Criminality and economic conditions

by Willem Adriaan Bonger

The irregularity is, then, only apparent; there is regularity in this sense, that the persons of average height predominate very greatly in number, and that the very short and very tall persons form minorities. This regularity in the individual differences, discovered by Quetelet, has been recognized as a universal law, applicable to everything living. The scientist named has demonstrated this not only for the height of the human body, but also for its weight, strength, quickness, etc.

Galton has proved the existence of this law for the intellectual capacity of man, and a number of other scientists have done the same for the animal and vegetable kingdoms.[330] Hence, “uniformity in variability” for all living nature must be considered as a universal law.

The same thing must be true for men’s moral qualities. In ranking any number of persons according to the intensity of their innate social sentiments (supposing it were possible to apply a measure to these), we should find that here also the law in question held good; with the great majority the social sentiments would have only a [[535]]moderate intensity, while there would be one small minority in which they would be weak, and another in which they would be very strong. We have no need to revert to the influence of the environment, for we have seen that it gives to all an egoistic or altruistic impulse, differing naturally according to the individual.[331] Supposing that the environment were the same for all, there would still be great differences between men as to the intensity of their social sentiments.

What is now the importance of this fact for the etiology of crime? In my opinion, the answer to this question will not be different from those which have been given to analogous questions when we were treating of the etiology of prostitution and alcoholism (pp. 407, 408 and 428), namely, that in every society, everywhere and always, an individual, according as his social sentiments are weaker or stronger than another’s, runs more or less risk than he of becoming a criminal, supposing the environment of the two to be the same in effect. The man who, according to the intensity of his social sentiments, would be placed in the line between A and B, would run more danger of becoming a criminal than the man who belonged between C and D. This point is of great importance for anyone who is investigating why the first falls into crime and not the latter. But it has little weight for criminal sociology, which concerns itself, not with definite persons, but only with general social facts.

The evidence that individuals differ quantitatively always and everywhere does not give the explanation of the problems whose solution sociology seeks, although they must be taken into account. The task that is incumbent upon it is to explain why individuals who, as a consequence of their innate qualities, run more danger than others of becoming criminals, actually become so. He who is born with weak social instincts runs more danger of becoming a criminal. But the certainty that he will become such does not exist—that depends upon the environment.

To sum up; I am of the opinion that individual differences are of great importance for one who is studying an individual by himself, but that they do not belong to the domain of the etiology of criminality. [[536]]

E. The Classification of Crime.

Before proceeding to the treatment of crimes separately, it is necessary to divide them into some main groups. It is a grave error (committed, however, by many criminologists) not to take account of the very different nature of crimes, if one is concerned with their etiology. It is, to be sure, permissible to treat conjointly moral forces which may prevent the execution of criminal ideas and which apply to all crimes. I have done so in the preceding pages. But we cannot treat the origin of the criminal idea itself in this same way. There are criminals and criminals. There are enormous differences between a professional thief, and a man who has been guilty of assault and battery in a state of intoxication, just as there are between a ravisher and a political criminal. And anyone who does not take account of these differences must necessarily limit himself to certain generalities.

I propose to treat of crimes divided into four categories in accordance with the motives which led their authors to commit them. Three of these categories form quite definite units, while the fourth is more heterogeneous.

The first is composed of crimes that have an economic aim (economic crimes). The greater part of the so-called crimes against property, such as theft, embezzlement, etc., belong to this category, but not all, for malicious mischief, for example, is generally dictated by a desire for vengeance. On the other hand some crimes against the person, like procuration, the object of which is economic and not sexual, belong here. As for crimes against the state, we must add counterfeiting to this category. Then there are other crimes that may be committed either for economic or non-economic reasons; for example, murder (for the purpose of robbery or for revenge), perjury (for the profit of winning a civil suit, or to prevent the conviction of a friend), arson (to get the insurance money, or for revenge), etc.