Lectures on the Philosophy and Practice of Slavery / As Exhibited in the Institution of Domestic Slavery in the United States, with the Duties of Masters to Slaves

by William A. Smith

Let no one imagine that this position conflicts with the well-known fact that man is a fallen being. For although fallen, he is still accountable. True, his moral nature is in ruins, but still it is a moral nature. Though disordered, it is not eradicated. Hence the restoration by grace is called a conversion; but if the essential moral nature of man had been destroyed by the fall, and an attribute of essential evil had taken the place of it, his restoration could not be called, as it is, a change, but should be called in the strictest sense an original creation. Hence, although man is fallen, depraved—and we need not object to the strong terms in which this depravity is usually expressed—still we find that the sentiment of all mankind is on the side of virtue, on the side of the good; and that men, though unchanged by sovereign grace, are still required to be honest, gentlemanly, and in all things regardful of each other’s rights. We admit of exceptions or modifications of this only in the case of those in whom humanity has not been fully developed, as before noticed, and those in civilized life who have so far abused their moral nature as, in the language of Paul, to fit themselves for destruction. Therefore, it still remains that the good in the form of rectitude, right, is in some modification an endowment of my nature: the right, in itself, is mine by nature.

But the good, as an attribute, is an active principle. We were endowed with it for the purpose of movement—for results. It is my duty to act right—straight, or in accordance with the good as a rule. Hence, whatever is a necessary condition of the operation of this active principle, the essential good, is in itself a good which is either in my possession, and hence is mine by possession; or it ought to be in my possession, and hence is mine by just title. Hence, to breathe, under all circumstances, together with all physical motion and the sustenance of the body, which involves the right of property to a certain extent, each in given circumstances, is the natural right of every one. So also the right of the embryo-man, the idiot, the imbecile, the uncivilized, or the savage, to protection and defence, is a natural right; and for the same reason, to be protected and defended from certain helpless conditions by others, is the natural right of every one in all states of humanity. Because each of these, and of all similar things, is in itself good, being a necessary condition of the operation of the essential good, and is either in our possession or ought to be in our possession; each one is also a natural right, the good that is or ought to be in our possession.

But there are acquired rights.

It is the duty of man to act, from the very fact that he is endowed with the attribute of the good, which envelops the idea of duty. He also has power to act from the very same natural constitution. Now, if he use this power as duty and rectitude indicate that he should do, all nature teaches, what the Bible confirms, that he will glorify God, i. e., exemplify his goodness, and therein promote his own happiness and the happiness of those with whom he is associated; or, in other words, he will secure for himself and confer upon his fellows eminent benefits resulting from the performance of his duty. Now, whatever results to him in this way is certainly his by possession, or by Divine grant, as much so as any natural right; but these benefits, being of the nature of the essential good, (for the reason that they are benefits, are in themselves right,) result to him in the performance of his duty, and therefore are his rights. But the acquisition is made to depend upon the exercise of his arbitrary volition. If he use this in pursuance of duty, they follow. If he use it in violation of duty, they do not follow. Hence, if he realize them at all, either by possession or by title, they are acquired, and therefore are acquired rights or benefits.

Therefore, acquired rights may be defined, such good, in the form of benefits or privileges, as results from the performance of duty. Logically, they belong to the class of the essential good called benefits or privileges, with the “essential difference” that they are such as result from the performance of duty. Any other result, though in itself of the nature of the essential good, yet, as it conferred no benefit, could not be said to be our right. Capital punishment, for example, when in accordance with the Divine will, is in itself of the nature of the essential good; still, it would be an abuse of language to say, in any ordinary case, that it was the right of the criminal to be hung! because for no reason that we can imagine does it confer any benefit or privilege upon the criminal. To be acquired rights, therefore, they must not only be of the nature of the good—that is, actual benefits—but this good must result from the performance of duty, and not from the non-performance of duty, as in the example given.

The definition corresponds with the language of common sense. All men, in speaking of cases which are supposed to involve the question of rights, employ the term in this sense. You say, of a farmer in a given case, that he had no right to an abundant harvest: why? because he neglected his farm: his lands were not properly prepared, and the growing crop was left open to depredations from stock: that is, he neglected his duty; he had no right to the benefit of an abundant harvest. And again, you say to a neighbor, You should have paid a certain sum of money to A., in a given case. He had a right to the money, because he complied with the conditions on which the money was to be paid. He did his duty, and therefore had a right to the money. Thus, the neglect of duty negatives right in the one case, and the performance affirms it in the other, according to the common usage of language.

Another idea which clearly enters into the common and correct use of this term is that it is reciprocal with obligation: that is, wherever there is a right in one person, there is a corresponding obligation, duty, upon others. If one man has a right to an estate, others are under obligation, that is, it is their duty, to abstain from it. If the letting of it alone be the result of duty on the part of others, the enjoyment of it by him must also result from duty on his part, or the ideas do not coincide: that which was duty in one set of men would not be duty in another, in regard to the same thing, and in correlative circumstances. This would be absurd: therefore, the duty of one set of men to let another alone in the enjoyment of a certain benefit, implies the correlative idea that they enjoy the benefit in virtue of doing their duty. Hence, those benefits which are our rights result to us from the performance of our duty.

The points established in this discussion are:

1. That conformity to what is ordered or commanded is not the true generic idea of the right in itself. What is ordered or commanded can only interpret the right, when the command itself conforms to the essential good, as in the case of the Divine will. This is always right, because it so conforms, or is always an expression of the essential good.