Lectures on the Philosophy and Practice of Slavery / As Exhibited in the Institution of Domestic Slavery in the United States, with the Duties of Masters to Slaves

by William A. Smith

“Master. The Latin is magister, compounded of the root of magis, major, greater; and the Teutonic, ster, Saxon, steoran, to steer.” The word, then, signifies a chief director—one who governs or directs either men or business. The leading idea is that of governor by his own will.

Slave. The derivation of this word is not a settled question. There is no difficulty, however, in fixing the meaning—one who is subject to the will or direction of another.

As a concrete, master means one who is governing in some particular instance or form by his own will; and slave, one who is so governed in some particular instance. But these are abstract terms. The ideas they convey may be conceived and held in the mind, apart from any particular application of the one or the other. And whether they are considered as abstract or concrete terms, they are correlatives—the one implies the other.

A system of slavery is a state or order of things established by law or custom, in which one set of men are the masters to a given extent, and another are the slaves to that extent.

Domestic slavery is an instance in which the order or state of things constituting the system itself, is made a part of the family relation. The head of the family is the master, and the slave is subject, as to the use of his time and labor, to the control of the master, as the other members of the family. Domestic slavery, therefore, is one of the forms of the general system of slavery. The system has existed under various forms. The ancient system of villanage in England, of serfdom in Russia, the peon system of Mexico, as well as domestic slavery in the United States, are all examples of slavery proper. This leads us to remark that the terms master and slave are not only abstract but general abstract terms: general, because the abstract ideas they convey are common to each of these conditions. Each of these systems is pervaded by generic principles or ideas, which classify the whole as belonging to the same genus—system of slavery. The abstract principle of slavery is therefore the general idea, which is enveloped alike in each and every form or system of slavery. Hence, as the abstract idea of master is governing by one’s own will, and that of slave is submission or subjection to such control; and as a system of slavery is a condition into which these ideas enter in correlation—it follows that the abstract principle of slavery is the general principle of submission or subjection to control by the will of another. This is the fundamental idea which is common to every form of slavery. No condition into which this does not enter as a fundamental idea is a state of slavery. Every condition into which it enters is a state of slavery to the extent in which it does so enter.

Submission or subjection to control by the will of another being our definition of the abstract principle of the system of slavery, two questions arise: First—Is this a correct definition? and second—If it be correct, is it a sound, legitimate principle, which may and ought to be adopted in practice, whenever it may be wise to do so?

First—Is the definition correct?

Subjection is the being put under the control of another. Submission is the delivery of one’s self to the control of another. The one implies the consent of the will, and the other does not. That subjection is an idea which fulfils the condition of slavery will not be disputed by any. Hence our definition is sufficiently wide to embrace that which is conceded by all. But our definition gives much greater breadth to the principle. It takes in submission as well as subjection. It assumes that the willing or the nilling of the subject of this form of control does not necessarily enter into the principle which logically defines it. He who is subjected to such control is a slave; and he who submits to such control is not the less so. This principle might therefore be still further generalized—control by the will of another, with its correlative idea submission or subjection only implied. But we prefer to define it in the terms employed, as being more likely to be appreciated in the sense intended. Are we correct in giving this wide compass of meaning to the principle in question? Do we assume too much when we say that a man is not the less a captive, and subject to the control of the captor, because he voluntarily gives himself up as such? Is a man then the less a slave who voluntarily consents to be controlled by the will of another? The popular use of terms in all languages shows that mankind have conceded this point. They all apply the idea of slave to such a case. Nay, more, they furnish a constructive meaning of the term based upon this meaning. They call a man a “slave to his passions,” who has voluntarily given himself up to be controlled in his future volitions by his passions as the subjective motive of his actions. “No bondage is more grievous than that which is voluntary,” says Seneca. “To be a slave to the passions is more grievous than to be a slave to a tyrant,” says Pythagoras. “No one can be free who is intent on the indulgence of evil passions,” says Plato. And Cicero says, “All wicked men are slaves.” St. Paul, Rom. vi. 16, uses the term in the same sense, and with the greatest propriety: “Know ye not that to whom ye yield yourselves servants [δούλους, slaves] to obey, his servants [slaves] ye are to whom ye obey; whether of sin unto death, or obedience unto righteousness?” (See Dr. A. Clarke, in loc.) And again, Ephesians vi. 5-7: “Servants, [δοῦλοι.] be obedient to them that are your masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your hearts as unto Christ: not with eye-service, as men-pleasers, but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart; with good will doing service, as to the Lord, and not to men.” Doing the will of God—with good will. We must certainly understand that it was the duty of those slaves to give both assent and consent to their condition, as a thing coming to them in the order of God’s providence, and pleasing to him; and therefore serve their masters with the same willing obedience, because therein they were serving the Lord. For these persons, we may suppose, were originally made slaves by subjection. They are exhorted to submit themselves not only to the particular commands of their masters, but also to their providential condition. The commands of their masters might be obeyed from mere prudential considerations. In this case, their obedience would be without the religious element. Paul exhorts them to religious obedience. Many, no doubt, obeyed: gave the consent of their wills, as they gave the assent of their understandings; and hence, cheerfully submitting to their providential condition as from the Lord, they obeyed their masters “in singleness of heart, as unto Christ.” They submitted, as any other good man submits, with consent as well as assent to his providential condition, and goes forth to the duties of that condition with a cheerful heart. Their condition was therefore changed from that of subjection to one of submission, and for as long a time as God might be pleased to continue it. Did they, by reason of such submission, cease to be slaves? Certainly not. They were slaves when in a state of subjection. They were not the less so when, from the high Christian motives commanded by the apostle, their condition was changed to one of submission. Be this, however, as it may, the following case is decisive of the whole question. The ancient Jew, who gave himself into slavery, was not the less a slave because he did it voluntarily; and the Mosaic law provided that such should be held and treated as slaves in perpetuity. See Exodus xxi. 5, 6: “And if the servant shall plainly say, I love my master, my wife, and my children: I will not go out free; then his master shall bring him unto the judges: he shall also bring him unto the door, or to the door-post; and his master shall bore his ear through with an awl; and he shall serve him for ever.” Thus the law of God made a man a slave who became so by his own voluntary act. A state of submission, therefore, to control by the will of another, is no less a state of slavery than a state of subjection. If the state itself be one of slavery, the idea, submission, which makes it so, is in this case an element of the system. Hence, the true philosophical definition of the principle, as before stated, is control by the will of another, with its correlative (subjection, or submission, as the case might be) implied. It may be the one; it may be the other; and whichever it is in a given case, is the mere logical accident of that case, and does not at all affect the principle itself.

As the whole of the abstract idea of the system of slavery is to be found in the terms master and slave in correlation; and submission and subjection to control by the will of another is the whole idea contained in the correlative sense of these terms, (certainly nothing more and nothing less,) the definition given is the whole, and nothing more, of the abstract principle of the institution. Whoever is in this condition is to that extent a slave. Whatever system envelops this principle—it matters not what form it may take, what coincident principles it may include, or what name may be given to it, or how far the practical working of this principle may be modified—it is nevertheless to the extent that this principle enters into it a system of slavery. It may be a wise system, because it is a necessary means for the accomplishment of some desirable end; or it may be an unwise system, because it is a means unsuited to the end proposed. But neither hypothesis will at all affect the principle. That is the same in the one case as in the other; that is, whether it be abused or properly used, the principle itself is the same. But can it be properly used at all? This leads to the second inquiry—Is this a sound, legitimate principle, which may and should be adopted in practice whenever it may be wise to do so?