A3-7-2] How frequently it happened in the conquests of the French revolution or of Napoleon, or when the Zollverein was extended, that two territories, now united to each other, feared an outflanking of their industries, each by the other, whose competition was formerly excluded; and that, afterwards, the abolition of the barriers to trade worked advantageously to both parties! (Dunoyer, Liberté du Travail, VII, ch. 3.) The Belgian manufacture of (coarse) porcelain flourished under Napoleon, spite of the competition of Sèvres. It declined after the separation from France, notwithstanding protective duties of 20 per cent. (Briavoinne, Industrie Belge, II, 483.) The French cotton manufacturers feared, in 1791, that the incorporation of Mülhausen would necessarily produce their downfall.
[A3-7-3] In Venice, the relations of a workman who had emigrated and refused to return home were imprisoned. If this was of no avail, the emigrant was to be put to death. (Daru, Hist. de V., III, 90.) It is said that this was still the practice in 1754. (Acad. des Sc. mor. et polit., 1866, I, 132.) Florence, in 1419, threatened its subjects who carried on the brocade or silk industry, in foreign countries, with death. Similarly, when the Nürnberg Rothgiessers were prohibited, under pain of the house of correction, showing their mills to a stranger. (Roth, Gesch. des N. Handles, III, 176.) In Belgium, enticing manufacturers of bone lace to emigrate was made punishable. Austrian prohibition for glass-makers, in 1752; for scythe-makers, in 1781. Colbert also approved of the imprisonment of manufacturers desirous to emigrate. (Lettres, etc., II, 568 ff.) By 5 Geo. I., ch. 28, and 23 Geo. II., ch. 13, the soliciting of an artificer to emigrate to foreign countries is punished by one year's imprisonment and £500 fine; and even workmen who do not respond to a call home within six months lose all their reachable property in England, and their capacity to inherit there. Every emigrant had to certify that he was no artificer. The only effect of this law was that the emigration of artificers to the United States was made by the way of Canada; the poorer ones, at most, were kept back by the cost of this circuitous route. Hence the law was repealed in 1825. Compare Edinb. Rev., XXXIX, p. 341 ff.
[A3-7-4] The first English prohibition of the exportation of machinery was made in reference to the Lee stocking frame, in 1696, the second in 1750; whereupon others followed very rapidly after 1774. As late as 1825, prohibitions of the exportation of a large number of machines and of parts of machines were still in force; but the Board of Trade might dispense with them. Here it was considered whether a greater disadvantage was caused to the industries by permitting the exportation, or to the manufacturers of the machines by prohibiting it. Porter, Progress, I, 318 ff., recommends full freedom of exportation especially for the reason that Englishmen can now procure all new machines, and sell the old ones to foreign countries. On the other hand, a French manufacturer purchased old machines parce que sous le système prohibitif je gagnerai encore de l'argent avec ces metiers. (Rau, Lehrbuch, II, § 209.) Similar cases in the United States. Cairnes, Principles, p. 485.
[A3-7-5] Bandrillart, Manuel, p. 299. Every nation needs, in order to become fully mature, an industry of some magnitude. But it may just as well be the silk industry as the cotton which shall lead to this maturity; and when the nation has much greater natural capacity for the former than for the latter, it would do well to reach its object by the shortest course.
[A3-7-6] Riehl, die deutsche Arbeit, p. 102 ff., 107. Shakespeare, the most English of Englishmen, and yet the most universal of poets! During the last centuries of the middle ages most nations had come to have national and even local costumes which were in strong contrast with the universality of fashions during the age of chivalry. This must have greatly contributed to the advancement of industry, even before the introduction of the state protective system.
[A3-7-7] How much more convenient it is for the statesman, when he does not need to give any thought to the education of industry, is shown, especially by the great difficulty of striking precisely the proper height of a protective tariff. If too low, it fails of its object; and so, likewise, if too high; because then, in a very unpedagogical way, it lulls one into a lazy security. And how impossible it is to make the tariff vary with every variation in the cost of production, in price, etc.; as List desired it should, not, however, without a good deal of variation in his own views. (Roscher, Gesch. der N. O., II, 989 seq.) How greatly would not List have been obliged to limit his assumptions, if he had lived to see the universal exposition of 1862, at which English connoisseurs expressed their pleasure that England had not remained behind France and Germany in locomotive building? (Ausland, 19 Oct., 1862.) Hence Schäffle opposes all protective duties as an educational measure, because the "protected" classes, by means of diets (Landtage), newspapers, etc. so greatly influence legislation; that is, the educator is influenced by the pupil! (System, 409 ff.) The usual calculation of the cost for home undertakers (Unternehmer) can always only strike the average, and hence it is too high for some and too low for others. (Rau, Lehrbuch, II, § 214.) It frequently occurs that large manufacturers already existing desire a low protective tariff to facilitate their competition with foreign countries, possible even without such tariff, but not high enough to encourage others to compete with them at home.
SECTION VIII.
INDUSTRIAL-PROTECTIVE POLICY IN PARTICULAR.