Philosophy and the Social Problem

by Will Durant

CONTENTS

PAGE
Introduction		[1]
[PART I]
HISTORICAL APPROACH
[CHAPTER I]
THE PRESENT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOCRATIC ETHIC
I.	History as rebarbarization	[5]
II.	Philosophy as disintegrator	[6]
III.	Individualism in Athens	[7]
IV.	The Sophists	[9]
V.	Intelligence as virtue	[12]
VI.	The meaning of virtue	[15]
VII.	“Instinct” and “reason”	[23]
VIII.	The secularization of morals	[27]
IX.	“Happiness” and “virtue”	[31]
X.	The Socratic challenge	[33]
[CHAPTER II]
PLATO: PHILOSOPHY AS POLITICS
I.	The man and the artist	[36]
II.	How to solve the social problem	[40]
III.	On making philosopher-kings	[44]
IV.	Dishonest democracy	[52]
V.	Culture and slavery	[55]
VI.	Plasticity and order	[60]
VII.	The meaning of justice	[62]
VIII.	The future of Plato	[64]
[CHAPTER III]
FRANCIS BACON AND THE SOCIAL POSSIBILITIES OF SCIENCE
I.	From Plato to Bacon	[67]
II.	Character	[69]
III.	The expurgation of the intellect	[70]
IV.	Knowledge is power	[74]
V.	The socialization of science	[76]
VI.	Science and Utopia	[79]
VII.	Scholasticism in science	[81]
VIII.	The Asiatics of Europe	[85]
[CHAPTER IV]
SPINOZA ON THE SOCIAL PROBLEM
I.	Hobbes	[90]
II.	The spirit of Spinoza	[91]
III.	Political ethics	[93]
IV.	Is man a political animal?	[95]
V.	What the social problem is	[98]
VI.	Free speech	[101]
VII.	Virtue as power	[105]
VIII.	Freedom and order	[108]
IX.	Democracy and intelligence	[112]
X.	The legacy of Spinoza	[115]
[CHAPTER V]
NIETZSCHE
I.	From Spinoza to Nietzsche	[117]
II.	Biographical	[120]
III.	Exposition	[126]
	1. Morality as impotence	[126]
	2. Democracy	[128]
	3. Feminism	[131]
	4. Socialism and anarchism	[133]
	5. Degeneration	[138]
	6. Nihilism	[141]
	7. The will to power	[143]
	8. The superman	[150]
	9. How to make supermen	[155]
	10. On the necessity of exploitation	[159]
	11. Aristocracy	[162]
	12. Signs of ascent	[165]
IV.	Criticism	[172]
V.	Nietzsche replies	[177]
VI.	Conclusion	[178]
[PART II]
SUGGESTIONS
[CHAPTER I]
SOLUTIONS AND DISSOLUTIONS
I.	The problem	[185]
II.	“Solutions”	[190]
	1. Feminism	[190]
	2. Socialism	[194]
	3. Eugenics	[198]
	4. Anarchism	[200]
	5. Individualism	[202]
	6. Individualism again	[202]
[CHAPTER II]
THE RECONSTRUCTIVE FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY
I.	Epistemologs	[214]
II.	Philosophy as control	[218]
III.	Philosophy as mediator between science and statesmanship	[222]
[CHAPTER III]
ORGANIZED INTELLIGENCE
I.	The need	[227]
II.	The organization of intelligence	[230]
III.	Information as panacea	[234]
IV.	Sex, art, and play in social reconstruction	[240]
V.	Education	[246]
[CHAPTER IV]
THE READER SPEAKS
I.	The democratization of aristocracy	[251]
II.	The professor as Buridan’s ass	[255]
III.	Is information wanted?	[257]
IV.	Finding Mæcenas	[261]
V.	The chance of philosophy	[264]
Conclusion		[268]

PART I
HISTORICAL APPROACH

PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL PROBLEM

INTRODUCTION

THE purpose of this essay is to show: first, that the social problem has been the basic concern of many of the greater philosophers; second, that an approach to the social problem through philosophy is the first condition of even a moderately successful treatment of this problem; and third, that an approach to philosophy through the social problem is indispensable to the revitalization of philosophy.

By “philosophy” we shall understand a study of experience as a whole, or of a portion of experience in relation to the whole.

By the “social problem” we shall understand, simply and very broadly, the problem of reducing human misery by modifying social institutions. It is a problem that, ever reshaping itself, eludes sharper definition; for misery is related to desire, and desire is personal and in perpetual flux: each of us sees the problem unsteadily in terms of his own changing aspirations. It is an uncomfortably complicated problem, of course; and we must bear in mind that the limit of our intention here is to consider philosophy as an approach to the problem, and the problem itself as an approach to philosophy. We are proposing no solutions.

Let us, as a wholesome measure of orientation, touch some of the mountain-peaks in philosophical history, with an eye for the social interest that lurks in every metaphysical maze. “Aristotle,” says Professor Woodbridge, “set treatise-writers the fashion of beginning each treatise by reviewing previous opinions on their subject, and proving them all wrong.”[1] The purpose of the next five chapters will be rather the opposite: we shall see if some supposedly dead philosophies do not admit of considerable resuscitation. Instead of trying to show that Socrates, Plato, Bacon, Spinoza, and Nietzsche were quite mistaken in their views on the social problem, we shall try to see what there is in these views that can help us to understand our own situation to-day. We shall not make a collection of systems of social philosophy; we shall not lose ourselves in the past in a scholarly effort to relate each philosophy to its social and political environment; we shall try to relate these philosophies rather to our own environment, to look at our own problems successively through the eyes of these philosophers. Other interpretations of these men we shall not so much contradict as seek to supplement.